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Introduction 
“What a wee little part of a person’s life are his acts and his words! His real life is led in his 
head, and is known to none but himself…. His acts and his words are merely the visible, thin 
crust of his world, with its scattered snow summits and its vacant wastes of water – and they 
are so trifling a part of his bulk! a mere skin enveloping it. The mass of him is hidden.” 
 
Mark Twain, Early Fragments 1870-1877 
 
It sounds like the perfect stuff for fiction, a story that combines the best ingredients of an 
adventure novel à la Lord of the flies and intelligent science-fiction like Skinner’s Walden II: 
Opacity island – a beautiful tropical island in the no man’s land of the South Pacific, 
surrounded by turquoise lagoons, inhabited by people who live together with their extended 
families in relatively small village compounds along the coastline and who never try to assess 
what is in another person’s mind. They do not guess what another person might think or feel 
and they describe themselves as navigating through the social world without something we 
would call empathy. Is there an island, hidden in the middle of the Pacific, where people live 
autistically together? How can they interact with each other when all attempts to “mindread” 
are missing? When nobody attempts to put him- or herself in another’s shoes? 
When running over the pages of some recent anthropological writings about the so-called 
“doctrine of the opacity of other minds” (Robbins & Rumsey, 2008), one is inclined to 
consider this exotic kind of scenario to be true. Somewhere, in a far away land, things seem to 
be very different. At least at first glance. A closer look at the matter, however, suggests that 
the anthropological observations might not be that exotic. However, they seem to carry the 
potential to think about some very hotly debated questions in the field of social cognition 
from a new – a cross-cultural – perspective. The opacity doctrine refers to “the assertion, 
widespread in the societies of the Pacific, that it is impossible or at least extremely difficult to 
know what other people think or feel” (ibid., pp. 407-408). According to Robbins and 
Rumsey,  
 
opacity doctrines ought to force a rethinking of some fairly settled approaches to topics 
such as the nature of theories of mind, the role of intention in linguistic communication and 
social interaction more generally, and the importance of empathy in human encounters and 
in anthropological method. In all of these areas, Pacific assumptions about the 
impossibility of knowing the minds of others fundamentally contradict social scientific 
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models that assume such knowledge is possible, and that further assume that gaining such 
knowledge stands universally as a regulating ideal for human beings in engagement with 
their fellows. (ibid., p. 408) 
 
Interestingly, in mentioning theory of mind, the role of intention in linguistic communication 
and social interaction as areas where it is assumed that knowing other minds is possible, 
Robbins and Rumsey seem to aim at a very special conceptualization of linguistic 
communication and social interaction, namely, one that appears to be strongly influenced by 
the first term mentioned in the row: theory of mind (ToM). Do the authors claim that opacity 
phenomena make it questionable whether ToM really is the basis of social understanding and 
interaction? One could argue, however, that it is precisely the difficulty to know what other 
people think or feel that requires us from very early on to develop a ToM. But do the authors 
really refer to the same theory of mind conception as cognitive scientists and developmental 
psychologists? I think they do. Schieffelin, another anthropologist contributing to the issue on 
the opacity of other minds, writes that opacity assertions have “caused some scholars to 
question the universality of theory of mind, to ask whether theory of mind is innate or 
socialized, and to puzzle over how intersubjectivity is achieved in such communities” 
(Schieffelin, 2008, p. 431). Robbins and Rumsey do either deliberately allude to the theory of 
mind framework, or they are indeed strongly influenced by it. This is supported by their 
following questions: 
 
Can our theories imagine that we might approach other people without assuming that we 
can know something about what goes on in their heads? Or that we might interpret their 
speech without explicitly making guesses about their intentions producing it? Or that we 
can get along with others without assuming that we can replicate their thoughts and 
feelings within ourselves as a way of understanding how things are with them? Could we 
ever cooperate with each other without being able to mind-read on all these levels? At 
least as they talk about their lives, many people in the Pacific appear to answer yes to 
these questions. (Robbins & Rumsey, 2008, pp. 408-409) 
 
In raising these questions, Robbins and Rumsey connect to the ongoing debate about how 
much “mindreading” is needed in order to interact socially. For example, varieties of the first 
question are also at the heart of the debate between cognitivists and embodiment theorists, the 
latter arguing that social interaction runs smoothly and does not require the interactional 
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partners to constantly think about what is going on in the other’s head. The second question is 
hotly discussed within the field of pragmatics. While some scholars are arguing that 
interpreting speech does not require us to consider the intentions lying behind a certain speech 
act (e.g. Gauker, 2001), most think that we couldn’t fully interpret the meaning of speech 
without grasping the other’s intentions (cf. Grice, 1989), and some even suggest that 
“pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind-reading” (Sperber & Wilson, 2002, 
p. 3) so that ToM becomes a necessary precondition for pragmatic interpretation to be 
possible. Leudar and Costall say that “Grice provided psychology with a system which 
mentalizes communication” (2004, p. 612). ToM became so popular that followers of Grice 
like Sperber and Wilson “now refer to the inference of communicative intentions as 
‘mindreading’” (ibid., p. 612). Pragmatics is therefore a good example that proves how theory 
of mind ideas have influenced other academic disciplines. The third question raised above is 
very much inspired by simulationist accounts: within the field of theory of mind, two major 
theories try to explain how people manage to explain and predict observed behaviour in 
mentalistic terms, namely, theory theory and simulation theory. The fourth question explicitly 
uses the term mindreading – again a clear reference to the theory of mind framework (see 
chapter 2).  
The same questions are at the heart of a growing interdisciplinary field interested in the topic 
of intersubjectivity, a field that is occupied by neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, 
developmental psychologists and philosophers from the analytical and phenomenological 
tradition – anthropologists were hitherto either ignored or remained silent themselves. 
The fact that the very same questions are now raised by cultural anthropologists is interesting 
and gives rise to various suppositions. It might indicate that there exists another, hitherto 
neglected perspective that could potentially shed a different light on the matter. As already 
mentioned, however, it might also turn out that it shows nothing more than how widespread 
current cognitivist ideas about how we come to understand other minds actually are and that 
they have already influenced researchers in other disciplines like cultural anthropology. 
Robbins and Rumsey might also strategically allude to this debate in order to call the other 
researchers’ attention to cultural anthropology as another discipline worth listening to. In any 
case, the alleged phenomenon of an opacity of mind turns out to be a meeting point where 
different conceptions of mind, intersubjectivity, sociality and empathy converge and collide.  
The aim of this work is to clarify whether the implications of opacity reports are really as far-
reaching as suggested by Robbins and Rumsey. To clarify this is important, since opacity 
claims are more than a peculiar feature of some Pacific islands – according to Rumsey, the 
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opacity claim “is in fact one of the most widely attested commonplaces in the folk 
psychologies of the world” (2011, p. 222). Such claims are not only common in many 
societies of the Southern Pacific, they are also pervasive in Central America, a region that 
does not have very much in common with the Southern Pacific. Kevin Groark tells us that 
“strikingly similar “opacity ideologies” have been documented among Mayan-speaking 
groups in highland and lowland settings throughout Southern Mexico, Belize, and Guatemala” 
(2011, p. 3). 
In suggesting that the opacity of other minds phenomenon might shed new light on the theory 
of mind framework, however, Robbins and Rumsey (2008) did probably not consider that 
experimental psychologists might turn the tables, stick to the ToM framework and interpret 
the opacity phenomenon from within this framework. This would open up the possibility for a 
reinterpretation of the opacity phenomenon in terms of theory of mind, since representatives 
of the challenged ToM might give priority to their theoretical assumptions about the 
universality of ToM and consequently interpret the opacity phenomenon as something like a 
theory of mind deficit. This is certainly not what Robbins and Rumsey intended and maybe 
they did not foresee this. Ironically, Robbins and Rumsey opened up the possibility for a 
reductionist reinterpretation of an anthropological phenomenon – and this is clearly not 
something cultural anthropologists usually aim for.  
Robbins and Rumsey make things even more complicated in saying that a “final area of 
theoretical and methodological concern to which Pacific opacity ideas are relevant is that of 
empathy” (2008, p. 415). Claims about the opacity or unknowability of other persons’ minds 
can also be found in a recent issue of Ethos on empathy edited by Hollan and Throop (2008) 
as well as in a recent book with the title The anthropology of empathy edited by the same 
authors (2011). The anthropological reports presented in chapter 4 were either published in of 
the two publications just mentioned or in the Anthropological Quarterly issue on the opacity 
of other minds edited by Robbins and Rumsey (2008). At the end of chapter 4, it will be 
evident to the reader that it makes very much sense to discuss these contributions together. 
Finally, opacity claims are interesting with respect to their impact on theory of mind and 
empathy. Still, it makes sense already at this point to shortly demonstrate how closely both 
topics are related to each other. Kevin Groark, for example, who contributes to the Ethos issue 
on empathy, focuses very much on “social opacity” among the Tzotzil Maya (Groark, 2008) 
and links both empathy and opacity in the title of his article Social opacity and the dynamics 
of empathic in-sight among the Tzotzil Maya of Chiapas, Mexico. Both Feinberg (2011) and 
Throop (2008) published their articles in the publications which focus on empathy – 
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nevertheless, they confirm opacity claims and could easily have been part of the issue on the 
opacity of other minds as well. Talking about his contribution, Feinberg says that it “shares 
with most other chapters in this collection a concern with the impenetrability of other people’s 
thoughts and feelings - the “opacity of other minds”” (2011, p. 152). Lepowsky, to give 
another example, explicitly suggests to explore the implications of opacity ideologies for the 
concept of empathy (2011, p. 44) and ends up talking more about the scope of opacity 
ideologies than about empathy. On the other hand, Robbins and Rumsey suggested that 
opacity doctrines do also force a rethinking of the importance of empathy and that those 
people who hold opacity doctrines “often describe their approaches to the world as ones that 
do not involve empathy” (Robbins & Rumsey, 2008, p. 416). Hollan and Throop are 
absolutely right in saying that these reports “are quite diverse in terms of the methods and 
analytical strategies utilized, the range of empathic behaviors observed or reported on, their 
rhetorical styles, and even their length” (2008, p. 390). More to the point: “All of this 
complexity is daunting” (ibid., p. 391). 
What needs to be done is therefore as obvious as it is difficult. We need to clarify what the 
phenomenon of the opacity of other minds really is. Moreover, we must examine the 
relationship between both theory of mind and empathy and the specific contexts in which 
opacity claims were observed as well as the local theories and cultural patterns that gave rise 
to them. Such an endeavour is doomed to failure without clear-cut definitions of what is 
meant by theory of mind, empathy, and, of course, opacity of mind. Yet we will see that clear-
cut definitions in this research area are hard to get. All this will require conceptual as well as 
textual work and critical analyses of existing anthropological data. It might also be reasonable 
to focus on a specific locale, since it is an open question whether the opacity of other minds 
phenomenon is the same across cultures. A clarification of what opacity in a specific locale is 
and how it relates to ToM requires the application of experimental methods as well. 
Therefore, the present study works with a combination of methods.  
While it is the main goal of this work to use the case of Samoa for a clarification of how ToM, 
empathy and opacity doctrines interrelate, I pursue some intermediate goals on the way which 
contribute to ongoing discussions in the field of ToM and empathy research. These sub-goals 
are an important part of this work. The first sub-goal is to demonstrate how the notion of 
opacity automatically gives credit to the ToM framework. The second will be to provide 
better conceptual tools for the ToM and mindreading debate and to bring these concepts 
closer to our lifeworld. The third goal is to provide a definition of empathy which is broad 
enough to include anthropologically reported forms of empathy and narrow enough to 
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distinguish it from related concepts. A final goal will be to critically discuss certain 
interpretations of cross-cultural false belief results. 
In chapter 1, I will write about the terms opacity and transparency and how they are 
commonly used. I will argue that the term opacity of other minds implies that the mind is 
hidden inside an opaque container or behind something like an opaque barrier and that the 
mere usage of the term opacity of other minds thus suggests to consider observable behaviour 
and mental states as two separate things. This basic assumption characterizes the ToM 
framework, which I will critically discuss in chapter 2. The notions of mental state attribution 
and mental state inference for the purpose of behaviour prediction and explanation will be 
identified as the core of ToM. I will demonstrate that the terms mental state attribution and -
inference are often used interchangeably and argue that they should be distinguished. The 
more popular term ‘mindreading’ will be identified as a term which contains the basic ideas of 
ToM while suggesting that something like a direct, telepathic access to others’ minds is 
possible. I will criticize this and contrast the ‘mindreading’ account with ideas from the 
phenomenological tradition which stress the possibility of a direct perception of others’ 
mental states via their expressive behaviour. In the course of chapter 2, I will try to develop a 
‘conceptual tool kit’ for a more exact description of what is going on in social encounters. 
Chapter 2 will end with definitions for the terms “contextreading”, “direct perception”, 
“mental state attribution”, “mental state talk”, “mindguessing”, “mental state inference”, and 
“false belief understanding”. This conceptual tool kit is, I think, better suited for the 
description of concrete social phenomena than the slippery and too broad notion of 
‘mindreading’. Chapter 3 will sketch different uses of the term empathy and critically discuss 
some of its definitions. I will try to narrow down the use of this concept by distinguishing it 
from the concepts that are usually associated with the ‘mindreading’-account and by 
suggesting that it is helpful to consider empathy as a primarily compassionate response that is 
typically present when encountering another human being. While we can determine via direct 
perception, contextreading and mental state inference what another person feels and why, I 
will argue that empathy helps us to assess the ‘how-aspect’ of another’s experience. Since the 
concept of empathy carries a lot of semantic shadings that are typical for Western culture, I 
will treat this definition as an interim result which must be adjusted to what other cultures 
have to say. Therefore, I will summarize various anthropological reports in chapter 4 and 
deduce how the authors use the term empathy and what they identify as local forms of 
empathy. Moreover, these contributions will be analyzed with respect to what they tell us 
about ‘mindreading’ and how the authors interpret the reported opacity claims. At the end of 
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this chapter, I will argue that these reports do not force us to rethink theory of mind – 
however, they help us to refine and enrich our view on empathy. One important insight of the 
anthropological authors is that people in many locales present something like an “opaque 
exterior” (Throop, 2008, p. 415) towards others, which makes mutual understanding more 
difficult. The chapter will end with a refined definition of empathy that is also valid for places 
where people demonstrate opaque exteriors. Since this chapter deals with a variety of 
different anthropological reports, it remains an open question whether what has been deduced 
from different reports does also apply to a single case. Therefore, the rest of this work will 
focus on Samoa. Chapter 5 will provide some basic information on Samoa and argue that 
Samoa is a suitable candidate for investigating the relationship between opacity claims, ToM 
and empathy. After talking about social structure and childhood in Samoa, I will present 
different concepts of Samoan folk psychology and focus on Samoan socialization practices. 
Against this detailed background, I will then turn to ‘mindreading’ and empathy in Samoa in 
order to spell out how they relate to opacity claims in this specific locale. While some final 
conclusions can already be drawn at this point, it remains an open question how false belief 
understanding – as one aspect of what is commonly associated with ‘mindreading’ – develops 
in Samoa. The second, empirical part of this work will therefore focus on false belief 
understanding among Samoan children. Finally, a synthesis of the theoretical and empirical 
part will summarize this work before I end with the discussion. 
Before getting started, some preliminary reflections are necessary. The present study works 
with concepts from Western scientific practice (ToM, mindreading, empathy) in places with a 
very different cultural background and contrasts concepts that are specific to a certain locale 
with our own. This is not without problems. Kenneth Pike (cf. 1967) derived the terms emic 
and etic from the linguistic terms phonemic and phonetic. In cultural anthropology, these 
terms soon became popular heuristic tools to distinguish between two perspectives or stances 
anthropologists might take up towards their “data”. Emic accounts describe behaviours of 
persons and cultural phenomena among certain groups in terms that are meaningful to these 
persons and to these groups, i.e., they try to adopt the others’ point of view and provide an 
account that is in line with the concepts of the persons observed. The primary method is 
participant observation, since it provides insights in how people from other cultures talk and 
conceptualize phenomena. Etic accounts, on the other hand, use the vocabulary and concepts 
of the person who observes, i.e., the cultural anthropologist. He applies terms from his own 
background to other cultures. Etic accounts try to be culturally neutral and to use a 
terminology that is transferable. In Pike’s words: 
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It proves convenient – though partially arbitrary – to describe behavior from two different 
standpoints, which lead to results which shade into one another. The etic viewpoint studies 
behavior as from outside of a particular system, and as an essential initial approach to an 
alien system. The emic viewpoint results from studying behavior as from inside the 
system. (1967, p. 37) 
 
There are good reasons to be careful when it comes to simple dichotomies. Headland notes 
that both terms are rather used “as a heuristic device” (1990, p. 18) and Pike emphasizes “that 
etic and emic data do not constitute a rigid dichotomy of bits of data, but often present the 
same data from two points of view” (Pike, 1967, p. 41).  
The attempt to contribute to scientific debates with an emic approach faces a serious problem 
if not a paradox. Let’s take the example of empathy. If cultural anthropologists do not start 
with a pre-given, Western concept or definition of empathy, but collect local data and 
phenomena which have their own names (for example: the Samoan alofa or Anutan aropa), 
how can they claim to contribute to empathy research? What could justify such a claim? How 
can they even correlate, associate or contrast observed phenomena with the Western notion of 
empathy without any preexistent conceptions of what empathy in a specific locale might be? 
A solution to this problem was suggested by Berry (1969), who says that anthropologists are 
first equipped with an emic concept of their own culture, which is then used as if it were etic, 
so to speak – at least, it serves as an “etic orientation” (Berry, 1990, p. 90). In doing so, the 
researcher has a valid basis for studying a phenomenon in another culture and judging how it 
differs from one’s own emic concept. Berry referred to this approach as an imposed etic one 
(1969, p. 124). The paradoxical structure of anthropological research is, viewed in this light, 
not a problem – it is, in a sense, what makes research cross-cultural. In Berry’s words: “We 
cannot be “cultural” without some notion like emic; and we cannot be “cross” without some 
notion like etic” (1990, p. 93). Correspondingly, the anthropological accounts presented in 
this work (especially in chapter 4) try to approach opacity, mindreading and empathy from 
both an emic and etic perspective. I will try to distinguish between the authors’ own emic 
concepts which they use as imposed etics and emic concepts of the culture studied. Likewise, 
my own definition of empathy provided in chapter 3 will be treated as an imposed etic 
concept. However, in comparison with the derived emic concepts in chapter 4 and the derived 
Samoan concepts in chapter 5, this definition will be refined and adapted to the derived 
concepts in order to develop a definition that is as cross-culturally valid as possible. 
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A scientific comparative approach that is interested in emic concepts thus works as follows: 
 
It involves setting aside one’s own cultural baggage (using imposed etic concepts and 
tools) and becoming thoroughly familiar with the new culture, to the point where valid 
knowledge is attained with an emic approach (usually through observation, participation, 
and other ethnographic methods). Once this is accomplished, the researchers have two 
conceptual systems at their disposal, and the act of comparison demands that they be 
brought into touch with each other. If they remain totally mutually exclusive, there is no 
possibility of comparison. However, if there are some features in common, comparison is 
possible, but only for these shared features; the common aspects for which comparison 
takes place were indicated by the term derived etic. That is, there are features that exist not 
only within one culture but also outside it. (Berry, 1990, p. 91)  
 
Finally, I have to say a few words about some terms and how they will be used. This work 
deals with a lot of terms and expressions that are problematic or not well defined. It is one 
goal of this work to improve this situation, but for the time being, their use cannot always be 
avoided. The term ‘mindreading’ will be criticized in chapter 2. Nevertheless, I will use it in 
subsequent chapters in inverted commas to refer to the different aspects which are usually 
associated with it and which I will spell out more precisely at the end of the second chapter. 
Whenever I use the term “opacity claim”, I refer to claims like those mentioned in the present 
introductory chapter by Robbins and Rumsey, i.e. to “the assertion, widespread in the 
societies of the Pacific, that it is impossible or at least extremely difficult to know what other 
people think or feel” (Robbins & Rumsey, 2008). Speaking of “opacity literature”, I refer to 
the different anthropological contributions which focus either on the opacity of other minds 
phenomenon, local forms of empathy in the light of this phenomenon, or on relevant literature 
on Samoa, mainly the work of Alessandro Duranti, Bradd Shore, Elinor Ochs, Eleanor Ruth 
Gerber and Jeanette Mageo, although it is only Duranti who explicitly uses the term opacity. 
Whenever I speak of opacity, I refer to the alleged difficulty in assessing and talking about 
other people’s mental states in the respective cultural environments.  
Another term deserves further attention. Robbins & Rumsey (2008) speak of the doctrine of 
the opacity of other minds (2008). The word doctrine comes from the Latin doctrina and is 
used in a variety of different contexts. Robbins & Rumsey do not further justify their use of 
the term, however, it usually refers to a system of beliefs and teachings. Although the authors 
do not explicitly say so, the fact that they use the term “doctrine” suggests that the 
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phenomenon observed might be deep-seated in the societies at issue, and that it might 
furthermore be endorsed and put forward by commonly shared values and beliefs one must 
stick to. The term might even suggest that people who do not stick to it might be negatively 
sanctioned. I do not think that this is a very felicitous term. We will see in chapter 4 that the 
opacity of other minds is asserted in many places although people do engage in 
‘mindreading’-practices. Moreover, assertions of opacity are often context-specific. 
Therefore, I think that the term exaggerates the importance of opacity claims – at least in 
some places.1  
Samoan terms will be introduced in italics. The Samoan translation for English terms or 
concepts is often put in parentheses. Whenever there is no specific reference provided for 
such a translation, I bear on the well-established Samoan Dictionary (Milner,1993). 
 
                                                          
1
 Interestingly, Gilbert Ryle begins his famous book The concept of mind with a chapter called “The Official 
doctrine” (cf. 2009). In this chapter, Ryle critically discusses Descartes’ separation between mind and body and 
refers to this official and influential doctrine “with deliberate abusiveness, as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the 
Machine’” (ibid., 2009). This is interesting, since we will see in chapter 1 that the term ‘opacity of other minds’ 
suggests precisely this: to consider of mind and body as separate. However, I do not know whether Robbins and 
Rumsey (2008) allude to Ryle or whether this is mere coincidence.  
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1. Opacity and opacity of other minds 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the terms opacity and opacity of other minds. Both 
expressions are not as clearly established as ‘mindreading’, theory of mind, or empathy. 
Therefore, it is not possible to provide definitions of what opacity could possibly mean in a 
research field where people are interested in how we come to understand other minds. There 
are no definitions for the term opacity of other minds – unfortunately, Robbins and Rumsey 
(2008) launched this term without defining it. And many authors who contribute to the debate 
on the opacity of other minds phenomenon uncritically adopted the term. Therefore, I will 
start by analyzing how we commonly use terms like opacity and transparency. After doing so, 
I will ask whether it makes sense to speak of an opacity of other minds. Finally, the notion of 
“referential opacity” will shortly be introduced – a notion that will directly lead us to the 
subsequent chapter on theory of mind. 
1.1 Opacity and transparency 
In optics, the term opacity refers to the degree to which light is allowed to travel through 
matter. In everyday speech, we say that something is opaque if it is difficult to see through or 
perceive. We use the term when we speak of surfaces, barriers, or containers. The everyday 
use of the terms opacity and transparency identifies them as visual metaphors. Surfaces and 
barriers can be opaque, transparent, or something in between. Opacity and its counterpart 
transparency represent poles on a continuum with full opacity (a massive door, painted black) 
at one end and full transparency (a window after the window cleaner has just left) on the 
other. Let us take a cup as an example. A cup can be transparent like those you use for a 
delicious Latte Macchiato or it can be opaque like a mug for the nasty black coffee they 
provide you at your office. In the first case, there is little doubt about the content of the cup. 
You can directly perceive the white layer of milk and the layer of coffee in light brown and 
infer that it is probably coffee (or at least something that looks very much like it). In the 
second case, it is not so easy. You can stick to a rule and assume that there is coffee in the 
mug because that is what mugs are usually used for. But you cannot be sure. Someone might 
have run out of glasses and put his tomatoe juice inside. A closer look at the context might be 
helpful. If it is early in the morning and if the mug is in the middle of a breakfast table you 
might bet that there is coffee inside. If there are, however, wine glasses and bowls with olives 
on the same table while the full moon is shining brightly through one of the windows, you are 
probably less sure and might wonder whether there is wine in the mug – this student’s kitchen 
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might have run out of wine glasses. Importantly, opacity in this example refers not to the 
contained (latte macchiato or coffee) but to that which contains (cup or mug), i.e. the 
container. This gives rise to the question whether we could use the terms opaque or 
transparent as well to refer to whatever is in a container. Let’s think of coffee mugs again. For 
example, we could say that the liquid inside a mug is opaque in the case of black coffee and 
transparent in the case of mineral water, independent of whether the mug itself is opaque or 
transparent. Yet if we say that the coffee inside a mug is opaque, we do apparently say 
something that is different from saying that it is black. We imply something that goes beyond 
the simple statement that it is black, since we refer to the coffee’s capacity to conceal 
something, to the fact that it is difficult to perceive something through it. Imagine a blowfly 
just drowned in one of two liquids in a transparent mug. If it drowned in mineral water, you 
would still see the blowfly because the glass and the liquid are transparent. If it drowned in 
black coffee, however, you would probably not see it, although the glass, i.e. the container, is 
transparent. In this example, we are in fact now dealing with two containers, simply because 
the introduction of a drowning blowfly has transformed what was called the contained into a 
second container: the liquid has now become a “container”, a containing substance for the 
contained blowfly. Now imagine that the blowfly drowned in mineral water and imagine that 
its body parts were transparent, too. We might then be able to see its gastric content, but this 
content could be transparent as well and so on. To speak of something contained as being 
either opaque or transparent does therefore only make sense if the contained thing can 
principally contain something else, or, more precisely, if it can conceal or reveal something 
potentially lying behind it. Of course, the same line of reasoning equally applies to a barrier 
with something lying behind it. The terms opacity and transparency are therefore used for 
barriers, surfaces, substances or containers that have the potential to reveal of hide something 
else in or behind them. We use them to refer to objects’ potential to become a container or 
barrier and thus specify their potential to reveal or hide something and implicitly treat them as 
being 1) either a (potential) container for or 2) a (potential) barrier to something else. 
1.2 Opacity of other minds 
Let us now come to the crucial question, namely, whether it makes any sense to speak of an 
opacity of other minds. If the above analysis of the word opaque is correct, then the mere use 
of the term “opacity of other minds” does either imply 1) that the mind of another person is 
contained in something opaque or hidden behind something opaque, or 2) that the mind is an 
opaque container for other things. In this view, the mind can somehow be seen but not its 
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contents, as the mind would be an opaque container for thoughts, emotions, intentions, etc. 
With regard to 1), the container or barrier would be our body and its overt behaviour, our 
gestures, facial expressions and everything that can be perceived from the outside. The 
contained would consequently be the mind. With respect to 2), the question whether the mind 
could be an opaque container for something else can only yield one possible answer, namely, 
that it “contains” our mental states. Note, however, that the distinction between 1) and 2) 
doesn’t make much sense if we do not consider the mind as a whole to be something else than 
its constitutive processes and mental states. In the context of our considerations of how we 
come to understand other minds and in current approaches to social cognition like theory of 
mind (see next chapter), “mind” is just the general term for all that occurs “in it”, i.e. 
thoughts, emotions, beliefs, intentions, etc. From this point of view, it doesn’t make much 
sense to interpret the term “opacity of other minds” as referring to the mind as a container for 
mental states. Therefore, the use of the term “opacity of other minds” can only imply that 
others’ mental states (that constitute the mind as a whole) are contained in something opaque 
or hidden behind something opaque. This container can only be our body, yet does it make 
sense to speak of an opacity of other bodies? It seems so. In a strictly biological sense, the 
outer demarcations of another body are clearly not transparent. I cannot see someone elses’ 
heart or liver as long as I am not witnessing a pretty horrible scenario. But if we move away 
from the biological interior of another person to mental entities, I wouldn’t be able to see 
someone elses’s thoughts, intentions and emotions even if this person’s body and interiors 
were transparent. I can, however, sometimes see the anger in another’s face, his intention to 
grasp something in the outstretching of his arm or her sadness in her body posture. But rather 
than saying that in these cases the body is a transparent container for or a transparent barrier 
to the current emotions or intentions of this person, it would be much more adequate to say 
that his body is expressing these mental states. This is an important difference. The idea of a 
container or barrier, implicated in the terms opacity and transparency, would only make sense 
if the mind were something hidden behind something material, i.e. the body. But since our 
mental states are not objects that reside somewhere in our head, they wouldn’t become more 
accessible to an outstanding observer even if the whole material body were transparent. 
Therefore, it is wrong to think of our body as a kind of container in which our mind resides.  
So if both the relationship between body and mind on the one hand and between mind and 
mental states on the other are not a relationship between a container and something contained, 
then the use of the term opacity (or transparency) of other minds is inadequate and can 
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therefore only have a metaphorical meaning that cannot be fully understood when relying 
only on the primary visual meaning of the terms.  
At this point, it should be obvious that the conventional meaning of the terms opacity and 
transparency as illustrated above cannot be simply transferred to human encounters. Since the 
relationship between mental states and observable behaviour is not a relationship between a 
container and something contained, the use of the term “opacity of other minds” boils down to 
the idea that mental states of other persons are considered to lie or treated as if lying behind a 
barrier. Since we use the term opacity to specify an object’s potential to hide something, it 
might for example refer to another person’s potential to hide the contents of his mind and 
whatever goes on inside of him. At this point, it remains an open question whether mental 
states are just treated in this way whilst they could be treated differently as well, or whether 
an observer or interactional partner really cannot “see” another person’s mental states, as if 
they were really lying behind an opaque barrier. We will come back to this point in chapter 4, 
where “strong” opacity interpretations will be distinguished from “weak” ones. 
An important result of the above analysis is that the mere use of the term opacity of other 
minds gives rise to the idea that mental states of others are hidden away behind an opaque 
barrier, that they are invisible and not directly perceivable. This is one of the very basic 
assumptions of the theory of mind framework that will be presented in the next chapter. From 
a ToM point of view, mental states are unobservable from the outside, they remain 
somewhere inside and must be inferred – and here we are: as soon as we speak of something 
being outside in contrast to something else that is inside, the notion of a barrier or container 
pops up, which automatically gives rise to the notions of opacity and transparency. Therefore, 
when cultural anthropologists introduce an expression like opacity of other minds, they 
automatically give credit to the theory of mind framework, whether they are aware of it or 
not. In the next chapter, I will outline this framework as well as its critics from the 
phenomenological tradition. Note, however, that although this framework was criticized for 
treating the mind as if lying behind an opaque barrier, many local ethnotheories across the 
Pacific and Central America seem to endorse a similar model in which private mental 
thoughts are considered to be hidden behind what is publicly presented (see chapter 4). In 
other words, while the usage of the term opacity of other minds can be criticized for implicitly 
supporting ideas à la theory of mind, the term might still accurately capture how people in 
specific locales conceptualize the relationship between private mental states and observable 
behaviour.  
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I have started from our everyday use of the term opacity. The term opacity of other minds, 
however, refers to the assertion that one cannot know what is in another persons mind as well 
as to ethnotheories and specific local understandings that give rise to such assertions. In order 
to know what opacity in a specific locale actually is, it will not suffice to analyze the term 
opacity. A closer look at the different anthropological reports is mandatory. In chapter 4, I 
will present summaries from anthropological observations in the Pacific as well as in Central 
America. Common to these reports is the observation that the opacity of other minds is 
asserted. As we will see, however, the reasons lying behind these assertions differ. What 
“opacity of other minds” actually means in a specific place must be derived from the existing 
reports and can only be answered individually for each place.  
1.3 Referential opacity 
The link of the term opacity to the theory of mind framework does not only become evident 
when considering its connotations and everyday use - it is also a link that was explicitly made 
by some researchers, since the term opacity is sometimes used in the expression “referential 
opacity” (Quine, 1964) to refer to a logical property of belief reports. For example, if we are 
told that there is a snake in the basket, and also that the snake is a plush toy, it follows that 
there is a plush toy in the basket. But if we are told that Sam is thinking that there is a snake in 
the basket, it does not follow from the fact that the snake is a plush toy that Sam is also 
thinking that there is a plush toy in the basket. The person whose mental state is described – in 
this example Sam – may not share the knowledge that the snake is a plush toy. Apperly and 
Robinson say that it is for this reason that “the transparency/opacity distinction has been used 
to illustrate what is gained as children learn to understand people’s behaviour in terms of 
mental states” (2003, p. 298). For example, the transparency/opacity distinction was used to 
describe the difference between 3- and 5-year-old children in theory of mind tasks we will get 
to know in the next chapter: while others’ mental states are transparent for 3-year-olds who do 
not yet have acquired a theory of mind, 5-year-olds understand the possibility of 
misrepresentation and therefore opacity (cf. Gopnik, 1993). In the same line, Mitchell linked 
an understanding of referential opacity to an understanding of the mind as representational 
(1996). These authors suggest that children’s understanding of beliefs is related to their 
understanding of linguistic substitutions in belief reports like in the example given above. 
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1.4 Summary 
Summing up, we can state that the term opacity gives rise to the idea that something like an 
opaque barrier or container conceals something else. To speak of an opacity of other minds 
amounts to suggesting that others’ minds are hidden away and not perceivable. Therefore, the 
term opacity invokes a model of the relationship between mind and body that is usually traced 
back to Descartes and, more importantly, characteristic for the theory of mind framework. 
Another link between the term opacity and ToM was established by some authors who linked 
the understanding of referential opacity to the development of a theory of mind. Therefore, I 
argue that the mere use of the term opacity gives credit to the ToM framework, whether the 
authors using this term are aware of it or not.  
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2. ToM, its critique and the development of a ‘mindreading’ tool kit 
In this chapter, I want to clarify some conceptual questions and develop the conceptual tools 
necessary for the later analyses of the anthropological reports. Since it is one aim of this work 
to clarify the relationship between opacity doctrines and ToM/mindreading, it will be 
mandatory to have a closer look at what ToM/mindreading is supposed to be. In the course of 
this analysis, I will suggest to abandon both terms and to use their most constitutive aspects as 
well as some concepts of alternative approaches instead since they are more precise. 
Furthermore, alternatives to the mindreading account will be discussed. At the end of this 
chapter, we will be able to distinguish between contextreading, direct perception, mental state 
attribution, mental state talk, mindguessing, mental state inference and false belief 
understanding. 
2.1 Theory of mind 
Maybe one of the shortest answers to the question of what psychology is all about is that it 
tries to understand the mind by scientific means – one’s own as well as the mind of others. 
With that “in mind”, the term theory of mind (ToM) seems to be nothing else than a 
description of the very agenda of academic psychology. But the theory and research it refers 
to are very specific and constituted a popular field within developmental psychology for the 
last 30 years. According to the theory, children who have acquired a theory of mind 
understand other people as well as themselves in terms of mental states. The behaviour of 
others is no longer an intransparent display of mysterious actions but a meaningful expression 
of their desires, beliefs, thoughts etc. For many researchers, the ability to attribute mental 
states to oneself and to others is one of the main achievements in childhood, opening up a 
wider understanding of the social world and crucial in understanding and predicting the 
behavior of others. Children at a certain age begin to realize “that the overt actions of self and 
others are the products of internal mental states such as beliefs and desires” (Wellman, 1990, 
p. 1). In contrast, 3-year-old children without a fully developed theory of mind “view thoughts 
and beliefs in themselves and in others as directly mirroring the real world“ (ibid.). It is 
therefore a major social-cognitive achievement to understand “that people act on the basis of 
their representations of reality rather than reality itself” (Callaghan et al., 2005, p. 378).  
The investigation of the development of children’s ability to understand human activity by the 
attribution of mental states to people has become a very popular field of developmental 
research, labelled theory of mind research. To have a theory of mind means, generally 
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speaking, “to be able to think about such abstract stipulations as thoughts, as if they, like 
physical objects, could be taken as objects of thought” (Feldman, 1988, p. 126). The term 
“Theory of Mind” has first been used by Premack & Woodruff (1978) who used the 
expression to think about the chimpanzees’ mind. The authors attempted to show that a 
chimpanzee can interpret the goal-directed behavior of a human actor. They defined theory of 
mind as follows:  
 
An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A 
system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not 
directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of 
others. As to the mental states the chimpanzees may infer, consider those inferred by our 
own species, for example, purpose or intention, as well as knowledge, belief, thinking, 
doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, and so forth. (ibid., p. 515) 
 
The basic elements of Premack and Woodruff’s definition are still constitutive of many 
modern theory of mind definitions. Pring (2005), for example, defines theory of mind as 
follows: 
 
[´Theory of mind´ is] the ´everyday´ ability to understand other people´s beliefs, thoughts 
and desires in order to explain and predict their behaviour. With the ability to infer mental 
states, like the true and false beliefs of oneself and others, children become more capable 
of participating in a wide range of conversational and social interactions. (ibid., p. 2) 
 
Theory of mind, therefore, is the ability to infer mental states in order to predict and explain 
behaviour. In the same issue of Premack and Woodruff’s influential article, the philosopher 
Daniel C. Dennett argued that a convincing experimental theory of mind test must not be 
based on the ascription of true, but false beliefs (1978). A prediction of another person’s 
behaviour on the basis of a true belief cannot be distinguished from an inference on the basis 
of one’s own knowledge about reality and how to deal with it. In order to do so, my own 
knowledge about reality must differ from the knowledge of someone else, as it is the case in 
situations where another person is holding a false belief. The developmental psychologists 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) were the first to come up with an experimental paradigm. In the 
following years, different varieties of the so-called false belief task produced an immense 
amount of experimental data. For the further reflections in this chapter, it will be important to 
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remark that theory of mind research was from the very beginning closely linked to the 
experimental paradigms invented to measure it. I argue that one could justifiably say that the 
experimental paradigms co-constituted how theory of mind was generally understood, as it 
was and still is almost impossible to say what a theory of mind is supposed to be without 
relying on what is happening in the tasks designed for its measurement. I will come back to 
this point later. 
Although the term theory of mind implies that we have something like a theory about others’ 
minds, such a view is in fact restricted to one of the two major theory of mind accounts, 
namely, theory theory. In contrast to this account, simulation theory denies that we need 
something theory-like to understand others in terms of mental states. The debate between 
these two accounts has a long history and can only be sketched out here in its basics. For the 
purpose of this work, however, the differences between these two accounts are not as 
important as what they share. 
Theory theorists talk about a theory because they assume two things: First, mental states are 
believed to be unobservable and thus theoretical. Second, ideas about internal states are 
believed to form a coherent system from which one can predict or explain behavior (Wellman, 
1990). Some authors speak of a folk psychological understanding, referring to the fact that 
people act to fulfil their desires in the light of their beliefs (Jenkins & Astington, 1996).  
Proponents of the theory theory subscribe to the notion that 4- to 5-year-olds think like small 
cognitive scientists (Harris, 1992). Like scientists, children make certain experiences and 
change their theories about others as a consequence:  
 
According to the theory theory, people understand others by recourse to a theory about 
others’ mental states and traits […] For example, after repeated experience with people 
acting in ways that do not match reality, one comes to realize that others can have false 
beliefs. (Lillard, 1998, p. 25) 
 
Theory theorists argue that our knowledge about the mind comprises not a formal scientific 
theory but an informal, everyday theory based on conceptual knowledge: “One takes in data 
concerning the person, consults the theoretical knowledge, and arrives at some folk 
psychological understanding” (ibid., p. 4). In the view of theory theorists, such an everyday 
understanding of the mind is best understood as a succession of naïve theories and changes in 
those conceptions are therefore theory changes (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994).  
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Bartsch and Wellman (1995) have argued that children begin with a desire psychology, then 
progress to a desire-belief psychology and finally attain a belief-desire psychology typical for 
adults with a full understanding of the representational character of the mind. Forguson and 
Gopnik (1992) argue that compared with 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds have developed a 
representational theory of mind, a model that construes “the relation between the mind and 
external reality as mediated by mental representations: mental states with contents that have 
satisfaction conditions in the external world” (ibid., p. 236). This view was made prominent 
by Perner (1991), who argues that there is no understanding of false belief without an 
understanding of misrepresentation. Wellman (1990) suggests that the development towards a 
representational theory of mind is caused by a conceptual change. In this view, early 
psychological understanding - a naïve psychology - gets slowly revised because social 
information leads to a new theory that replaces the old (Sodian & Thoermer, 2006).  
In contrast, proponents of simulation theories believe that “children improve their grasp of 
folk psychology by means of a simulation process” (Harris, 1992, p. 120). Here, mental states 
of others become accessible through a kind of role-taking process. The understanding of other 
minds is therefore not based on conceptual knowledge. To read someone’s mind is nothing 
else than to “re-evoke the other’s mental state” in oneself (Lillard, 1998, p. 4).  
In this view, what develops in the course of time is the ability to run more accurate and 
complex simulations. Some indirect support for the simulation account comes from the 
discovery of the mirror neurons. These neurons discharge not only when one executes a goal-
related movement, but also when one observes other people doing the same movement. Some 
believe that mirror neurons provide a mechanism of “embodied simulation, which can provide 
a direct access to the meaning of actions and intentions of others” (Gallese, 2007, p. 662).  
Speaking about the differences between theory theory and simulation theory, Gordon 
describes the theory theory as a “cold methodology: a methodology that chiefly engages our 
intellectual processes, moving by inference from one set of beliefs to another, and makes no 
essential use of our own capacities for emotion, motivation, and practical reasoning” and the 
simulation theory as a “hot methodology, which exploits one’s own motivational and 
emotional resources and one’s own capacity for practical reasoning” (1996, p. 11). 
In the same line, Gallese and Goldman characterized theory theory as a “detached” theorizing 
whereas from the point of view of simulation theory, people are more actively involved when 
trying to understand others (cf. 1998, p. 497). Thompson makes an interesting remark: “Given 
this difference, it is not surprising that empathy figures prominently in the simulation-theory 
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account of mind-reading” (2001, p. 11). The influence of simulation theory in definitions and 
usages of the term empathy will become evident in the following chapter on empathy. 
I have mentioned above that for the purpose of this work, the differences between these two 
theories are not as important as their commonalities. According to Thompson, both theories 
“take mind-reading to be a matter of how we infer from outward behaviour that others possess 
unobservable inner mental states” (2001, p. 13). I will focus on this observation in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
In recent years, theory of mind research was integrated into the broader field of social 
cognition and has become more interdisciplinary in nature, bringing together neuroscientists, 
psychologists and philosophers. Moreover, the capacities that were originally associated with 
the term theory of mind are now also associated with a very popular and more and more 
common term: mindreading.  
2.2 Mindreading  
More than 30 years ago, the philospher Daniel C. Dennett raised a question in his book 
Brainstorms: “Is it in principle possible that brain scientists might one day know enough 
about the workings of our brains to be able to “crack the cerebral code”and read our minds?” 
(1978, p. 39). The notion of mindreading, due to its paranormal connotations, can hardly 
sound less scientific. Costall, Leudar and Reddy (2006) even presume that the term, because 
of its use in magical contexts, “must have initially been invoked in Theory of Mind circles 
with some humorous intent, even self-irony” (ibid., p. 166) and – after critically discussing 
the concept - conclude their paper with the following words: “Mind-reading, in short, far from 
being a serious theoretical option, needs to be recognized for what it is – a joke” (ibid.). But 
as a matter of fact, people use the term in very serious, scientific discussions. In his 
questionable struggle to build a mindreading device, John-Dylan Haynes from the Bernstein 
Center of Computational Neuroscience in Berlin is one of the few researchers out there who 
somehow understand and use the term in its original and literal sense, since he really tries to 
read mental states from brain states (cf. Haynes et al., 2007). Meanwhile, however, the term 
has acquired a much more common meaning which coincides with what was usually coverd 
by the term theory of mind. In a sense, the term mindreading has become something like a 
successor of the theory of mind debate, inheriting the most basic ideas of both theory theory 
and simulation theories while circumventing the differences and endless disputes between 
them. So when psychologists ask how we come to understand other people, a nowadays very 
popular answer is to say that we engage in mindreading. It is striking how liberally this term 
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is still used. Shannon Spaulding frankly claims: “No one, to my knowledge, denies that 
mindreading occurs” (2010, p. 137). According to Antaki (2004), “ToM proponents put 
inverted commas around 'mind-reading', as if they mean the term only figuratively, but then 
proceed essentially as if people do actually read minds” (pp. 667-668). In some definitions, 
the link to theory of mind is obvious and made explicit. For example, Barr and Keysar (2005) 
say that a “goal of research in cognitive science is to understand the nature of human 
“mindreading” – not, of course, mindreading in the magical or paranormal sense but, rather, 
in the mundane sense of how people apply theory of mind in order to infer the mental states of 
other people” (ibid., p. 271). According to the authors, mindreading is not about magic or 
paranormal skills, but refers to how theory of mind is used to infer mental states. Whereas the 
term mindreading is considered to evoke notions of magical or paranormal skills, the terms 
theory of mind and mental state inference are presented here as more mundane and left 
without further explanation, as if they were self-explanatory and unquestionable, not in need 
of further definition. The authors themselves add that “the term “mindreading” has been used 
rather liberally to denote a broad variety of activities related to social cognition” (2005, p. 
273). Malle (2005) defines mindreading as “the human activity of inferring other people’s 
mental states” (ibid., p. 26) and seems to aim for “a unified theory of mental state inference” 
(ibid.). In this definition, Malle seems to suggest that mindreading amounts to mental state 
inference. In the literature, the terms mental state inference and mental state attribution are 
often used interchangeably. Whereas Malle uses the former to define mindreading, Barr & 
Keysar (2005) use both to explain what mindreading is: “The development of mindreading 
abilities throughout the lifespan can be characterized as a trajectory away from egocentrism 
and toward greater and more nuanced mental attribution” (ibid., p. 272). In the same paper, 
they understand mindreading as the application of theory of mind “in order to infer the mental 
states of other people” (ibid., p. 271). According to Barr and Keysar, mental state inference 
and mental state attribution are either identical or both constitutive for mindreading practices.  
We can conclude, that both theory of mind and mindreading are apparently about mental state 
inference and attribution. But what is the difference between mental state inference and 
mental state attribution? Is there a difference? Although both terms are often used 
interchangeably, it might be worth asking whether this interchangeable usage is justified. I 
think there are good reasons to distinguish between both. First, their semantics suggest to use 
them more carefully. Inference might be prior to attribution, simply because in order to 
attribute something to someone, I often need a reason that justifies my attribution, and this 
reason might be an inferred one. Second, the term mental state inference seems to fit better 
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into the theory theory framework, where mental states have to be inferred from non-mental 
evidence on the basis of theoretical knowledge or rules before they can be attributed to 
someone else. In simulation theory, I experience the mental state of another person in my own 
mind on the basis of a simulation process. Consequently, it seems as if I do not have to infer 
that mental state. I only have to attribute it to someone else after experiencing it for myself as 
a result of simulation processes. If this was true, then the idea of mental state inference would 
have no place in simulation theory. As a consequence, it would also be wrong to equate 
mental state inference and mental state attribution or to use both terms interchangeably. As a 
matter of fact, there are many versions of simulation theory, and some explicitly deny the 
necessity of inference (cf. Gordon, 1995). But there is evidence that inference might be 
involved in certain versions of simulation theory as well. In one of the most paradigmatic 
descriptions of simulation theory, Goldman (1992) says: 
 
The initial step…is to imagine being ‘in the shoes’ of the agent…. This means pretending 
to have the same initial desires, beliefs, or other mental states that the attributer’s 
background information suggests the agent has. The next step is to feed these pretend 
states into some inferential mechanism, or other cognitive mechanism, and allow that 
mechanism to generate further mental states as outputs by its normal operating 
procedure…. More precisely, the output should be viewed as a pretend or surrogate state, 
since presumably the simulator doesn’t feel the very same effect or emotion as a real agent 
would. Finally, upon noting this output, one ascribes to the agent an occurrence of this 
output state. Predictions of behavior would proceed similarly…. In short, you let your own 
psychological mechanism serve as a ‘model’ of his. (ibid., p. 21)  
 
Goldman explicitly speaks of an “inferential mechanism here”. Moreover, the question arises 
how the simulator knows which desires, beliefs, or other mental states he must pretend and 
feed into this inferential mechanism. Since Goldman says that the attributer’s background 
information suggests specific mental states, it seems as if these initial mental states are 
inferred as well. I do not want to discuss this issue deeper – it leads us to a serious problem of 
this variety of the simulation account, namely, the problem that the simulation procedure 
requires what it is supposed to explain: the knowledge of another person’s mental states. 
Although the term mental state inference, at first glance, fits better into the theory theory 
framework, it seems as if inference might also be involved in simulation theory. One might 
therefore argue that it would be justified to use both mental state inference and mental state 
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attribution interchangeably if both always went hand in hand. A closer look at some concrete 
examples, however, should convince us that both terms should be distinguished. A very 
obvious example for mental state attribution without prior inference are cases of 
anthropomorphism. If people describe an ant as sad, they attribute a mental state to an insect 
without having anything like a justified reason for doing so, since the ant’s sadness is neither 
perceivable nor are there any theoretical reasons for assuming that ants can feel sadness at all. 
Or consider children’s play with dolls. A young girl might construct a narrative and, on the 
basis of this narrative, infer that the doll is sad. However, the girl might also start her play 
with the statement that her doll is sad. The latter case is again an example for mental state 
attribution without prior or co-occuring inference, although the girl might of course continue 
her play by providing reasons for the doll’s sadness ex post. Besides anthropomorphism, 
consider the phenomenon of projection, understood in the original psychoanalytic sense. In 
this case, I project my own innerpsychic conflicts, affects, or thoughts onto another person. In 
other words, I attribute my own mental states to him, although not necessarily consciously. I 
argue that in this case, mental states are again attributed to another person but not inferred 
beforehand, since I simply project what is already there in my own mind onto another. 
The next example focuses on gossip, since this will also be of relevance in the review of the 
anthropological reports in chapter 4. If people try to make sense of an absent person’s 
behaviour in gossip, if they speculate which motives or reasons might have led to a certain 
behaviour of that person, then gossipers use mental-state-talk and thus tentatively attribute 
mental states to that person. Let’s consider two cases of gossip. In the first case, the gossipers 
witnessed what they are gossiping about, i.e., they had direct perceptual evidence. In the 
second case, the gossipers were told about the same event by someone, i.e., they have a story 
but they had no direct perceptual evidence. In the first case, a man – I will call him Jim - 
insulted someone and hit him in the face. Jim, however, is normally known for his peaceful 
attitude. The gossipers were present when Jim did this. Some hours later, the gossipers meet 
and talk about why Jim behaved like this and conclude that he must have been very angry. In 
doing so, they attribute a mental state to him, but did they infer it? Did they have to make an 
inference in order to be able to attribute anger to Jim? According to Gallagher, inference “in 
some minimal sense involves moving from some known information, which one takes as a 
clue or as evidence, to something that is not known” (2008, p. 537, footnote 3). Yet seeing 
someone insulting and attacking another person is an expression of anger that is directly 
perceivable. So is Jim’s anger “something that is not known” in the moment it is perceived? If 
we say that anger must be inferred from observed behaviours like insulting and attacking, then 
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we automatically deny that certain behaviours might be sufficiently expressive of a certain 
mental state – we transform them into mere behaviour without mental significance. If we take 
this example as a case of mental state inference, then we end up using the term in a very broad 
sense that does not even match Gallagher’s minimal definition, since it is not very convincing 
to say that we move from known information (observed insult and attack) to something that is 
not known (anger). We immediately perceive Jim as angry. The anger must not be inferred in 
addition to that which is directly perceivable.2 Moreover, the anger does not have to be 
attributed to Jim while seeing him insulting and attacking, since any expression of anger is not 
perceived independently from the person that expresses it. I do not directly perceive anger and 
must attribute it to Jim in a second step. Rather, I directly perceive his anger, anger he 
expresses, the perceived anger does already belong to Jim and there is no need to figure out 
via subsequent attribution whom it belongs to. Therefore, I suggest that the first case of the 
gossip example is another example for mental state attribution without mental state inference.  
In acknowledging this, I think we are on to something very important that hasn’t clearly been 
spelled out before, since the distinction between mental state inference and mental state 
attribution might help us to break down the term mindreading into two different components 
that have been mixed up so far.  
Now imagine a group of gossipers talking about the same situation, but this time, nobody 
actually witnessed the situation they are talking about – they just heard about it from someone 
else. In this case, they attribute mental states as well, but they had no perceptual evidence. In 
this case, we can say that the gossipers infer the anger, since they move from known 
information (Jim insulted and attacked someone) to something that is not known (Jim was 
angry). In speculating about the reasons for this person’s behaviour, the gossipers construct a 
coherent story, and anger is a possible, although not certain mental state one can infer on the 
basis of behaviours such as insulting and attacking. It might be more appropriate, however, to 
speak of mindguessing in this case, since the notion of guessing makes clearer that these kinds 
of inferences are errorprone. I will come back to this point later.  
Summing up, what theory theory, simulation theory, and the mindreading-account have in 
common is that in order to understand other people’s behaviour, one must infer and/or 
attribute mental states to them. I argued that it makes sense to distinguish between both 
                                                          
2
 Note, however, that the directly perceivable expression of anger does not constitute the psychological state – at 
least not fully. In arguing that anger can be perceived directly without the need for attribution or inference, I am 
not denying that there is more to the experience of anger than what is expressed. Nevertheless, its expressed 
components are usually sufficient for others to understand which emotional state is displayed. The question is 
not whether the bodily expression of anger exhausts its experience. According to Zahavi, the point of 
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mental state inference and mental state attribution, although both terms regularly appear in 
definitions of mindreading. It was further argued that the term mindreading does normally not 
refer to a direct perception of mental states, although the semantics of the term suggest 
precisely this. Although this would be a good reason to abandon the term, it is still widely 
used. Ian Apperly (2011), for example, even prefers the term mindreading to the term theory 
of mind since it is an open question whether having a theory is necessarily involved in the 
processes and abilities ToM is thought to explain. According to Apperly, the term 
mindreading is more neutral. We have seen that mindreading refers to mental state inference 
and attribution, although the term, taken literally, suggests a practice that would precisely not 
need inference or attribution since it refers to the most direct access to another person’s 
mental states one could think of. In my opinion, mindreading is the more presumptuous 
choice. If mental state inference and attribution are at the core of both ToM and mindreading, 
why don’t we simply use the former terms? In contrast to the term theory of mind, 
mindreading implies – at least for laymen - the idea of a direct perception of others’ mental 
states. Such a “direct perception view” of mental states does indeed exist and has its origins in 
the phenomenological tradition. Ironically, it is an approach that evolved in opposition and as 
a critique to the mindreading approach. Whereas mindreading, in the word’s literal sense, 
suggests direct perception, direct perception approaches have evolved in a very different 
scientific tradition – and this is, I think, an important reason to abandon the term mindreading. 
Finally, I think that there is another very simple reason why people prefer to use the term 
mindreading instead of mental state inference and mental state attribution. The reason for 
doing so is precisely that mental state inference and mental state attribution, as argued above, 
should be distinguished. This makes things more complicated and suggests to do away with a 
very handy term. If researchers use mindreading for a variety of phenomena, they do not have 
to think about what exactly is going on, mental state inference, mental state attribution, or 
both. The term mindreading therefore clouds the underlying processes. This is, I think, the 
main reason why we should abandon the term. But now, let’s turn to an approach where direct 
perception really means direct perception.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
controversy is rather “whether bodily expressivity has intrinsic psychological meaning, or whether whatever 
psychological meaning it has is derived” (2011, p. 549). 
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2.3 Phenomenological critique and the “direct perception view”3 
At the bottom of the idea that other people’s mental states must be inferred lies another and in 
a way deeper assumption, namely, that there is a gap between the minds of persons (cf. 
Leudar & Costall, 2009a). A gap that has to be bridged somehow in order to make sense of 
other persons: 
 
The supposition is precisely that the other person’s mental states are hidden away and are 
therefore not accessible to perception. I cannot see into your mind; hence I have to devise 
some way of inferring what must be there, based on evidence that is provided by 
perception. (Gallagher, 2008, p. 536) 
 
Such a view, in speaking of the hiddenness and non-accessibility of the mind, is in line with 
the analysis of the term opacity given in the first chapter, as it suggests that there is something 
indiscernable, something lying beyond the perceivable behaviours and expressions of other 
persons. This was confirmed by Zahavi who recently wrote that both theory theory and 
simulation theory “have been accused of presupposing the fundamental opacity of other 
minds” (2011, p. 546). Assuming a gap between the minds of persons is the logical 
consequence of a specific conceptualization of the mind. Overgaard (2007) argues that “if we 
think about the mind as constituting an inner realm of its own, separated in various ways from 
the “external” world, then something like the epistemological problem of other minds is likely 
to pop up sooner or later” (ibid., p. 2). As a consequence, “one needs to get into the other 
person’s head and find out what their mental states are” (Gallagher, 2008, p. 536). This 
conceptualization is normally traced back to Descartes. Cartesian dualists would claim that 
the minds of others are essentially inaccessible to direct experience. It is hard to deny that the 
content of one’s own mental life is experienced in a way the content of another’s mental life is 
not. It feels intuitively wrong to assume that there is no such thing as an inner realm of 
experience, hidden from others, opaque for outstanding spectators. Nevertheless, it feels 
likewise wrong to assume that the mental lives of others are completely inaccessible for 
outside spectators. Researchers in the phenomenological tradition have focused on the latter 
intuition and provided alternatives to approaches where another person’s subjective life is 
                                                          
3
 The notion of direct perception was made popular by Gibson and originally referred to visual perception (cf. 
Gibson, 1979). In the context of the present debate, however, it refers solely to the perception of others’ mental 
states. Although Zahavi rightly says that there “isn’t any established view on what “direct” means” (2011, p. 
548), I will – in line with Zahavi – use the term in the sense that the perception of another’s emotional state like 
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only graspable via conclusion by analogy or inference. Common to these critics is the 
emphasis on the perceivable aspects of others’ minds.4 This was also a major concern to the 
later Wittgenstein. His following words can be read like an early critique of simulation 
accounts: 
 
Look into someone else’s face, and see the consciousness in it, and a particular shade of 
consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor, and so 
on…Do you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his face? (Wittgenstein, 
1967, cited in Overgaard, 2006, p. 65) 
 
Wittgenstein also rejects the idea that we arrive at other people’s mental states via analogy, 
deduction or inference. In this sense, the following two quotes appear like a critique of ToM 
and mindreading accounts: 
 
In general I do not surmise fear in him – I see it. I do not feel that I am deducing the 
probable existence of something inside from something outside; rather it is as if the human 
face were in a way translucent and that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in 
its own. (Wittgenstein, 1980, cited in Overgaard, 2006, p. 64)  
 
“We see emotion.” – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and make the 
inference the he is feeling joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, 
radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. 
Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. (Wittgenstein, 1980, cited in 
Overgaard, 2006, p. 65) 
 
Overgaard reminds us that Wittgenstein was eager “to emphasize that the human body and 
human behavior are full of “mental” significance” (2007, p. 24). If human behaviour and the 
human body are full of “mental significance” and if they express something that does not 
point to a mental event hidden beyond the body and behaviour, but if expression in itself must 
be thought of as mental (Overgaard, 2005; Fuchs, 2011), then mental state inference seems 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
anger can be directly perceived as such without the need for an intermediary step (e.g., reliance on theory, 
inference). 
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unnecessary for the understanding of others – superfluous, as expressive behaviour is 
perceived directly. As argued in the example above, in seeing Jim insulting and attacking 
someone, I perceive Jim as angry.   
The direct perception view is currently endorsed by philosophers in the phenomenological 
tradition. Shaun Gallagher, one of the most prominent opponents of theory theory and 
simulation theory, criticizes that both these approaches “posit something more than a 
perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others” (2008, p. 535) and says 
that “we see or more generally perceive in the other person’s bodily movements, facial 
gestures, eye direction, and so on, what they intend and what they feel” (Gallagher, 2004, p. 
204). In contrast to the mindreading account, Gallagher advocates the idea that “we have a 
direct perceptual grasp of the other person’s intentions, feelings, etc.” (2008, p. 535). He says: 
“In most of our ordinary and everyday intersubjective situations we have a direct, perception-
based understanding of another person’s intentions because their intentions are explicitly 
expressed in their embodied actions” (2004, p. 205). This idea has a long tradition within 
phenomenological philosophy. In his book The nature of sympathy, the German philosopher 
Max Scheler says: 
 
For we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person’s joy in 
his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his 
entreaty in his outstretched hands…And with the tenor of his thoughts in the sound of his 
words. If anyone tells me that this is not ‘perception’, for it cannot be so, in view of the 
fact that a perception is simply a ‘complex of physical sensations’…I would beg him to 
turn aside from such questionable theories and address himself to the phenomenological 
facts. (Scheler, 1954, cited in Gallagher, 2008, pp. 260-261)  
 
Phenomenologists argue that we do neither need theories, nor simulations or inferences to 
directly perceive another person’s mental states. The examples provided are mostly emotional 
states that can be expressed via bodily postures, mimics and gesture. Shaun Gallagher says: 
 
The claim here is not that direct perception (or other aspects of this approach – the reliance 
on context, social roles, narrative, etc.) can penetrate to the soul of the other person and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4
 I am aware of the fact that there are many different and conflicting positions within phenomenology and that 
there is not one phenomenological critique to approaches that assume a gap between the minds of persons. Even 
phenomenologists might focus on alterity and on the fundamental difference between self and other (cf. Levinas, 
1969). However, those researchers in the phenomenological tradition who critically argue against the theory of 
mind framework indeed share the idea that others’ mental states can be directly perceived.  
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discover her innermost emotional states. Nor is the claim that we can never be misled by 
what we perceive. The claim is rather that for the most part, in most of our encounters in 
everyday life, direct perception delivers sufficient information for understanding others. 
(Gallagher, 2008, p. 540) 
 
Notice, that Gallagher mentions other aspects of the direct perception approach, namely, the 
reliance on context, social roles and narratives that add to the direct perception of expressed 
emotional states. Within the mindreading approach, observable behaviour and context are 
normally considered to be the bases on which we infer another’s mental states. And on the 
basis of attributed mental states we predict and explain the other person’s behaviour. A 
question that naturally arises here is whether behaviour could not be predicted and explained 
on the basis of observable behaviour and context alone, without the extra step that involves 
assessing another’s mental states.  
2.4 Contextreading 
The possibility of direct perception might apply to expressed emotions, but what about 
thoughts, inner speech, silent monologues and considerations? Of course, one might see that 
another person is thinking (cf. Overgaard, 2005). Nowhere is this truth better illustrated than 
in Rodin’s Le Penseur. A professional Poker player, in contrast, might not display any facial 
expression at all that might lead one to the idea that he is thinking. In this case, it is the 
context of the game that justifies the assumption that he is probably thinking. In the case of 
chess, we cannot read a chess-players mind who is planning his next move, but we can read 
the context of the game and thus infer what his considerations or his next move might be. 
Imagine two chess players playing against each other. This seems to be a paradigmatic case 
for mindreading: I have to infer my opponent’s thoughts, explain his past move and predict 
what my opponent’s next move will be, which strategy she is following, what her plans are. 
From another point of view, however, I just have to think about the pattern on the board. If 
my chessmen are in pattern A and my opponent’s chessmen in pattern B, then certain moves 
are automatically, i.e. by the rules of the game, good moves while others are bad moves. 
Some moves could be called “risky moves”, i.e., moves, that are good if and only if my 
opponent is not very attentive and that are bad moves if he is attentive. What makes a risky 
move a good move is not the fact that my opponent cannot successfully read my mind, i.e. 
infer my thoughts – it is the fact that she is not able to infer the implications of my move for 
the game, that she does not consider all possible moves. That she tries to read my mind is, at 
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least in this case, just a metaphor that points to her fear that she might have overlooked 
something on the board that I am aware of. Her uneasiness while planning her next move 
demonstrates precisely that she cannot read the content of my mind, and in going on to think 
about why I did move my queen directly in front of her king without any further protection 
she is not reading my mind, but trying to make sense of all the chessmen’s configuration on 
the board on the background that she can’t read my mind. In this example, mindreading is just 
a metaphor for contextreading. I can’t see in the mind of my opponent what her next move 
will be, but I can try to engage in “board-reading” and if I read the board successfully, I might 
indeed be able to predict my opponent’s next move correctly. This might feel like successful 
mindreading while it is in fact nothing more than intelligent and attentive contextreading, 
based on a sufficient understanding of the rules of the game.5 I will therefore use the term 
contextreading to refer to the ability to make sense of situations, circumstances and the course 
of events without the necessity to infer mental states, for example by considering rules or 
norms. 
When it comes to Poker, we do not only engage in contextreading (cards in the game and 
number of players), but in bodyreading as well, i.e., in the direct perception of what the other 
person’s body expresses (sweat, tremor, breath, etc.). What we try to read is not the other’s 
mind but the persuasiveness of his bodily expressions that might indicate whether he is 
bluffing or not on the basis of evidence we have as a consequence of attentive contextreading.  
Here is another example. If I go to the bakery and ask for half a kilo of dark bread, the woman 
behind the desk will normally give it to me and my first interpretation of her behaviour would 
probably not be a mentalistic one (“She is giving me the bread because she wants to”) but one 
that refers to her social role, to what is expected from her (“She is giving me the bread 
because that’s what people who work in a bakery do”) – if I need an explanation in such 
situations at all. In this example, I would neither explain nor predict her behaviour by 
reference to a mental state but to her social role as a baker, i.e., by reference to the situational 
context.  
Note, however, that while contextreading makes mental state inference superfluous in many 
situations, contextreading can also help to infer another’s mental state in some cases. For 
example, noticing a mount of facial tissues at her bedside, and realizing that Leonard Cohen’s 
A thousand kisses deep has been played again and again, I might conclude that she is sad by 
way of inference. Yet with respect to most of the examples provided so far, it seems as if 
                                                          
5
 In the chess example, I wanted to demonstrate that contextreading is sufficient. If it were not, a match against a 
chess computer would be impossible. If we play against human beings, however, contextreading cannot be 
separated from other ongoing processes that might indeed be aimed at what the opponent is up to.  
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Gallagher is justified in saying: “In seeing the actions and expressive movements of the other 
person in the context of the surrounding world, one already sees their meaning; no inference 
to a hidden set of mental states (beliefs, desires, etc.) is necessary” (2008, p. 542). 
Where, one might ask, is mindreading involved at all in everyday life, if we can make sense 
of most situations via direct perception and contextreading?6  Gallagher’s view, or, more 
generally, the direct perception approach of mental states, is not unchallenged, however. In 
the following, I will focus on two critics, Shannon Spaulding and Mitchell Herschbach. 
2.5 Critics of direct perception 
Shannon Spaulding argues that the examples provided by Gallagher to criticize accounts 
based on mental state inference are rather examples of bodyreading than mindreading (2010, 
p. 122). According to her, Gallagher’s account of direct perception and related ideas in the 
field of embodied cognition claim that in most cases, we get along socially without 
mindreading and engage in it only in rare circumstances, encountering very strange or unusual 
behaviour. In contrast, the mindreading account claims that “for the most part, mindreading is 
how we get along socially” (2010, p. 124). According to Spaulding, Gallagher’s argument that 
our ordinary interactions do not seem to involve mindreading, i.e. explaining and predicting 
others’ mental states, “is subject to the objection that an appeal to phenomenology is 
unjustified in this context because much of mindreading is supposed to be non-conscious, at 
the sub-personal level, and phenomenology cannot tell us what is happening at the sub-
personal level” (ibid., p. 129). Spaulding represents the mindreading account in a very 
straightforward way as an account about sub-personal processes, as the following quotations 
unmistakably demonstrate: 
 
The debate in mindreading between the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory is a 
debate about the architecture and sub-personal processes responsible for social cognition. 
Neither account is committed to any view on what phenomenology tells us is going on in 
our ordinary interactions. With mindreading, there is a process (theorizing or simulating), 
and there is a product (an explanation or a prediction). In general, neither the process nor 
the product need be consciously accessible, let alone phenomenologically transparent. 
(2010, p. 131) 
                                                          
6
 Note, that direct perception and contextreading belong together in many cases. The direct perception of 
someone’s fury can be part of my contextreading. Likewise, I might need to consider the context in order to 
determine whether another’s facial expression is showing disgust or anger. 
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What phenomenology can tell us is that our ordinary interactions seem to be based on an 
immediate, pragmatic, evaluative understanding. However, since the question in the 
mindreading literature is not about what our ordinary interactions seem to be but about the 
architecture and sub-personal processes actually responsible for our ordinary interactions, 
Gallagher’s argument does not refute the broad scope of mindreading claim. (ibid., 132) 
 
Spaulding also opposes Gallagher’s argument that false belief experiments are designed to 
test conscious metarepresentational processes (cf. Gallagher, 2001). According to her, these 
tasks require a “conscious, explicit mode of thinking” (2010, p. 133) which does not address 
the issue of what is going on at the sub-personal level. She concludes: “If the debate in 
mindreading is about what is happening at the sub-personal level, then these artificial 
experiments involving conscious processes are of no help in determining what sub-personal 
processes are operative” (ibid.). Within the ToM debate, however, the notion of mental state 
inference was from the very beginning closely tied to exactly those kinds of experiments (see 
next chapter). To say that they are “of no help” means to neglect what actually constituted the 
whole debate about mindreading and established what mental state inference is 
paradigmatically supposed to be. It is true, of course, that these tasks do not help “in 
determining what sub-personal processes are operative” (ibid., p. 133). But how could the 
mindreading claim (that we get along socially by mindreading most of the time) ever be 
falsified if the actual mindreading process is supposed to go on on a sub-personal level that 
has nothing to do with explicit experiments? And how could we ever identify these sub-
personal processes? By better fMRIs that show mental state inferences in situ? How should 
something like an inference, a concept born in our phenomenologically transparent everyday 
world, ever be observed and identified on a sub-personal level? Spaulding concludes that the 
mindreading critique “ultimately fails because it does not establish that mindreading occurs 
only in rare circumstances” (ibid., p. 138) and demands that “it must be established that 
mindreading does not underlie our ordinary, fully developed social understanding” (ibid., p. 
138). Yet since Spaulding resorts to sub-personal realms that are immune to any 
considerations and observations on the personal, consciously available level, it is relatively 
easy for representatives of direct perception accounts to turn the tables by demanding that the 
mindreading account must establish that we engage in mindreading not only in rare 
circumstances. Spaulding is right to emphasize that Gallagher cannot prove that mindreading 
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occurs only in rare circumstances, but neither can she disprove that direct perception might be 
going on most of the time.  
Gallagher’s examples, in refuting extra cognitive steps and detour, reveal a certain degree of 
similarity to some of the examples cited above by Wittgenstein: “I see my car as drivable. 
This does not mean that I see my car, and then judge that it is drivable” (Gallagher, 2008, p. 
537). ToM proponents, however, would simply respond that people see their car as drivable 
because sub-personal processes provide them the necessary information via sub-personal 
inference. In a footnote, Gallagher (2008) explicitly deals with potential objections à la 
Spaulding: 
 
Does this sub-personal activity involve inference? Inference in some minimal sense 
involves moving from some known information, which one takes as a clue or as evidence, 
to something that is not known. First, it is important to note that neurons do not face the 
world alone. They function only as part of a large and complexly interconnected system. 
Even a mirror neuron that fires when I see an intentional action (even an incomplete or 
partially occluded action) is not functioning on its own – it fires only if a variety of other 
neurons and neuronal systems are working in a certain way. When mirror neuron x fires, it 
is not just because I see action A, but also because all kinds of neuronal activity is going 
on, including, of course, activity in the visual cortex, and under conditions defined by a 
host of other factors, including levels and effects of neurotransmitters. Furthermore, it is 
misleading to say that the neuron is responding to the action, since the neuron doesn’t 
observe the action. Sub-personal processes do not observe or perceive; and even non-
conscious perception is something that the organism as a whole does. On what basis, then, 
could there be anything like sub-personal inference? (ibid., p. 537) 
 
I cannot resolve the dispute between both parties here. Nevertheless, I think that the picture 
that Spaulding draws is confusing, to say the least. ToM has become so popular and 
influenced the scientific community so profoundly that it seems as if its critics have to prove 
it wrong. What is never really acknowledged is that the burden of proof lies not with the ToM 
critics who start from the phenomenal level and on that basis deny that we mindread and infer 
mental states all the time, but with the ToM representatives who still have to show that 
something like sub-personal or implicit inferences 1) do exist at all and 2) are the ongoing and 
causally necessary processes that enable us to navigate through the social word – especially in 
 35
the light of phenomenal experiences that tell a different story, since they are not full of 
conscious inferences.  
I do not want to take sides with Gallagher or Spaulding at this point. Instead, I want to suggest 
a reasonable way of how to proceed, especially in the light of the ongoing debate between 
both sides. Notice, that we can, on a phenomenal, experiential level, confirm all the 
competing accounts and aspects mentioned so far. We experience anger directly in someone’s 
face, we reason theoretically, using inferences, about how an absent person might feel or 
behave given certain information, we put ourselves into another’s shoes, i.e. simulate, in order 
to understand better how this person might feel. Sometimes, we directly perceive someone in 
anger and later report to a friend that this person was angry, i.e., we verbally attribute a 
mental state in reported speech. We experience situations where we make sense of someone’s 
behaviour because we have a look at the context or at the social role of this person. On a 
phenomenal level, all this can be confirmed. On a sub-personal level, however, none can.7 So 
if the core of ToM and mindreading accounts is the idea that we infer mental states and 
attribute them to others, then we can either go on arguing that these inferences take place on a 
sub-personal level all the time, or we can leave this idea aside for the moment. In order to 
clarify the relationship between an alleged opacity of other minds in Samoa and ToM, the 
notion of sub-personal mental state inference does not help very much, for even if people do 
not infer mental states explicitly and are not consciously aware of sometimes doing so, they 
might still infer mental states on a sub-personal level. The whole idea, brought forward by 
Robbins and Rumsey (2008), to reflect on ToM on the basis of anthropological observations, 
suggests to focus on how we come to understand others in phenomenally available ways, 
simply because anthropological observations are never observations of sub-personal 
processes.  
We have seen that a great deal of our normal social interactions can be explained by direct 
perception, reliance on social roles and contextreading. Even behaviour prediction as one of 
the main functions of theory of mind can be alternatively explained in a number of ways, for 
example by predicting others’ behaviour on the basis of personal traits (cf. Andrews, 2008). 
But according to another critic of the direct perception approach, Mitchell Herschbach, all 
                                                          
7
 One might argue that implicit false belief measures in preverbal infants confirm that something like mental 
state inference is occuring at the sub-personal level. I will discuss some of these studies in the following chapter 
on the false belief task. At this point, let me just offer some arguments against this idea. First, it is still an open 
question how such early false belief measures should be interpreted (cf. Perner & Ruffmann, 2005; Ruffman & 
Perner, 2005). Second, it is very questionable whether implicit capacities should be equated with sub-personal 
processes. Third, even if sub-personal processes provided something like rules that led infants to make the 
correct inferences in these non-verbal false belief tasks, it would still be an open question whether sub-personal 
inferences are constantly at work in the less sophisticated and more common everyday situations.  
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these alternative routes to understanding do not cover a very specific case which is central to 
the mindreading account. With reference to ToM-critics like Gallagher, Herschbach says that 
“the phenomenological critics say little about false beliefs” (2008, p. 41), although he – in line 
with many other theory of mind researchers - considers false belief understanding to be “a 
paradigm case of mental state understanding” (ibid., p. 33). In his critique of the 
phenomenological critics of theory theory and simulation theory accounts, Herschbach (2008) 
explicitly focuses on false belief understanding. The phenomenological critics propose that 
we do not have to infer mental states since we perceive emotions and intentions of others in 
their expressive behaviour, i.e., directly. Herschbach agrees on that, but argues that their 
alternative conception of social understanding does “not obviously cover the case of false 
belief” (ibid., p. 41). The sadness in someone’s face is, via expression, shared with an 
observer. The same is true for many kinds of intentional behaviours. In the case of false 
belief, however, “a person with a false belief has an understanding of the world that is not 
shared with the observer and cannot be perceived in their current behaviour” (ibid., pp. 41-
42). False beliefs “are not currently perceivable, and thus paradigmatic of why we treat 
mental states as ´inner`, ´hidden` and distinct from observable behaviour” (ibid., p. 48). 
According to Herschbach, although we can adjust our behaviour depending on what we 
unreflectively know about other people’s beliefs, it remains unsatisfying to call this a purely 
embodied practice that does not involve mental state attribution or mindreading at all. 
Herschbach concludes: 
 
we do not have much empirical evidence at this point about exactly how important false-
belief understanding is to our daily lives, or how easy or difficult it is even for adults. But 
acknowledging all of this does not detract from false-belief understanding’s status as a 
paradigm case of mental state understanding. (ibid., p. 37) 
 
I think Herschbach is right in saying that the ToM-critics’ avoidance of the false belief 
phenomenon is at least unsatisfying. Even if mental state inference is not how we get along 
socially all the time, the false belief phenomenon points to a form of understanding in social 
situations that cannot easily be explained by the direct perception approach. If false belief 
understanding is a paradigm case for mental state understanding, then the false belief tasks 
should be paradigmatic measures or operationalizations of the phenomenon at issue.  
The next chapter will critically discuss the false belief task. I will argue that the false belief 
task will provide us with a paradigmatic case of mental state inference as understood by ToM 
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representatives. After doing so, we will have all the necessary conceptual tools that will help 
us to analyze the anthropological reports on the opacity of other minds.  
2.6 False belief 
The false belief tasks is said to provide an example par excellence of mental state attribution 
and inference that allows for behaviour prediction and explanation. I would even say that the 
definitions of these terms as they are used in ‘mindreading’ and theory of mind accounts were 
never verbally formulated as clearly as they were operationalized in the varieties of this task. 
False belief understanding has generally been considered to be one of the hallmarks of a full-
fledged theory of mind and “a so-called ″definitive″ test of mental-state understanding” 
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001, p. 655). Even though theory of mind cannot be limited to 
false belief understanding, false belief tasks have become the most popular tool to assess the 
child’s theory of mind (Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008). Performance in these tasks 
“has come to serve as a marker for mentalistic understanding of persons more generally” 
(Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001, p. 656). Wimmer and Perner (1983) came up with the first 
false belief task in which children were told a story about “Maxi and the chocolate”. They had 
to predict where Maxi with a mistaken belief about the location of some chocolate would look 
for it, either where he put it himself before leaving the room or where it was moved by his 
mother when Maxi was absent. While younger children said that Maxi would look in the new 
location, children around five years of age correctly predicted that Maxi would look for the 
chocolate where he himself had put it before leaving the room. Numerous studies followed, 
mainly replicating the original finding that 3-year-old children fail this task while the majority 
of the 5-year-old children succeed. An influential meta-analysis by Wellman and colleagues 
(2001) showed that the false belief performance of children from different countries similarly 
increased from below- to above-chance during the preschool years. In spite of its popularity, 
the history of false belief research is only slightly longer than the history of its critique. 
Bloom and German (2000) correctly stated that there is more to a ToM than understanding 
false belief and that passing the false belief task requires other abilities than ToM like for 
example inhibitory control (for a further recent critique see also De Haan, Jaegher, Fuchs & 
Mayer, 2011). Nevertheless, I think Herschbach is right in pointing out that these tasks assess 
something – and it is something that cannot be explained without an understanding of the fact 
that other people can be misinformed, that they can have a perspective on the world that 
differs from my own and from what is the case in reality.  
 38
On the following pages, I will argue that there are presently three important types of false 
belief tasks that should be distinguished. Older false belief tasks require the child to answer 
explicit questions about where another person will look for something or what another person 
will say, i.e., they involve making explicit verbal predictions. I will call these classical false 
belief tasks explicit verbal prediction tasks. More recent paradigms are mainly non-verbal8 
and the role of children in these tasks is more participatory. Children observe an experimenter 
who acts, requires or asks for something and who is holding a false belief in the critical 
condition. Children have to give a behavioural response that might consist in helping the 
experimenter to get a desired object, for example. In these tasks, predictions are not 
necessary, but children have to make sense of another person’s current behaviour and infer 
what his intention actually is (cf. Buttelmann, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2009). I will call these 
taks active behavioural response in interaction tasks. The third type involves implicit 
measures and eye measurement technology. These paradigms are non-verbal and do not 
require children to act, i.e. they are non-behavioural as well.9 I will refer to these tasks as 
looking behaviour tasks. Whereas classical explicit verbal prediction tasks are usually passed 
with 5 years of age (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001), studies that used the other two task 
types claimed false belief understanding at much younger ages, for example at 13 months 
(Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007) or 18 months of age (Buttelmann et al., 2009). The difference 
in performance between explicit verbal prediction tasks and the other two types of tasks 
suggests that the different paradigms might not measure exactly the same ability. In 
discussing the different types of false belief tasks, I will argue that mental state inference does 
always involve mental state attribution. At the end of this chapter, I will try to answer the 
question why false belief understanding is considered to be a paradigm case of mental state 
understanding. Finally, I will present the conceptual tool kit developed in this chapter with 
short definitions of the different terms.  
                                                          
8
 These tasks are non-verbal in the sense that children do not have to give a verbal answer. However, the 
experimenter might give her instructions verbally, she might comment on her actions verbally to make them 
more salient or in order to construct the necessary experimental narrative, and even the final prompt that is 
followed by the children’s behavioural response might be given to children verbally. Nevertheless, the children 
themselves respond by giving, pointing, helping, getting something for the experimenter, etc. In this sense, they 
are non-verbal as compared to the classical explicit verbal prediction tasks.  
9
 One might argue that eye movements are a kind of behaviour as well. Yet since looking behaviour tasks are 
considered to measure implicit false belief understanding, the corresponding eye movements might at best be 
thought of as a kind of passive behaviour. For the purpose of the present chapter, however, it should be obvious 
that the kind of response necessary in the active behavioural response in interaction tasks is very different from 
the response children are giving in the implicit tasks. Therefore, I will go on calling the former behavioural and 
the latter non-behavioural.  
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2.6.1 Explicit verbal prediction tasks 
A first and most famous example for this type of false belief task has already been described 
above in the story about “Maxi and the chocolate”. Such paradigms are also referred to as 
unexpected transfer or change-of-location tasks, since it is the change of location of an object 
that induces a false belief in a story character or person whose following behaviour must be 
predicted.10 Children are consequently asked where the story character or person (usually 
another experimenter or assistant) will look for something he has hidden when coming back 
into the room. Children who pass this task correctly state that he will look for the thing where 
he has put it before leaving the room, not where the object presently is, since he cannot know 
this. Note, however, that where the other person will look is not directly perceivable. When 
children are asked the test question, the other person is still absent. Moreover, the context 
does not directly provide an answer. Although we can engage in contextreading, this alone 
will not suffice. Note, that in the case of chess, as argued in the previous chapter, 
boardreading is sufficient to plan the next move. In the case of the false belief task, things are 
more complicated. Let’s have a look at another famous example, the so-called Sally-Anne task 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). In this task, dolls (Sally and Anne) are used to enact the 
false belief story. The child observes Sally put a marble in a basket and then leave the room. 
While Sally is absent, Anne moves the marble from the basket into a box which is in the same 
room. Sally then comes back into the room and the child is asked where Sally will look for the 
marble, and children who understand false beliefs will correctly answer that Sally will look in 
the basket since she still thinks that it is there. In this example, contextreading provides us 
with the following information: 
 
1.) Sally hides a marble in the basket  
2.) Sally leaves the room  
3.) the marble is moved to the box while Sally is still outside  
4.) Sally re-enters the room 
5.) the test question provides the information that Sally is going to look for the marble  
 
                                                          
10
 Besides unexpected transfer tasks, unexpected contents tasks do also belong to the explicit verbal prediction 
type. In these tasks, children are typically shown a container with a typical content and asked to say what is 
inside. After showing them the unexpected content, children are asked what one of their friends will think is in 
the box (cf. Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986). For lack of space and because unexpected contents tasks do not 
add anything of importance for my following arguments, I will merely focus on unexpected transfer tasks.  
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Note that the correct answer to the test question is not simply contained in points 1-5, since 
we need some kind of understanding what “being absent while an object is moved to another 
location” actually implies. At the very least, we have to understand that – in the context of this 
example - Sally cannot know something she hasn’t seen. Moreover, we must understand that 
people memorize things and search for things where they remember them to be. This 
knowledge is not directly perceivable, it is not contained in points 1-5. That Sally will look 
under location A is not fully implied in the fact that the marble was moved from the basket to 
the box in Sally’s absence. It is a behaviour that must be inferred. When Sally re-enters the 
room, children are asked where she will look for the marble. At this point, children must think 
something like “Since Sally hasn’t seen that the marble was moved into the box, she still 
thinks that it is in the basket” or “Since Sally was absent while the marble was moved, she 
still remembers the marble to be in the basket”. Such a reasoning structure is justifiably called 
a mental state inference, since a non-observable mental state (what Sally thinks or 
remembers) is inferred on the basis of a certain course of events one attended to. That Sally 
might still believe the marble to be in the basket is something we infer in addition to the 
perceptually given.11 On the basis of the inference that Sally still thinks that the marble is in 
the basket, they can make another inference which infers Sally’s behaviour that she will look 
for the marble in the basket. Passing this task would therefore require two steps: 
 
1.) mental state inference (what does Sally think or remember) 
2.) behaviour inference (where will Sally look for the marble) 
 
Herschbach says that both theory-theory and simulation-theory take success in such tasks “to 
be the result of mental state attribution” (2008, p. 37). In the analysis above, two inferences 
were identified. Where is the mental state attribution considered by Herschbach to be 
involved in those tasks? Does the fact that Herschbach uses the term mental state attribution 
provide us with another example of how mental state inference and attribution are 
                                                          
11
 Although I cannot go into details here, I have to address two possible alternative explanations. First, children 
might pass the Sally-Anne task without inferring a mental state by simply attributing ignorance to Sally and by 
following the rule that people who are ignorant get it wrong. Such a more parsimonious interpretation could 
indeed be an alternative in this case, but studies which controlled for such an alternative explanation rather 
supported the view that children really attribute false beliefs – and not only ignorance - to others (Southgate, 
Senju, & Csibra, 2007). Second, Sally might also pass the task by sticking to the simple behavioural rule that 
people tend to look for things where they last saw them. Behavioural rules can always be evoked as alternative 
explanations. They must, however, be adjusted to the situations they have to explain ex post. In the case of the 
false belief task, many different behavioural rules would be required to explain the different forms of false belief 
tasks. A mentalistic interpretation appears to be more parsimonious (cf. Call & Tomasello, 2008). Moreover, 
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confounded? Correct performance in the Sally-Anne task cannot be explained by merely 
referring to mental state attribution, since it remains an open question how children know that 
they have to attribute a false belief to Sally. Note however, that the inferences sketched above 
(“Since Sally hasn’t seen that the marble was moved into the box, she still thinks that it is in 
the basket” or “Since Sally was absent while the marble was moved, she still remembers the 
marble to be in the basket”) do already contain a mental state attribution, namely “she still 
thinks that…” and “she still remembers…”. It seems as if one cannot think of mental state 
inferences without someone in mind whose mental states are inferred. If I infer that Sally 
cannot know that the marble moved and that she still remembers it to be in the basket, these 
inferred facts do already contain the information that all this is about Sally. I do not infer a 
false belief which must subsequently be attributed to Sally in a second step. One might argue, 
however, that the first inference is computed on an abstract, general level (“People who 
haven’t seen that an object was moved to another place still think that the object is in the 
place it was before”). In the case of the Sally-Anne task, this would result in three steps: 
 
1.) mental state inference (what people who haven’t seen something think or remember) 
2.) mental state attribution (the resulting mental state of the first general inference must now 
be attributed to a concrete case, i.e. Sally) 
3.) behaviour inference (where will Sally look for the marble) 
 
Note, however, that the first inference does also already contain a mental state attribution, 
although a general one (what people think or remember). Therefore, I suggest to stick to the 
first analysis that only requires two steps, since mental state inference and attribution appear 
to coincide in the case of the false belief task. Notably, mental state inferences cannot be 
computed without someone (a concrete person or persons in general) in mind whose mental 
state must be inferred. More to the point, there is mental state attribution without inference, 
but no mental state inference without attribution. This might also explain why both terms are 
used interchangeably by many researchers and why some definitions of ToM or mindreading 
use only one of both terms. Nevertheless, there are still good reasons to distinguish between 
both terms (see previous chapter). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
first empirical studies that controlled for a “People look for objects where they last saw them” - rule rather 
support the mentalistic interpretation (Träuble, Marinovic & Pauen, 2010).  
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2.6.2 Active behavioural response in interaction tasks  
In these tasks, participants must interpret the speech or actions of an interactional partner, 
usually the experimenter, in light of his false belief in order to give the correct response. The 
required response in these tasks is active and behavioural, i.e., non-verbal. With respect to 
such tasks, Herschbach states: 
 
Participants are not being asked to make reflective judgments about the other person’s 
mental states, or to explicitly predict or explain their behaviour. Rather, false-belief 
understanding is required to successfully navigate the interaction, to respond online to the 
other person’s verbal request. (2008, p. 46) 
 
Studies that used this type of false belief task were done by Carpenter, Call and Tomasello 
(2002), Buttelmann et al. (2009) or recently by Southgate, Chevallier, and Csibra (2010). 
Since the latter study will be of importance in the empirical part of this work, I will have a 
closer look at it in the present chapter as well.  
In this study, an experimenter placed two novel, unnamed objects in two boxes of different 
colour. In the false belief condition, he leaves the room after doing so. Then, a second 
experimenter appears from behind a curtain and switches the objects in a sneaky way before 
disappearing behind the curtain again. When the first experimenter re-enters the room, he 
points to one of the two closed boxes and asks the child to get the intended object for him. 
Infants as young as 17 months seem to understand that the experimenter actually intends the 
object in the non-referred box. In the true belief condition, in contrast, they interpret his 
pointing behaviour as actually referring to the referred box, since the experimenter has seen 
the exchange of the objects in this condition.   
In the true belief condition, contextreading would give us the following information:  
 
1.) Experimenter 1 places two objects in two boxes 
2.) Experimenter 2 appears and removes the objects from the boxes 
3.) Experimenter 1 watches how Experimenter 2 swaps them 
4.) Experimenter 2 disappears again 
5.) Experimenter 1 points to one of the boxes, asking for help 
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Children subsequently help the adult by giving him the object out of the box he is actually 
pointing at. No mental state inference is required for that. Children see an adult pointing to a 
box and give him the object inside.  
In the false belief condition, contextreading would give us the following information:  
 
1.) Experimenter 1 places two objects in two boxes 
2.) Experimenter 1 leaves the room  
3.) Experimenter 2 appears and swaps the objects while Experimenter 1 is absent 
4.) Experimenter 2 disappears again 
5.) Experimenter 1 re-enters the room 
6.) Experimenter 1 points to one of the boxes, asking for help 
 
Children subsequently help the adult by giving him the object out of the box he is not pointing 
at. For doing so, children somehow have to interpret the adults pointing gesture as actually 
referring to the other box, although the perceptual evidence does not give them any reason for 
doing so. The reason for opening the other box must therefore be an inferred one, children 
have to think something like “Since he hasn’t seen that the objects were swapped, he still 
thinks that object 1 is in the box he is pointing at”.   
Again, although there is no prediction involved here, children in this type of false belief task 
have to infer a non-observable mental state on the basis of something that was directly 
perceived in a very similar way than in the explicit verbal prediction task. And like in the 
explicit verbal prediction task, the mental state inference does already contain mental state 
attribution. According to Southgate and colleagues, their results “demonstrate that 17-month-
old infants are able to attribute beliefs to others, and that they can use this ability to assign 
reference in a communicative context” (2010, pp. 910-911). Like Herschbach with respect to 
the explicit verbal prediction tasks, Southgate and colleagues interpret their findings as 
involving mental state attribution and do neither say anything about the inference which 
makes this attribution possible nor about the underlying knowledge that allows for the correct 
inference (that people can hold a false belief).  
2.6.3 Looking behaviour tasks 
 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) used a violation-of-expectation paradigm to demonstrate false 
belief understanding in 15-month-old infants. Infants were familiarized with a scene in which 
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an agent hides a toy in one of two locations and later returns to retrieve the object from the 
location where he hid it. Infants were then shown scenes where the toy was moved without 
the agent’s knowledge. They saw one out of two situations. Either the agent looked for the toy 
where he falsely believed it to be or where the toy was actually located (although the agent 
could not know this). The fact that infants looked longer in the latter case was interpreted by 
the authors as a sign that their expectation was violated – and the very fact that infants seemed 
to expect the agent to act in accordance with his false belief was interpreted as an early, 
implicit form of false belief understanding. However, some researchers have argued that the 
attribution of false beliefs is not the only explanation that can account for the longer looking 
times. Children might use associations between actor, object, and location (Perner & 
Ruffman, 2005) or they might simply attribute ignorance to the agent instead of false belief 
(cf. Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2007).  
A more convincing study using an anticipatory looking paradigm was done by Clements and 
Perner (1994) and more recently by Southgate and colleagues (2007). These studies are not 
very different from traditional tasks like the Sally-Anne task – however, children do not have 
to give a verbal answer. Instead, their anticipatory looking is examined using eye-tracking 
technology. In the study of Southgate and colleagues, infants are first familiarized with a 
video of an agent who watches how a ball is hidden by a puppet in one of two boxes. 
Windows through which the agent reaches for the boxes are then illuminated and the actor 
reaches for the box containing the ball. The test trial consists of two false belief conditions. In 
the first condition, the puppet initially places the ball in the left box. Then, the puppet moves 
it to the right box and then goes back to the left one to close its lid. Then, the actor turns round 
(i.e., from now on he cannot see what is going on) and the puppet removes the ball from the 
scene. After that, the actor turns back and the windows are illuminated (which signals that he 
will reach for one of the two boxes in order to retrieve the ball). In the second false belief 
condition, the puppet again places the ball in the left box. Then, the actor turns round before 
the puppet moves the ball from the left box to the right one. After doing so, the puppet 
removes the ball from the scene. Then, the actor turns back and the windows are illuminated 
again. While children in the first false belief condition correctly gaze to the right window 
significantly more often than to the left window, children in the second false belief condition 
gaze more often to the left window. According to the authors, this pattern “cannot be 
explained by the use of simpler rules, such as looking toward the first or last position of the 
object, the last position the actor attended, or the last location the puppet acted on” (ibid., pp. 
590-591) and take their results as evidence “that 2-year-olds are able to attribute false beliefs” 
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(ibid., p. 591). Again, the authors interpret their findings as involving mental state attribution 
and do neither say anything about the inference which makes this attribution possible nor 
about the underlying knowledge that allows for the correct inference (that people can hold a 
false belief). If the reasoning-process in this task is comparable to the one described in the 
Sally-Anne task analysis, then the inference involved is also comparable.  
Whether looking behaviour tasks actually measure the same as explicit verbal prediction or 
active behavioural response in interaction tasks, is an open question (see for example 
Buttelmann et al., 2009; Perner & Ruffman, 2005). For the purpose of this work, the first two 
types of false belief tasks seem to be more interesting. Explicit verbal prediction tasks are 
usually not passed before five years of age, i.e. at an age where children have already been 
strongly influenced by cultural rules and norms as well as local epistemologies, or, in the case 
of the present work, alleged opacity doctrines. Although children pass active behavioural 
response in interaction tasks much earlier, they still have to give an active behavioural 
response. Such a response is not given out of a cultural vacuum: even at very young age, 
children’s behavioural responses might already be guided by what is culturally expected and 
appropriate. From this point of view, the more passive looking behaviour tasks appear to be 
less appropriate when it comes to investigating the relationship between the possible influence 
of opacity doctrines on the constitutive aspects of mindreading. 
2.7 How properties of the false belief task influence our theorizing 
After summarizing and analyzing various types of false belief tasks, let me ask the following 
question again: Why is false belief understanding considered to be a paradigmatic example of 
mental state understanding? Is it really the paradigmatic example for our ability to explain and 
predict behaviour by attributing and inferring mental states? If people gossip about someone 
who insulted and attacked his neighbour although he is usually known for his peaceful 
character, they might infer that he must have been very angry and that he will probably try to 
avoid meeting the neighbour in the following days. In this example, the gossipers infer a 
mental state on the basis of behaviour that is usually associated with anger. In doing so, they 
also attribute anger, since I have argued that mental state inference cannot be thought of 
without mental state attribution. Moreover, they explain his behaviour by reference to a 
mental state and they also predict his probable behaviour on the basis of the attributed mental 
state. So what is so special about the false belief task? And why do ToM critics like Shaun 
Gallagher (2008), Daniel Hutto (2008) or Leudar and Costall (2009a) oppose theory of mind 
when ToM is simply about this: attributing and inferring mental states for behaviour 
 46
explanation and prediction? After all, they would probably have a hard time denying that all 
this occurs in the example just given.  
Let me clarify this by making two points. First, I will argue that the false belief task is 
actually about more than what is constitutive of theory of mind or mindreading in 
corresponding definitions. Second, I will argue that theory of mind research was tied so 
closely to the false belief task that aspects of laboratory experiments in general influenced the 
theories that were derived on the basis of false belief results. I will start with the first point.  
Although inferential abilities are necessary for passing the false belief task, it is not primarily 
measuring inference per se. Rather, the false belief task assesses whether children have the 
necessary knowledge on which basis the correct inference can be made, namely, that people 
who don’t see a change-of-location still think that an object is in the previous location. It is 
this knowledge that allows for the correct inference. Therefore, passing the false belief task 
requires among other things (like for example inhibitory control) not only reasoning abilities 
that allow for inference in general (cf. Frye, Zelazo & Palfai, 1995, p. 524; Riggs & Peterson, 
2000; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998), they require the understanding that 
people in such a situation cannot know about things they haven’t seen and that they act on the 
basis of what they think is the case. But this insight challenges the link between definitions of 
theory of mind and ‘mindreading’ on the one hand and the alleged paradigmatic test designed 
for its measurement on the other, since the false belief task clearly tests more than the ability 
to explain and predict behaviour on the basis of mental state attributions and inferences. What 
is additionally assessed in false belief tasks is an understanding which we only need very 
rarely, and even in situations in which we have to explain and predict behaviour by attributing 
and inferring mental states (e.g. the peaceful guy’s outburst we heard of in gossip), it is an 
understanding we mostly do not need. However, the false belief task somehow redefined what 
it was supposed to measure. Reddy and Morris (2004) observed that there is “a peculiar 
redefinitional tendency in the process of building a scientific paradigm, in which the theory 
not only defines its own investigative remit but also usurps common meanings and thus 
redefines its evidence” (ibid., p. 655). Although ToM definitions speak about mental state 
inference and mental state attribution for the purpose of behaviour prediction and explanation, 
they measure all this with a task that requires more, namely, an understanding that people can 
be misinformed about the true state of affairs and that such misinformation can guide 
behaviour. This additional “more” subsequently put more common examples from everyday 
life in question. What about our gossipers, who concluded that this formerly peaceful guy 
must have been really angry? Inferring anger in this example might be the result of a simple 
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association between specific behaviours and a mental state term (anger), and providing anger 
as a reason for aggressive behaviour might be a learnt narrative competence. Since such a 
kind of mental state inference does not involve an understanding that people can be 
misinformed and hold a false belief, it is not considered to be a “true” example of theory of 
mind, although theory of mind is defined as the ability to infer mental states for behaviour 
explanation. This is precisely the “peculiar redefinitional tendency” Reddy and Morris 
criticized. All of a sudden, our everyday interactions and experiences are not good enough for 
demonstrating that someone understands other minds as another perspective on the world. 
And according to Leudar and Costall (2009b), “the basic conviction has remained that it is 
only on the basis of experimental evidence that we can determine whether a particular 
individual is really able to understand other people” (ibid., p. 7).  
Let’s come to the second point. False belief tasks are tied to laboratory settings in which other 
influencing factors are controlled. Pillow, Hill, Boyce and Stein (2000) distinguish both 
perceptual experience as well as guessing from inference and confirm that inferences “provide 
knowledge of events that have not been directly perceived” (ibid., p. 170). What I think is 
most telling is how they distinguish inference from guessing: “Inferences and guesses both 
involve cognitive activities; however, inferences are based on the integration of premise 
information rather than on random generation of ideas in the absence of information. 
Furthermore, valid deductive inferences yield certain knowledge, but guesses are uncertain” 
(ibid., p. 170). Transferred to the domain of mental states, this would imply that the term 
mindguessing should be used for guesses that are not based on any evidence and that are 
uncertain while mental state inferences are based on given information and yield certain 
knowledge. I will come back to this point in a moment. 
In the experiment of Pillow and colleagues, children between 4 and 7 years of age had to rate 
the certainty of a puppet’s belief about a hidden toy as well as to explain the origin of this 
belief. Both the puppet and the child saw two toys of different colour. Afterwards, the toys 
were hidden in two separate containers. In the first condition (perception condition), the 
puppet looked into one of the containers and made a statement about the colour of the toy 
inside. In the second condition (inference condition), the puppet looked into one of the 
containers but made a statement about the colour of the toy in the other container. In the third 
condition (guess condition), the puppet made a statement about the colour of a toy in one of 
both containers without looking into either of them before. Note, that the operationalization of 
the guess condition is not in line with the definition of guesses given above. In this condition, 
children see the two objects before they are hidden. Therefore, the odds of guessing correctly 
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are fifty-fifty. Guessing, at least in its operationalization by Pillow and colleagues, is therefore 
far from being a “random generation of ideas in the absence of information” (ibid., p. 170).  
The authors “expected children to rate the puppet as highly certain when its statement 
appeared to be based on direct perceptual experience or deductive inference but to rate the 
puppet as uncertain when the statement appeared to be a guess” (ibid.). In a second 
experiment, another condition was introduced, a so-called invalid inference trial. In this 
condition, the puppet looked into one of three cans (each containing an object of different 
colour) and made a statement about the colour of an object in one of the other two containers. 
In this condition, looking into only one can does not allow to deduce the colour of the object 
in one of the other cans (cf. Pillow, Hill, Boyce & Stein, 2000). What is interesting here is 
how the inference condition – in contrast to the invalid inference trial - is operationalized as 
the condition where there is only one correct answer. The authors say that “deductive 
inferences are more certain than guesses” (ibid., p. 170), but in operationalizing a study on 
inference so that there is only one correct answer, they automatically create the impression 
that inferences can yield certain knowledge. And here is my argument: false belief 
researchers did exactly the same and so the last thirty years of false belief research gave rise 
to exactly such an impression. I have argued that behaviour explanation and prediction by 
means of mental state attribution and inference can occur in everyday life. But almost never 
in everyday life can we know for certain whether our inferences are correct. As soon as there 
is more than one possibility, Pillow and colleagues would speak of an invalid inference. In 
these cases, mindguessing would probably be the more appropriate term. 
Imagine that you are having a coffee with a friend - let’s call him Michael. Michael is 
obviously very sad and strikes his chin thoughtfully. Another friend told you the day before 
that Michael’s girlfriend has left him. Consequently, you might infer that he is currently 
thinking of his girlfriend. Now how certain are you that he is thinking of his girlfriend? Your 
inference was based on your background knowledge that his girlfriend has left him and on the 
direct perception of his sadness and thoughtful expression. To assume that Michael is thinking 
of her is therefore reasonable. However, Michael’s thinking might be occupied with 
something else as well. Although the sad mood he is in originates in the fact that his girlfriend 
has left him, this mood could have started a whole bunch of other negative feelings and 
thoughts. Instead of thinking of his ex-girlfriend, he might as well think of another girlfriend 
who left him many years ago, how his first love rejected him in school, he might remember 
the divorce of his parents or think whether he should ask the beautiful waitress in his favourite 
café to go out for a drink with him. Actually, these alternatives are not very improbable. 
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Saying that we infer a mental state in such situations obscures how fallible they are in 
everyday life and how much certainty depends on the other’s confirmation. Rather than 
speaking of mental state inference, we make a probable guess based on available evidence. In 
other words, we engage in mindguessing, although we use given information and background 
knowledge to make the guess as good as possible. The term “inference” has its place in 
mathematics and the natural sciences, but not in everyday social encounters. The same is true 
for terms like “prediction” and “explanation”. With respect to the latter, Hutto says that 
“proper reason explanations require us to designate the reason for acting – as opposed to 
simply offering a possible reason for acting” (2004, p. 570). Explaining, predicting and 
inferring all sound as if there is one correct answer, as if the possibility of gaining certain and 
exact knowledge about another’s mental states is real. As we have seen, all these terms are 
constitutive for definitions of ‘mindreading’ – and ‘mindreading’, due to its relatedness to the 
notion of telepathy, is itself a term which suggests that certain knowledge about others’ 
mental states is easily possible. However, explaining something is not the same as providing 
possible reasons for a behaviour. When we move from everyday life to the artificial world of 
the laboratory, we reduce the contingency of everyday life, we reduce the endless possibilities 
that our mindguessing activities in everyday life face to a binary setting with one wrong and 
one correct answer which can unequivocally be inferred. In doing so, we give rise to an 
illusion of inference, an illusion of explanation and prediction. In speaking of an illusion, I do 
not want to say that we do not infer, explain and predict in the laboratory – the illusion is 
generated when we take for granted that what is at work in the laboratory is also pervasive 
outside of it, when we assume that the preciseness and unambiguousness of the laboratory – 
reflected in a corresponding terminology that speaks of inference, explanation and prediction 
– should shape our theories of how we come to understand others.  
One might ask, however, why we shouldn’t use the term mental state inference in a weaker 
sense, for example in the same way as I used it above in the example of the peaceful guy who 
surprisingly attacked someone. I said that people in gossip infer that he must have been very 
angry on the basis that such behaviour is usually associated with anger. Indeed, given 
information is used to arrive at a plausible conclusion, so why not talk of mental state 
inference? I think there is no stringent reason to avoid the term in such cases. However, I have 
tried to demonstrate how researchers think of inferences as processes that yield certain 
knowledge. This is why I prefer the term mindguessing. But let me suggest a possible 
solution. We could think of pure mindguessing and false belief understanding as two poles of 
one continuum. On the very left, mindguessing occurs without any premise information. On 
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the right pole, we have the artificial situation of a false belief laboratory experiment with only 
two possible and only one correct answer. The more we move from the left to the right, the 
more premise information via contextreading is given, and the chances to guess correctly 
become higher. As soon as there is at least some information available on which we can base 
our guesses, we could also talk of mental state inference. As we move from the left to the 
right, mindguessing gradually loses its guessing character and, since more and more 
information is provided, we gain the impression that we might infer another’s mental state 
with certainty, false belief situations being the extreme example. In this view, mental state 
inference is the process which we use at all points of the continuum except for cases of pure 
mindguessing. But in order to avoid the illusion of inference as a deduction that yields certain 
knowledge, I suggest to use the term mindguessing for all those cases where the inference is 
not more than a probable guess based on available evidence. 
2.8 Summary 
Let us sum up. In this chapter, I have criticized the notion of mindreading and suggested to 
use the terms mental state inference and mental state attribution instead. I have further argued 
that both terms should be distinguished although they often go hand in hand. A short 
introduction to the direct perception approach of mental states was given and I have 
introduced new terms like contextreading and mindguessing. Finally, I have tried to argue that 
the term mental state inference gives rise to the illusion of certainty, which is why I 
introduced the term mindguessing. The first part of the conceptual tool kit that will be 
necessary for the analysis of the opacity reports is therefore ready for use. It will be 
summarized now by presenting the corresponding definitions before I turn to the next chapter 
on empathy. 
 
Contextreading: the ability to make sense of situations, circumstances and the course of 
events without the necessity to infer mental states, for example by considering rules or norms 
Direct perception: will be used to refer to the direct perception of certain mental states, for 
example intentions that can be read off behaviours or mood and emotions that can be 
perceived in someone’s facial and corporal expression as well as in gestures; no inferences are 
involved 
Mental state attribution: ascribing silently or aloud a mental state term to either an animate 
or inanimate being, for example when labelling something which is directly perceived 
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Mental state talk: talk and narrative that involves mental state attribution, either in 
interactive situations or inner soliloquy  
Mindguessing: guessing the content of someone’s mind, either without evidence or on the 
basis of given evidence that still leaves alternative possibilities open 
Mental state inference: a reasoning process in which non-observable mental states are 
inferred on the basis of given information, involved in mindguessing as soon as guesses are 
based on evidence as well as in false belief understanding 
False belief understanding: the ability to base mental state inferences on the knowledge that 
people might falsely believe something to be the case and act on the basis of this belief 
 52
3. Empathy 
In the introduction, I argued that the opacity of other minds phenomenon is at least as much 
about empathy as it is about ‘mindreading’-practices across cultures. In a stepwise process, I 
will start to critically review current definitions and conceptualizations of empathy and 
develop a definition of empathy on theoretical grounds. This definition will be enriched by 
emic concepts reported in the anthropological contributions on empathy (see next chapter) 
and by additional aspects of Jeannette Mageo’s (2011) account on empathy in Samoa. In this 
chapter, I will start with a short paragraph on the history of the term before I go on to outline 
the conceptual difficulties of the term. After this, I will argue that grasping the ‘how’-aspect 
of another’s experience is a central aspect of empathy in my view. Finally, I will provide a 
first definition of empathy. 
3.1 Historical background of a modern concept 
The term empathy was coined by Edward Titchener (1909) who introduced it into English as 
a translation of the German term Einfühlung (literally: “feeling into”; Lipps, 1903, 1906). It 
was originally introduced in the field of aesthetic perception (cf. Vischer, 1927). Vischer 
called the imaginary shift into another object Einfühlung.12 Lipps (1906) understood the term 
in a much broader sense, although he confirmed that we anthropomorphize objects and things 
via Einfühlung. 13  For Lipps, Einfühlung also provides us with knowledge of other 
consciousnesses (“Wissen von fremdem Bewußtseinsleben”; 1906, p. 35) via a kind of inner 
participation (“inneres Mitmachen”) or imitation of observed expressive behaviour (Lipps, 
1903, p. 111). Indeed, Einfühlung, in Lipps view, is this kind of inner participation.14 Lipps 
argued that seeing a foreign gesture or expression results in a tendency to reproduce it, which 
                                                          
12
 In Vischer’s words: “Betrachte ich einen ruhigen, festen Gegenstand, so kann ich mich ganz folgsam an die 
Stelle seines inneren Aufbaus, seines Schwerpunktes setzen. Ich bilde mich demselben ein, vermittle meinen 
Umfang mit dem seinigen, strecke und erweitere, biege und beschränke mich in demselben” (1927, p. 21). In 
another place, Vischer says about the inner sense which is thereby at work that it “fühlt an der Form auch ihre 
Fülle. Er umfaßt z. B. einen Baum, versetzt sich in seine holzige Triebkraft und fühlt, zurückkehrend, seinen 
Formcharakter von innen heraus; starrt, sproßt und schwankt in ihm, tastet in seinen Spitzen. Er brüstet und 
bäumt sich in der Woge. Er ballt sich dumpf in der Wolke. Für diese Art von Versetzung weiß ich kein besseres 
Wort als: Einfühlung” (1927, p. 63). Here, Vischer describes how Einfühlung even allows for feeling into a tree. 
13
 “Daß wir trotzdem alle diese Ausdrücke auch auf Dinge anwenden, hat seinen Grund in dem gleichen 
Umstande, der uns auch von Tätigkeiten der Dinge sprechen läßt, d. h. in einer Vermenschlichung oder 
Beseelung der Dinge der Außenwelt, kurz in der »Einfühlung«” (Lipps, 1906, p. 28). 
14
 “So mache ich denn insbesondere auch das innere Verhalten, das in einer Ausdrucksbewegung für mich 
unmittelbar liegt, in dem Maße innerlich mit, als dasselbe meinem eigenen Wesen gemäß, oder mir selbst 
„natürlich“ ist, und als ich der Ausdrucksbewegung, und damit zugleich jenem inneren Verhalten, betrachtend 
hingegeben bin” (Lipps, 1903, p. 111). On the same page, Lipps says: “Dies Mitmachen ist aber 
Einfühlung“”(ibid.). 
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in turn evokes the feeling normally associated with it. Lipps’ model clearly anticipates 
simulation theory and makes it understandable that empathy has recently become a central 
category within the simulationist camp (see for example Stueber, 2012). For Lipps, “empathy 
is a resonance phenomenon or a form of inner or mental imitation activated in the perceptual 
encounter with another person and his activities” (Stueber, 2012, p. 55). The result of this 
resonance or inner participation must then be projected onto the other and thus allows 
understanding him. There is an important difference between Vischer’s use of the term 
Einfühlung and Lipps’ application of the term for human encounters. On Vischer’s account, 
Einfühlung refers to the act of feeling something into an object or piece of art that is not part 
of the object or artwork itself, since neither objects, nor paintings or novels do have any 
feelings. Lipps, however, uses the term to refer to processes where we project a feeling into 
another after a kind of resonance has taken place. One could argue that works of art can also 
make us resonate. This is certainly true. However, I think nobody would deny that there is a 
clear difference between both kinds of resonance. Most importantly, whereas our “feeling 
into” a work of art adds something to it that was formerly not there, our “feeling into” another 
person is supposed to tell us something about this person that is already there, it is supposed 
to assess something of the other, namely, that she is a minded, conscious creature having 
specific mental states. Whereas Einfühlung in Vischers’s sense treats something as if it were 
minded although it is not, Lipps uses the term to describe how we come to understand 
something as minded which indeed has a mind, namely, human beings.   
3.2 Empathy, ToM, and simulation: on the way to conceptual clarity  
Since the times of these authors, things have become more complicated. In their influential 
article on empathy, Preston and de Waal (2002) state that the concept of empathy “has had a 
difficult history, marked by disagreement and discrepancy” and that the interdisciplinary 
research field that investigates empathy “suffers from a lack of consensus regarding the nature 
of the phenomenon” (ibid., p. 1). Nevertheless, Decety and Ickes are certainly right to claim 
that “empathy research is suddenly everywhere!” (2009, vii). And, in line with Preston and de 
Waal, they add that the construct of empathy is “a very complicated one that, from its very 
introduction, has been used by different writers in very different ways” (ibid., vii). The 
previous chapter has demonstrated that it is quite difficult to get clear-cut definitions of such 
terms like theory of mind, mindreading, mental state attribution, or mental state inference. 
With empathy, however, things are even more complicated, since almost “everybody writing 
in the field would declare that there is no accepted standard definition of empathy” (Engelen 
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& Röttger-Rössler, 2012, p. 3). Stueber even says that “the concept of empathy has been 
characterized by a rather shameful disregard for conceptual clarity” (2012, p. 55). In an 
attempt to bring some order into the field of empathy research, Batson (2009) recently 
identified two major research questions that guide this research and eight different uses of the 
term empathy which refer to different phenomena. According to Batson, the two questions are 
1) “How do we know another’s thoughts and feelings?” and 2) “What leads one person to 
respond with sensitivity and care to the suffering of another?” (2009, pp. 8-9). Each of the 
eight uses of the term empathy identified by Batson can be treated as an attempt to answer one 
of these two questions. Note, however, that knowledge about what another person thinks and 
feels can also lead someone to respond with sensitivity and care. Likewise, caring for 
someone might provide knowledge about what they think and feel. Instead of trying to 
provide the definition for empathy, Batson suggests: “The best one can do is recognize the 
different phenomena, make clear the labeling scheme one is adopting, and use that scheme 
consistently” (ibid., p. 8).  
The eight concepts as identified by Batson (cf. 2009, pp. 4-8) are: 
 
Concept 1: Knowing another person’s internal state, including his or her thoughts and feelings 
Concept 2: Adopting the posture or matching the neural responses of an observed other 
Concept 3: Coming to feel as another person feels 
Concept 4: Intuiting or projecting oneself into another’s situation 
Concept 5: Imagining how another is thinking and feeling  
Concept 6: Imagining how one would think and feel in the other’s place 
Concept 7: Feeling distress at witnessing another person’s suffering 
Concept 8: Feeling for another person who is suffering 
 
With respect to concepts 7 and 8, Batson says that they “are not sources of knowledge (or 
belief) about another’s state; they are reactions to this knowledge” (2009, p. 9). The concepts 
of pity and sympathy are probably the ones that were most often associated with concept 8. 
But let’s start from the beginning. While concept 1 bears a striking resemblance to ToM, 
concept 2 refers to processes such as mimicry and imitation. Gallese, for example, thinks of 
empathy as a form of inner imitation (2003, p. 519). Batsons formulation of concept 3 would 
be a valid description for emotional contagion (cf. Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994), 
while it could also be the result of what is covered by concept 2. According to Batson (2009, 
p. 6), concept 4 refers to the psychological state originally referred to by Lipps (1903, 1906) 
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as Einfühlung. Concept 5 is about those imaginative abilities that focus on the other while 
concept 6 is rather about imagining to be in the other’s place. Batson mentions the similarities 
between concepts 4, 5, and 6 and goes on to suggest that simulation proponents might 
consider their approach as involving several of the concepts in this list:  
 
A simulation theory proponent might argue that by intuiting and projecting oneself into 
the other’s situation (concept 4) or by imagining how one would think and feel in the 
other’s place (concept 6), one comes to feel as the other feels (concept 3), and knowledge 
of one’s own feelings then enables one to know – or to believe one knows – how the other 
feels (concept 1). (2012, p. 9) 
 
Alternatively, matching (concept 2) might lead one to feel as the other feels (concept 3) and 
therefore to know his mental state (concept 1). This demonstrates how much influence 
simulationist ideas have on how empathy is currently conceptualized and understood. From a 
simulationist point of view, concepts 1-6 are just descriptions of different aspects or steps 
within a simulation process. After sketching different uses of the term empathy sensu Batson, 
I will now critically discuss some concrete definitions of empathy and try to link them to the 
concepts identified by Batson. In doing so, I will try to argue for a reasonable definition of 
empathy in order to be able to add it to the conceptual tool kit with which the anthropological 
reports in chapter 4 will be analyzed.  
Note that there is another distinction running through some of the concepts identified by 
Batson (concepts 1, 5, 6), namely, the distinction between thoughts and feelings in empathic 
processes. As a matter of fact, some researchers focus on the affective, emotional side of 
empathy, others on the more cognitive aspects. This often results in the difficulty to 
distinguish empathy from the concepts analyzed in the previous chapter on theory of mind 
and ‘mindreading’. Some authors even define empathy or related concepts in the same way 
theory of mind is usually defined. For example, William Ickes defines empathic inference as 
“the everyday mind reading that people do whenever they attempt to infer other people s 
thoughts and feelings. It is a concept that other writers address under such headings as 
‘mentalizing’ or ‘theory of mind’” (2009, p. 57). Although Ickes speaks of empathic inference 
and not of empathy, he still explicitly links theory of mind to an empathic process. Inspired by 
Ickes, Decety and Jackson (2004) define empathy as “a complex form of psychological 
inference in which observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning are combined to yield 
insights into the thoughts and feelings of others” (ibid., p. 73). Remember the analysis of the 
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Sally-Anne task in the previous chapter. Children have to observe the ongoing events 
involving Sally and Anne, they have to memorize where the marble previously was and at 
which location Sally has seen the marble. They have to know that people who do not see 
things usually do not know any details about them and they have to reason, i.e., infer that 
Sally will still think that the marble is in the basket. I have argued that this task provides the 
paradigmatic example for the term mental state inference as it is used in the theory of mind 
framework. But according to the definition of empathy provided by Decety and Jackson, 
children’s success in the Sally-Anne task would also be a paradigmatic example for empathy. 
Both the definitions of Ickes and Decety and Jackson can clearly be related to concept 1 in 
Batson’s list. If we accept such a usage of the term empathy, we end up having two different 
labels for one and the same phenomenon. Therefore, I suggest to be very critical of every 
definition of empathy that sounds too much like mindreading and theory of mind. One might 
argue, however, that this is not problematic since cognitive and affective empathy are 
distinguished in some definitions (Walter, 2012). Yet if cognitive empathy amounts to ToM, 
then we end up with two labels for the same phenomenon again. 
Cultural anthropologist Jason Throop summarizes the most important aspects of how some 
anthropologists dealt with the concept of empathy: 
 
Common to these views is the idea that empathetic acts are characterized by at least three 
distinct moments: (1) a decentering of the self from its own historically and culturally 
situated self-experience; (2) imagining the perspective of another from a quasi-first-person 
perspective; and (3) approximating the feelings, emotions, motives, concerns, and 
thoughts of another mind. (2008, p. 405) 
 
The second point here is equivalent to Batson’s concept 6, the third comes close to concept 3.  
I have already mentioned that simulationist ideas figure prominently in many definitions of 
empathy. Throop’s second point, which sounds like an exemplary characterization of what 
simulation theory is all about, clearly proves that. A closer look, however, reveals that 
actually all three points make reference to simulation theory since they belong together 
logically. A decentering of the self is actually the precondition for the ability to imagine 
oneself in another’s shoes and point three just states the goal of simulation processes: we 
decenter and imagine another’s perspective because we aim to approximate his feelings, 
emotions, etc. Does empathy then amount to simulation? Has simulation theory become our 
theory of empathy? Authors like Stueber admit that their “account of empathy is closely 
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linked to contemporary simulation theory” (2012, p. 56). Moreover, I have pointed out that 
concepts 1-6 in Batson’s list could easily be reframed as a description of simulation processes. 
The same is true for the three distinct moments of empathic acts sensu Throop. With regard to 
simulation theory, Sharrock and Coulter (2009) say: “No one is denying that we can 
sometimes imaginatively simulate a situation and our reaction to it, but ST is advanced as a 
generalized account of how we understand others and requires, therefore, that we be 
simulating pretty much all the time” (2009, p. 80). Simulation theory (ST) was put forward as 
a theoretical account of how we understand others as having minds in general – and I think 
this is where we should be cautious, since simulation would, from this point of view, be 
necessary to know that others are minded at all. Moreover, we would have to simulate anger 
in ourselves in order to know that another person is angry. Simulation thus conceived shares 
with other ToM approaches the basic assumption that other people’s minds are hidden away 
from each other, that there is a gap that must be bridged somehow, and that expressive 
behaviour alone cannot tell us something about the other’s mental state (see previous chapter). 
Sharrock and Coulter critically remark: “It is sometimes suggested that ST has affinity with 
the vernacular request to put ourselves in another person’s shoes, though ST itself is rather 
more a case of putting other people in our shoes” (2009, p. 84). So is there a possibility to 
think of empathy as a form of perspective taking that does not buy into the basic assumption 
of the hiddenness of other minds? 
I think the picture we have arrived at so far is unsatisfying. If empathy research is currently 
experiencing a revival, then there should be more to it than the present analysis suggests. Note 
that we would intuitively, based on our naïve everyday understanding of the term, never 
equate theory of mind (concept 1) with empathy, nor would we equate it with mimickry and 
imitation (concept 2), with emotional contagion (concept 3), personal distress (concept 7) or 
pity and sympathy (concept 8). Moreover, we have seen that concepts 4 and 6 and the 
definitions of empathy presented above do not offer very much that goes beyond theory of 
mind or what simulation theories have to offer – and simulation theory in its original form is 
just another account within the theory of mind framework. But even if we accepted to identify 
empathy with simulation, we would again end up having two terms for the same phenomenon.  
3.3 Grasping the ‘how’-aspect of others’ experience 
Before I try to develop a conception of empathy that is hopefully more satisfying and not 
identical with simulation theory, let me start with asking a question that might sound 
heretical: Do we need the concept of empathy at all? Imagine you are on a party, it is late and 
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you see someone you like but do not know very well – let us call him Donald – sitting on the 
sofa. You want to say hello and, while approaching the sofa, you directly perceive the sadness 
in his face. You stop in front of him and, since you don’t know what the reason for his 
sadness might be, you start to talk a bit with him. He tells you that his girlfried has left one 
hour ago with another guy while he was spending some time on the toilet because he felt sick. 
Donald shows you a photograph he secretly made with his iPhone before going to the toilet. It 
shows his girlfriend talking with that other guy, on the photo both appear to have fun. You 
read the context – what Donald told you and what you see on the photograph – and you infer 
that Donald probably thinks that his girlfriend is cheating on him. You go to get a drink and 
meet someone at the bar who tells you that Donald’s girlfried thought he had already left, that 
she was angry because Donald didn’t tell her and that she finally agreed to leave with 
someone who dropped her at her home and then went on to his girlfriend. You infer that 
Donald is holding a false belief and that he is sad because he falsely believes his girlfriend to 
cheat on him while she is probably lying in bed, angry with him because she falsely believes 
that Donald left without telling her, while he was waiting on the toilet for his sickness to pass.   
In this example, you can understand a very complex social situation by direct perception, 
contextreading, mental state- and false belief inference. Direct perception provides you with 
an answer to the what-question: Donald is sad. Contextreading helps you to infer that Donald 
might think that his girlfried is cheating on him and false belief inference answers the why-
question, since it lets you understand that Donald is sad because he falsely beliefs his 
girlfriend to cheat on him. It seems as if we already have everything we need to analyze social 
situations and interactions in our conceptual tool kit. But all this is knowledge that keeps us in 
the position of a distant observer, it does neither help us to understand how Donald feels, nor 
how Donald feels, as long as we are not somehow drawn ever more deeply into his personal 
experience. In short, while the conceptual tools developed in the previous chapter can help us 
to understand what another person feels and why this is so, we do still not have a real idea of 
how this person feels – and this is where I think empathy comes into play. Of course, in a 
minimal sense, perceiving someone’s sadness gives us an idea how this person feels, since we 
all now what it means to be sad. Yet as long as we do not share the other’s emotion, this 
minimal understanding of the ‘how-aspect’ is rather abstract and conceptually guided. It 
remains ‘cold’ and does not necessarily bring us in closer contact with the other. Engelen and 
Röttger-Rössler appear to have the same intuition: “Empathy is a social feeling that consists 
in feelingly grasping or retracing the present, future, or past emotional state of the other; thus, 
empathy is also called a vicarious emotion” (2012, p. 4). Interesting in this definition is that 
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emotional states are not only the object of empathy, the process of empathy itself is a 
“feelingly grasping”. The definition of Bischof-Köhler goes into the same direction: 
“Empathy is a process in which an observer vicariously shares the emotion or intention of 
another person and thereby understands what this other person feels or intends” (2012, p. 41). 
Whereas Röttger-Rössler talks of “feelingly grasping”, Bischof-Köhler even speaks of sharing 
(ibid.). As argued above, I think that sharing is an important aspect in empathic processes. 
Bischof-Köhler adds that the empathic response is “primarily an emotional response” (ibid.) 
and that it “may be caused by the expressive behavior of the other or by the person’s 
situation” (ibid.). 
Yet one important question here is: what motivates us to feelingly grasp or even share how 
someone feels, to go beyond the mere perception of another’s emotional state? If I can 
identify the emotion of another person and if I even understand why she is having that 
emotion, why should I move on to feel for myself how it feels for her? Why do I need to share 
her feeling, especially if it is not a very positive one? I will later present Jeannette Mageo’s 
account of empathy in Samoa that might offer an answer to these questions by defining 
empathy as redirected attachment. If we take her idea seriously, then empathy is precisely to 
be distinguished from a cold understanding in the sense of ToM, since sharing emotions helps 
to establish social bonds and to attach oneself to others we identify with – at least to a certain 
degree.  
Let me address two more questions which I think are important. The first one will focus on 
whether empathy is only possible in real encounters between humans, the second is about its 
moral dimension. First, Batson (2009) does not explicitly mention whether the different uses 
of empathy apply to human encounters only or whether empathy does also occur when 
engaging with fiction, for example the characters in a story. Some researchers think that 
empathy is also active when imagining fictional scenarios and therefore support the view that 
empathy does not require the presence of a real human being (Breithaupt, 2012; Walter, 
2012). Such a view on empathy seems to be justified at least historically (Vischer, 1927). 
Batson’s concepts 5 and 6 are about imaginative capacities, and so one might suspect that 
they can also be directed to story characters. However, Batson claims to have identified two 
major research questions that guide the field of empathy research, namely, how one knows 
another’s thoughts and feelings and what leads one to respond with sensitivity and care to the 
suffering of another (2009, pp. 8-9). With this in mind, it seems as if Batson was actually not 
thinking of fictional scenarios, but real encounters between human beings.  
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A broad use of the concept of empathy that allows for it to occur in virtual encounters is, to 
my view, not without problems. Despite of its origin in aesthetics, the term empathy is 
nowadays mostly applied to the context of real human-human encounters. According to de 
Waal, the “lowest common denominator of all empathic processes is that one party is affected 
by another’s emotional or arousal state” (2008, p. 282). Such a kind of affection does 
typically occur when one can directly perceive the other person. At this point, I have to come 
back to the example of Donald given above. In this example, I said that the direct perception 
of Donald’s sadness provides us with an answer to the what-question. Although this is true, it 
is not the whole story, since direct perception is not a ‘cold’ kind of perception. The other’s 
expression im-presses us, we resonate with someone’s sadness or joy, or, as de Waal would 
say, we are affected by his emotional or arousal state. The direct perception of another person 
is therefore an important aspect for empathic processes to occur and also an important aspect 
that helps us to understand how a specific emotion is experienced by the other. If we read a 
novel and use our imagination to immerse ourselves into the story, our own imaginations can 
cause emotional reactions in us. We might favour a certain protagonist and literally feel with 
him. Importantly, however, these feelings are caused by a narrative and our own imaginary 
constructs. We do not understand another human being. Instead of feeling into someone, we 
feel into an imaginary scenario, and in doing so, we feel something. But what we feel is 
obviously different from what another real person really feels. Therefore, although we might 
be affected by fictive characters and their mental states (which we are told in a story), it is 
certainly a very different kind of affection than when another human being is present.15 If we 
apply the concept of empathy for both situations, we ignore this difference and end up losing 
the potential power of the empathy concept for our real intersubjective encounters as well as 
the possibility to add something to what the ToM-framework has on offer. Let me explain 
why. The ToM account was criticized as a detached account, reducing social cognition to 
what happens if people think about others from a 3rd-person-perspective (Fuchs & De 
Jaegher, 2009; De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher, 2010), i.e. from an observational stance 
that excludes direct interaction and mutual influence. Critics have repeatedly argued that 
social cognition research should focus on direct interactions and on interactions where people 
are emotionally involved with each other (Reddy, 2008). While ToM was traditionally 
associated especially with others’ beliefs and desires, empathy is commonly thought of as a 
                                                          
15
 It is not by accident that we can be struck by a present person’s appearance and immediately fall in love with 
her in a way modern dating possibilities via Internet can never compensate for, although text, pictures and voice 
can easily be transmitted and exchanged online. This illustrates that another’s physical presence adds something 
very important to the components just mentioned. 
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process directed at another’s emotions. Its focus on emotions, on the question of how 
something feels like from the other’s point of view, is what makes empathy different from 
more detached processes associated with ToM. Against this background, applying empathy 
for engagement with fiction amounts to throwing out the baby with the bath water. 
The second question to be addressed is whether empathy is morally positive or neutral, i.e. 
whether empathy can also be used to harm others. The paradigmatic example would be the 
expert torturer who might be especially good at his job because he uses empathy to torture as 
effectively as possible. While some researchers think that compassion or sympathy are the 
most common motivational consequences of empathy (Bischof-Köhler, 2012, p. 45; Harris, 
2007, p. 169; Preston & Hofelich, 2012), that empathy is essentially an altruistic impulse or 
response (de Waal, 2009, pp. 115-117), others think that empathy is rather morally neutral 
and that “some facets of empathy allow competitors to better understand and hence undermine 
each other” (Breithaupt, 2012). In his list, Batson doesn’t really take a stand here and does not 
explicitly object to the idea that empathy might also be at work in the case of torture, for 
example. However, concepts seven and eight seem to suggest that Batson thinks of empathy 
as a rather compassionate state. In line with this, he considers the question of what leads one 
to respond with sensitivity and care to the suffering of another (2009, pp. 8-9) as one of the 
major research questions in the field of empathy research.  
The example of the skilled torturer is repeatedly mentioned in order to argue that empathy can 
also be used for malicious means. Note, however, that there is yet another option. Instead of 
thinking that empathy is either morally neutral (and therefore also applicable in the case of 
torture) or a compassionate response, I suggest that empathy primarily indeed is a 
compassionate response, but that the positive implications of this response for others can – as 
a consequence of specific experiences in the course of life – be inhibited, suppressed, 
unlearned and finally turned upside down. Consider the following situation. You are in a 
hurry and rush down the pedestrian precinct. You hesitate when a beggar in a pitiable 
condition asks you for money. You are immediately affected by his emotional expression and 
feel a bit miserable, you realize that you start imagining how he might have ended up like this 
and suddenly are in the middle of an empathic process. But you are in a conflict, since you are 
already late. You inhibit your empathic reaction (cf. Breithaupt, 2012), start rationalizing, and 
end up becoming cynical. Suddenly, you feel angry. You even feel, although covertly, the 
tendency to insult and publicly humiliate that person for his laziness and inability to pursue a 
normal life. And somehow, you feel that you would precisely know how to effectively insult 
and shame this person. Your primary empathic reaction has changed and your consequent 
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reaction might be something like a defense mechanism that inhibits the primary empathic 
reaction as well as its claim for compassionate behaviour (for example to donate some 
money). 
Some might wonder why I do not simply use the term sympathy to refer to compassionate 
reponses. Sympathy is derived from the Greek sympatheía, meaning “feeling with”, 
“compassion”, “liking”. None of the meanings of the term sympathy is about knowing how 
someone feels. Empathy, in contrast to sympathy, gives us a deeper, emotionally enriched 
understanding of another person, since we allow ourselves to share anothers’ feeling in order 
to grasp the how-aspect of his experience. This presupposes sympathy, and this is why I think 
empathy is primarily a compassionate response.16 In the course of the following chapters, I 
will back up this argument with anthropological data and theories. 
3.4 Summary 
At this point, I have presented different usages of the term empathy sensu Batson as well as 
different definitions and argued for the pros and cons. Moreover, I have tried to 
(preliminarily) answer some open questions in empathy research in order to come closer to 
my own definition. Although I argued that we should not equate empathy with simulation 
theory, I still think that one aspect of simulation processes, namely, taking the other’s 
perspective via imaginative processes in the sense of Batson’s concepts 4-6, is an important 
part of empathy as well. As a summary of this chapter, I will try to provide a tentative 
definition of empathy as it results from the analysis above. I have tried to argue that empathy 
helps us to understand how another person feels. Moreover, I have tried to argue that it is 
reasonable to speak of empathy only in real human-human encounters, in which we are 
somehow affected by another person’s emotional expression or arousal (cf. de Waal, 2008). 
Empathy is, at least primarily, a compassionate reaction that leads us to share or feelingly 
grasp another’s emotion. As a consequence, empathy is a primarily compassionate reaction to 
another’s expressed emotional state that leads us to understand the ‘how’-aspect of another’s 
experience via a combination of imaginative processes and sharing.  
 
                                                          
16
 As an indirect support of this view, Decety and Jackson say in their influential article on empathy: “Of all the 
sources from which one can draw insight as to the constituents of human empathy, psychotherapeutic schools 
provide the most interesting, experience-related knowledge” (2004, p. 74). If this is true, then “the most 
interesting, experience-related knowledge” on empathy is derived from a setting where the basic compassionate 
orientation of the therapist is beyond question. Although the field of psychotherapy offers interesting insights on 
empathy, I will not deal with it in the present work. 
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With respect to cultural anthropology, I have pointed out in the introduction that 
anthropologists are especially interested in emic concepts of empathic-like phenomena. The 
different anthropological reports will be presented in the next chapter. At the end of it, we will 
be able to complement Batson’s list and to readdress the question what empathy is. These 
reports will help us to rethink some of the questions raised in this chapter, namely, whether 
we should think of empathy as something with positive motivational consequences or 
something that can be used for negative purposes as well, whether empathy can only occur 
when someone else is present and whether we must be affected by another’s emotional state 
or arousal. At the end of the next chapter, we will then be able to refine the definition of 
empathy just given.  
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4. Anthropological opacity and empathy reports   
The aim of this chapter is to give a review of the recent anthropological contributions that 
deal with the opacity of other minds as well as with the role of empathy and its local shapings 
in these communities. The first four contributions focus on opacity rather than empathy and 
were part of the Anthropological Quarterly issue on the opacity of other minds edited by 
Robbins and Rumsey in 2008. Robbins and Rumsey both conducted field research in Papua 
New Guinea, and both were concerned with the relationship between opacity claims and 
practices of confession. This “co-occurrence within Melanesianist ethnography of two 
apparently contradictory motifs” (Rumsey, 2008, p. 455), namely, the prevalence of opacity 
claims and a rising prominence of confession practices, gave the impetus for the Social 
Thought and Commentary section in Anthropological Quarterly (cf. Rumsey, 2008).  
The rest of the anthropological contributions reviewed here were either published in the Ethos 
issue on empathy edited by Hollan and Throop in 2008 or in the book Towards an 
anthropology of empathy edited by the same authors in 2011. Most reports are from Papua 
New Guinea (PNG). This does not mean that the opacity phenomenon is something specific to 
PNG – there are reports from Polynesia as well as from Central America. Rather, the debate 
on the opacity of other minds was started by anthropologists specialized in PNG.   
But before turning towards the different reports, some words on the scope of opacity reports 
are necessary. Hollan and Throop (2011) raise the question whether the opacity of other 
minds phenomenon does “indicate that people really do avoid acting upon, or even 
speculating about, other people’s thoughts, feelings, and intentions” (ibid., p. 9) in cases 
where mental states are not directly or consciously expressed. Opacity assertions give rise to 
the idea that people in those places might not only assert opacity, but that they might function 
differently, that other minds really might be unknowable, i.e. opaque, to them. This idea is 
nourished when anthropologists say that “the relative value and desirability – even the 
possibility – of social knowing can vary significantly both within and between cultural 
contexts” (Groark, 2008, p. 430, emphasis added). Could it be that people who were born and 
raised in such places really cannot know other minds while people from other places without 
opacity doctrines can? Such a view would remind us very much of the ironical scenario of an 
‘opacity island’ sketched in the introduction. Robbins and Rumsey (2008) say that “one can 
distinguish something like a “strong reading” of opacity statements – a reading that assumes 
that such statements really do have an impact on how people approach the task of 
understanding one another, rather than just on how they talk about how they think about one 
another” (ibid., p. 410). Kevin Groark, in referring to the different anthropological 
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contributions and what they tell us about the possibility of knowing what goes on in another’s 
mind, says that they are “ranging from ‘strong opacity positions’ which assert the global 
impossibility of accessing such knowledge, to ‘weak opacity positions’ marked by an 
assertion of opacity in interaction, but a recognition that such knowledge can in fact be 
gained” (in press). The idea of a global impossibility of gaining such knowledge is in fact a 
tempting exoticism. I have demonstrated in the introduction of this work how influential ToM 
ideas have become, and that it is precisely this influence that makes opacity claims so 
tempting. Before, the only human beings that were reported to have problems with gaining 
knowledge about other people’s minds are people with autism or deaf children and youngsters 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Peterson & Siegal, 1995). Thinking that ToM might be 
our main route for understanding others and something like the cognitive precondition that 
allows for more complex social interactions gives rise to a highly questionable idea, namely, 
that people who claim opacity might be delayed or hampered in terms of social cognition. 
From a historical point of view, this comes very close to colonialist ideas stressing the 
superiority of the Western mind. A careful clarification of the opacity phenomenon is 
therefore an important thing to do.  
Picking up the existing terminology, I will distinguish between a “strong” and “weak” reading 
of opacity doctrines in the analysis of the anthropological reports to come. I will classify an 
anthropological interpretation as a strong reading if the anthropologist interprets opacity 
reports as really referring to the impossibility of knowing the minds of others, be it because of 
cognitive deficits or due to extreme social constraints. In contrast, I will classify any 
interpretation as a weak reading if it does not deny the fundamental possibility of gaining such 
knowledge at least in certain contexts, although opacity claims as well as a different shaping 
of mindreading practices and empathy might be reported. 
It will become evident that actually nobody endorses a strong reading. Hollan and Throop, in 
reflecting on the different contributions, draw the same conclusion: “None support the idea 
that the opacity doctrine is an actual claim about the fundamental unknowability of other 
minds” (2011, p. 10).  
4.1 Anthropological reports 
The following reports will not only be analyzed with respect to whether their authors endorse 
a strong or weak opacity reading - more importantly, I will try to deduce how the authors use 
concepts like empathy and mindreading with the conceptual tools and definitions developed 
in the previous chapters. 
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4.1.1 Ku Waru, Papua New Guinea 
Rumsey argues that among the Ku Waru people in Papua New Guinea, traditional forms of 
confession preceded the Christian ones. Ku Waru people believe that if people do not confess, 
they can become physically ill or even die (cf. Rumsey, 2008). As an example, Rumsey 
mentions that clansmen were gathering to confess before important or risky activities, e.g. 
battles. On these occasions, they had the possibility to confess individual transgressions and 
feelings of anger and were usually forgiven. At such occasions, Ku Waru people feel an extra 
pressure to confess “because people believe that those who go into battle with unexpressed 
grievances or concealed transgressions on their minds are much more likely to be killed in the 
fighting” (Rumsey, 2008, p. 459). Practices of confession are, according to Rumsey, 
“designed to reveal” (ibid., p. 455) what is in another person’s mind. Therefore, so goes the 
argument, they contrast with opacity claims and corresponding local theories of what can be 
known. Another common belief among the Ku Waru people also seems to be in contrast with 
the observed opacity claims, namely, the idea that although the content of people’s minds may 
differ, “the way in which their minds work is similar” (ibid., p. 464). Moreover, Ku Waru 
people “believe that the condition of one’s skin provides a reliable indicator of one’s state of 
mind” (ibid., p. 465). This is an important comment, since it points to a form of bodily 
empathy, to a heightened monitoring of that which is perceptually given. We will hear more 
about this from other places where the anthropological data yield more information. Other 
exceptions can be found in the case of erotic love and courtship, as “it is said to be possible 
for each member of a couple to know what is in the other’s mind because it is the same as 
what is in their own” (ibid.).  
Rumsey endorses a weak opacity reading when he concludes that “people’s statements about 
their inability to see inside the mind of another should not be taken to mean that they do not, 
in practice, make inferences about other people’s intentional states, and act more-or-less 
successfully on them” (ibid., p. 470, footnote 20). He says that people do mainly disavow the 
practice of inferring other people’s intentional states in cases where matters of intentionality 
are contentious, i.e. crimes and social transgressions (ibid.).  
4.1.2 Urapmin, Papua New Guinea 
Robbins’ research among the Urapmin in Papua New Guinea focused on the changes that 
occur in communities where opacity claims are prevalent when the “imported” practice of 
Protestant conversion suddenly requires sincere speech as well as on people’s struggle with 
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these changes. Robbins deals with an important question, namely, which kind of ethnographic 
evidence might “demonstrate that people were not, despite their opacity claims, mind-reading 
just the same” (2008, p. 428). According to Robbins, the very fact that there are struggles 
involved in the adoption to Christian practices of confession “offers some proof that those 
involved in them were not, before conversion, in the habit of trying to be sincere speakers or 
to interpret other people’s utterances in terms of the intentions that motivated them” (ibid., pp. 
424-425). His argument goes as follows: 
 
if, despite their ideological protestations to the contrary, people were in fact acting as 
sincere speakers and mind-reading interpreters all along, we would have to imagine that 
the task of constituting themselves as Christian linguistic subjects…would not be as 
difficult as these accounts show it to be (ibid., p. 425).  
 
It seems as if Robbins, in contrast to Rumsey, fancies and votes for a strong opacity reading. 
However, Robbins then softens his point by mentioning the possible counter-argument that 
the struggles involved in adopting Christian assumptions about the knowability of other minds 
(as reflected in confession practices, for example) might tell us “nothing about what goes on 
in people’s heads, but only about the institutions in which people cast their social 
performances” (ibid.). Robbins goes on to examine these struggles and says that “Urapmin tell 
several stories of people who nearly committed suicide out of shame after publicly confessing 
their own sins or having them confessed by others” (ibid.). 
This suggets, that for Urapmin people, it is rather mindrevealing than mindguessing or mental 
state inference which is negatively experienced and considered as shameful. However, 
Robbins reports “the reaction of almost fear or disgust Urapmin often express at the very 
suggestion that they might know what others are thinking” (ibid., p. 426). Apparently, there is 
also fear or disgust involved in knowing other minds or at least in witnessing their revelation. 
When Robbins asked people about what others were thinking, he felt as if he “had asked them 
to peek in on someone doing something very shameful in private” (ibid.). 
Among the Urapmin, Robbins tells us, women initiate marriages by “calling the name” (win 
bakamin) of the man they want to mary (cf. Robbins, 2008). Women have to find a man who 
is willing to hear and officially confirm this. Robbins point out how “difficult it is for a 
woman to ask that another person hear her speech as a reflection of her mind and how 
shameful it is for a man who agrees to listen to her to treat her speech in this way” (ibid., p. 
427). This practice serves, according to Robbins, “as evidence of how marked sincere speech 
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and mind-reading interpretation were (and still are) in traditional Urapmin understanding” 
(ibid.). In my view, he is not using the correct term at this point. If a man agrees to hear a 
woman’s confession, there is no need for him to ‘mindread’, since it is precisely in cases of 
sincere speech where we don’t have to think about what is going on in another’s mind. What 
is shameful is the act of revealing the mind as well as gathering such a direct insight into 
another person’s feelings and thoughts as a hearer, to see her exposed. If listening to sincere 
speech had something to do with anything like ‘mindreading’, then the question arises which 
practice would be required in cases of insincere speech. My suggestion is that ‘mindreading’ 
understood as mindguessing and/or mental state inference is rather helpful in cases of 
insincere speech. 
With respect to confession, Robbins observed that even “pastors and deacons take to distance 
themselves from the sincere speech that is spoken at confession” (ibid., p. 428). According to 
Robbins, this suggests that “producing the sincere speaker has proven easier in Urapmin than 
has producing the listener willing to treat speech as a window in other minds” (ibid.). This 
comment is helpful, as it suggests that people might know very well that sincere speech is a 
“window in other minds” – and this is precisely what makes things difficult in a culture where 
the exposure of individual feelings and thoughts was not part of normal everyday interactions.  
Rather than having difficulties with reading opaque minds, Urapmin appear to have 
difficulties with handling people whose minds have – due to practices of confession - 
suddenly become transparent. 
Although Robbins’ initially appeared sympathetic to a strong reading of opacity claims, his 
own data appear to be more about problems people have in revealing their minds. If nobody 
reveals his own mind, people might indeed appear opaque to each other. However, this does 
not necessarily tell us anything about the strategies people might still use to gain insights into 
other people’s mind. 
4.1.3 Kaluli, Papua New Guinea 
Schieffelin did field research among Kaluli, a subgroup of the Bosavi Kalu (men from 
Bosavi) in Papua New Guinea. She tells us that Bosavi people resisted confessing because 
mental states were considered as truly private. Schieffelin argues that “in a society where 
almost everything else could be known about a person, people resisted being coerced into 
giving moral accounts or making explicit what they were thinking about” (2008, p. 438). 
Schieffelin was mainly interested in language socialization and described how prompting 
routines socialized children into culturally preferred patterns of how to speak, think, and feel. 
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She describes how older speakers tell young children to say something to a third party, thus 
prompting utterances that include internal states. She argues, however, that caregivers are not 
speaking for their children “in the sense of reading their minds” (ibid., p. 433). Instead, 
caregivers’ “directives to their 2-3 year olds to speak are deemed to be situationally or 
interactionally appropriate rather than originating with the child’s interest or internal state, 
which Bosavi claim cannot be known” (ibid.). In other words, caregivers say for their children 
what should be said – they do not try to interpret nonverbal behaviour or unclear utterances. 
Nevertheless, since these prompted utterances include internal states, mental state attribution 
does clearly occur among Bosavi. Early correlates of such prompting routines can be 
observed in caregiver-child interactions. Bosavi caregivers “do not verbally expand child 
utterances, nor guess the meaning of unintelligible utterances” (ibid., p. 434). In line with this, 
there is also no baby-talk lexicon among the Kaluli (cf. Ochs & Schieffelin, 1994). These 
early activities of language socialization teach children “not to verbally guess at or express 
others’ unvoiced intentions and unclear meanings” (Schieffelin, 2008, p. 433). Interestingly, 
Kaluli children are nevertheless “encouraged to verbalize their own desires and intentions” 
(ibid.).  
Bosavi children must learn to report what they hear without attributing meaning and to 
indicate the source of information. Therefore, Bosavi interactions “draw heavily on indirect 
speech styles which socially distribute the responsibility for inferring meaning” (ibid., p. 435). 
Saying something without clear justification would amount to gossiping. But once a person 
“verbally expresses his or her thought, desire, or inner state to another, however, it can 
circulate as a directly quoted utterance with its author made explicit and with appropriate 
evidential markings” (ibid., p. 436). In other words, the individual person should not infer 
meaning and irresponsibly distribute her own interpretation – rather, she should distribute 
facts in indirect speech with an exact specification of the source of information. 
Although Kaluli state that “one cannot know what another thinks or feels” (Ochs & 
Schieffelin, 1994, p. 484), Schieffelin does not interpret these statements in a strong sense. 
She says that “Kaluli obviously interpret and assess one another’s available behaviors and 
internal states”, but “these interpretations are not culturally acceptable as topics of talk” 
(ibid.). They do talk, however, about their own feelings (cf. Ochs & Schieffelin, 1994). 
According to Schieffelin, opacity claims among the Kaluli point to “a cultural dispreference 
for talking about or making claims about what another might think, what another might feel, 
or what another is about to do, especially if there is no external evidence” (ibid.). Schieffelin 
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tells us that Bosavi attribute mental states and that they interpret and assess available 
behaviour as well as internal states.  
4.1.4 Korowai, Papua New Guinea 
Stasch did his field research among the Korowai in Papua New Guinea. He explains that 
Korowai consider otherness of thoughts as a matter of politics and vice versa. Stasch draws 
upon the work of philosopher Richard Moran and argues that the main difference between 
self- and other-knowledge is not an epistemological one but a difference concerning the 
authority over mental states (cf. Stasch, 2008). Although the epistemological access towards 
my own mental states might be biased as well, I am still the only one who can claim authority 
over them. Stasch therefore hypothesizes that opacity claims might be “not only about 
knowledge and meaning but also about authority” (2008, p. 443). Among the Korowai, people 
do not directly state that one cannot know what is in another person’s mind, but they 
frequently repeat the “verbal formula yepa yexulmelun, literally “Herself her thoughts,” or 
“Himself his thoughts,” an expression closely parallel to canonical statements about opacity 
of other minds reported from many other New Guinea communities” (ibid., p. 444). Stasch 
heard this formula when he asked why a third person had done a certain action or whether a 
third person would do a certain action in the future. Informants reacted by disavowing 
knowledge of other people’s thoughts: “The assertion “She has her own thoughts” is an 
argument against an opposite idea people took to be implied in my questions, an idea of mind-
reading” (ibid.). Note, however, that if Korowai people take the idea of ‘mindreading’ to be 
implied in such questions, then they must know about its possibility. Indeed, Stasch reports: 
 
Plenty of times, though, interviewees did answer my questions about reasons for others` 
actions with statements of those people’s motives, and they answered questions about  
others’ future actions with outright predictions of what those others would do. It seems 
also that disavowal of telepathy is topic-specific. (ibid.) 
 
In providing motives for others’s actions, Korowai clearly engage in mental state attribution 
and mindguessing. Stasch goes on to report that Korowai readily “attribute to others thoughts 
of ill-regard” (ibid.) towards themselves, even if there is no evidence for it. Apparently, it is 
fine “to claim quasi-telepathic knowledge of someone else’s thoughts about one’s own worth, 
even when it is not fine to presume to know or impinge on that person’s own plans and hopes 
for him- or herself” (ibid., pp. 444-445). Moreover, Stasch says that Korowai represent other 
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people’s thoughts in their speech and use a special particle for doing so: di- (to say) represents 
“a quotation of thought, not audible speech” (ibid., p. 445). Accordingly, opacity claims 
among the Korowai are for Stasch “a focus of sensitivity and instability, rather than asolute 
embargo” (ibid.). Stasch, too, does obviously not support a strong opacity reading. As a 
consequence, Stasch interprets the Korowai form of the opacity claim not as a statement 
against any idea of ‘mindreading’, but as a statement that supports the idea of personal 
autonomy: “Making these statements, speakers affirm a principle that people’s actions are 
determined by their thoughts, not something outside their thoughts. The anti-telepathy 
statements are assertions of the reality and consequentiality of other people’s thinking” (ibid.). 
We have seen in the first chapter that this idea sounds very much like a basic tenet of the 
theory of mind framework. In this view, children who acquire a full-fledged theory of mind 
understand that behaviour is driven by mental states. From this point on, what children 
understand is almost paradigmatically expressed by Stasch: “What the other person is going to 
do will be determined by the person’s processes of thought leading to an action, not by 
conditions that are already known” (ibid.).  
If Korowai receive unexpected gifts, they also use the expression that Stasch considers to be 
the Korowai form of the opacity claim, “himself his/herself her own thoughts”. In Stasch’s 
interpretation, “thought” serves like an “all-purpose explanation” (ibid., p. 446) of why people 
do what they do, for example in cases where the reasons for a certain behaviour are not 
immediately evident. Stasch tells us that one “culturally-valued Korowai understanding of 
what organizes human action is a model of persons forming specific goals and acting 
deliberately to bring them about” (ibid., p. 447). The Korowai formula is also evoked in cases 
of social conflict, referring to “disparities of will” (ibid.) rather than difficulties of knowing 
what might be in another’s mind. When Stasch asked informants whether Korowai people 
think silently without speaking, they confirmed this without hesitation and mentioned 
examples like “thinking of shooting somebody, of having sex with someone’s wife, or of 
killing someone’s pig” (ibid., p. 448). Stasch concluded that Korowai “associate silent 
contemplation with deception, bad intentions, violation, and awareness that one’s desires are 
at odds with what other people want” (ibid.). This association points to a conflict that arises 
not only in Korowai culture, namely, the potential difference between outer appearance and 
inner silent soliloquy. Since Korowai value transparent expression as well as enactment of 
social harmony, and self-determination (ibid.), these values automatically clash with the belief 
that people are silently occupied with asocial ideas and bad intentions. 
As a consequence, Korowai want to find out what others are up to: 
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Often, too, Korowai would like to know what other people are thinking, and they take 
steps to find out through speech. Conversely, wary in advance what others will infer or 
speculate about their own intentions, people take great pains to report their intentions 
aloud and head off particular inferences about their thoughts that other might form. 
(Stasch, 2008, p. 451) 
 
Summing up, it seems as if the Korowai example is not very convincing if one wants to make 
a case for the opacity of other minds phenomenon. The Korowai do not say that one cannot 
know what is in another person’s mind. Instead, they emphasize the individual’s authority 
over own thoughts. They engage, in specific contexts, in speculations of what others are up to. 
Korowai want to know what others are thinking and they even anticipate that others might 
speculate or infer their own intentions.  
4.1.5 Anuta, Solomon Islands 
Feinberg did his fieldwork in Anuta, a Polynesian community in the Solomon Islands. 
According to Feinberg, Anutans “affirm the opacity of other minds in myriad statements” 
(2011, p. 155). Feinberg starts with a concept that appears to be most important to Anutans, 
namely, aropa, which is commonly translated as love, sympathy, pity or compassion (cf. 
Feinberg, 2011). Similar concepts can be found in any other Polynesian language, variants 
include the Samoan alofa, the Hawaiian aloha, or aroha among the Maori of New Zealand. 
Aropa is enacted via economic assistance or sharing of things like houses, land, and food. 
Aropa is also tied to the definition of kin, as Anutans define kin as those persons who 
demonstrate aropa in their interactions (cf. Feinberg, 2011). Feinberg warns us, however, that 
the “English glosses for aropa should be treated with caution, as they typically suggest 
internal emotional states” (2011, p. 162). Although “aropa involves an inner state as well as 
outward action” (ibid.), Anutans express aropa mainly through supporting behaviour.  
In addition to the concept of aropa, Feinberg discusses other local concepts that are of 
relevance in intersubjective encounters. The term maanatu “can refer to analytic thought or 
having an opinion” (ibid., p. 153) and is also used for speculation or projection. The direct 
translation of “to guess”, however, is matea. The word atamai refers to one’s own mind and 
“applies to affect as well as cognition” (ibid.). An important emotion among Anutans is 
shame, pakamaa. For Feinberg, “embarrassment or shame requires an ability to place oneself, 
metaphorically, in someone else’s skin: it is a response to what one thinks another thinks of 
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him or her” (ibid., p. 154). In linking the experience of shame to thoughts about what others 
might think, Feinberg does not seem to support a strong opacity reading - quite on the 
contrary. According to Feinberg, Anutans “show intense concern about each other’s “real” 
intentions” (ibid., p. 156), they “are concerned with feelings and intentions as predictors of 
future behavior” (ibid., p. 162), they “frequently formulate hypotheses about what others are 
thinking and feeling” (ibid., p. 157) and “they try to interpret the intentions behind others’ 
speech acts” (ibid.). Moreover, Anutans “display empathy in a variety of contexts” (ibid.) and 
they “readily express their emotions” (ibid., p. 163, footnote 9). Against this background, 
there is no reason to believe that Anutan opacity claims might point to deeper cultural 
differences concerning empathy, theory of mind or mental state talk. But why, then, do 
Anutans assert the opacity of other minds? According to Feinberg, Anutans invoke the 
opacity of other minds in certain cases “to give the benefit of the doubt to someone who had 
made a questionable assertion” (ibid., p. 156). Further, it is used “to impugn others’ honesty 
or good intentions” (ibid.). Whereas opacity claims led other researchers to conclude that 
people might view each others’ minds as utterly opaque and impenetrable, Feinberg suggests 
a very different interpretation for the Anutan case in stating that “their views are similar to 
those of Westerners; we are just more hypocritical” (ibid.). What Feinberg wants to say is that 
nobody can really know what someone else is thinking, and whether overt utterances do really 
mirror the thoughts of someone remains uncertain, in Anuta as well as in Europe or Northern 
America. Therefore, Feinberg concludes: 
 
Their view of other minds’ accessibility is fundamentally similar to that of Europeans or 
Americans. They recognize that one’s ability to read another’s thoughts is limited, but that 
limitation does not preempt their ability to empathize any more than it does ours. (ibid., p. 
157) 
 
Nevertheless, Anutans emphasize observable behaviour. Feinberg tells us that they are 
“primarily concerned with one another’s actions rather than their inner states” (ibid., p. 162). 
Summing up, we can say that Feinberg demonstrates the most constitutive aspects of what is 
commonly understood as ‘mindreading’ in Anuta. However, he does not develop a full-
fledged account of Anutan empathy. He warns us that there is no word in Anutan language 
that could easily be translated as empathy. Nevertheless, Feinberg presents aropa as at least 
overlapping with it “in several critical respects” (ibid.), since the concept of aropa touches 
what is also associated with empathy in Western countries, namely, love, compassion, 
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sympathy, and pity. What I consider to be most interesting about his contribution, however, is 
that he presents Anutans as people that are absolutely interested in other people’s minds in 
spite of the fact that they claim the opacity of other minds. The Anutan case is therefore a 
clear proof that opacity claims do not necessarily force a rethinking of theory of mind 
(Robbins & Rumsey, 2008). 
4.1.6 Asabano, Papua New Guinea 
Lohmann, referring to Robbins and Rumsey (2008), repeats their view that the opacity of 
other minds phenomenon “challenges social scientific views that empathy is necessary for 
sociality” (Lohmann, 2011, p. 99). His own research among the Asabano of Papua New 
Guinea, however, “provides an example of how, such beliefs notwithstanding, empathy does 
exist in such societies, though conceptualized, valued, and learned in culturally distinctive 
ways” (ibid.). 
Asabano believe that one cannot directly witness other people’s inner states. As a 
consequence, certain knowledge is impossible. Asabano people, however, say that their hearts 
can be “with others”. The bound morpheme sosati- can be translated as “heart-with” and is 
used in a variety of expressions. In addition to this term, mable “refers to mentation as a 
whole, inclusive of thinking, feeling, remembering, imagining, and planning” (ibid., p. 100). 
Mentation occurs in the heart (sosabu). Consequently, thinking and feeling are not considered 
as separate, Asabano refer to both as sosamableta or “heart mentating” (ibid., p. 101). 
Lohmann tells us that “Asabano trust their senses as sources of relatively sure knowledge” 
(ibid., p. 103). Asabano engage in “empathetic exercises” (ibid.) through a combination of 
sensory perceptions and own imagination.  
Lohmann refers to sosati- as “heart-togetherness” (ibid., p.102) and says that it does not imply 
certain knowledge about others’ inner states. According to Lohmann, it rather expresses what 
one knows about one’s own state of mind regarding another person (ibid., p. 104). Heart-
togetherness, then, “derives from knowledge of one’s own thoughts about another, 
particularly when enriched by sensory data” (ibid., p. 103). It enables people to imaginatively 
create “an experiential scenario from the perspective of the empathizee that is likely to be at 
least partially accurate” (ibid., p. 104). In addition, a form of “bodily empathy” is 
acknowledged among Asabano people. They interpret “certain bodily signs in themselves as 
indicating something about the condition of people beyond other sensory indicators” (ibid., p. 
103). When such sympathetic clues are discovered in or on one’s own body, they are 
interpreted and used “as a means of long-distance “perception” of the state of other people” 
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(ibid., p. 105). An example for this form of bodily empathy is isi’sitibu, a phenomenon in 
which one’s underarm sweats without exertion. This is interpreted by Asabano people as 
indicating that someone will soon arrive. Lohmann describes isi’sitibu, like “heart-
togetherness”, as a “culture-bound, empathy-like syndrome” (ibid., p. 106) that does only 
provide sure knowledge about oneself.  
Besides his description of the Asabano, Lohmann’s contribution is also interesting as he 
explicitly deals with more theoretical aspects of research on empathy. In contrast to other 
anthropological contributions, Lohmann clearly positions himself and gives us an idea of how 
he conceptualizes empathy. Moreover, he also relates empathy to theory of mind. Lohmann 
argues that in order “to empathize or even speak with others, one must assume that they have 
minds that are in basic respects similar to one’s own, and one must have some ability to 
predict how they will understand and react to particular events and utterances” (ibid., p. 96). 
Lohmann considers these abilities as a basis for empathy and explicitly states that empathy 
depends on theory of mind (ibid.). He argues that “in order to copy behaviors and attitudes, 
one must be able to represent what others think and feel” (ibid., p. 95) and concludes in the 
next sentence: “Empathy is thus essential for effective sociality, for enculturation, for 
linguistic communication, and for theorizing about and knowing one another” (ibid.). The 
ability what others think or feel, however, is usually associated with ToM rather than with 
empathy. Note, how theory of mind and empathy are conflated here: is empathy or theory of 
mind essential for effective sociality? Lohmann argues that theory of mind is the basis for 
empathy and concludes that empathy is essential for effective sociality, but what is empathy 
according to Lohmann? Before I will try to provide an answer, it must be noted that some of 
Lohmann’s assumptions are highly controversial. It is neither uncontested that we need to 
represent others’ mental states in order to copy or imitate them, nor is it a common 
assumption that empathy depends on ToM – rather, some researchers think that empathy is 
prior to ToM (cf. Bischof-Köhler, 2012). With regard to empathy, Lohmann starts by – I think 
correctly – stating that the English folk concept of empathy assumes a rather active, positive 
regard for the person empathized with and emphasizes emotional rather than intellectual 
identification with the empathizee (cf. Lohmann, 2011, pp. 107-108). Lohmann points to the 
difficulty of working with concepts from one’s own folky psychological assumptions in other 
cultural contexts, since they might “distort our descriptions of other emic realities in 
unintended ways” (ibid., p. 108). As the English folk concept of empathy is itself an emic 
model, it cannot serve the purpose of cross-cultural comparisons. In order to avoid this 
problem, Lohmann suggests to take etically defined definitions of empathy as for example 
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provided by Preston and de Waal (2002) as a starting point for analyzing and categorizing 
deviations in the anthropological record (cf. Lohmann, 2011). The general contributions of his 
own work among the Asabano for empathy research are described by Lohmann as follows: 
 
If Asaba models of empathy have value for etic theory, it is to point out that empathy 
provides certain knowledge only about the empathizer’s inner state. The information it 
provides about the empathizee is an estimate based on reasonable, suggestive, but more or 
less incomplete evidence. (ibid., p. 109) 
 
Finally, Lohmann presents his view on empathy: 
 
Empathy exists at the interface between sensory perceptions and imagination. One draws 
on sensed indicators of the other person’s inner state and one’s own memories, thoughts, 
and feelings to build a semblance or a representation of those attitudes in one’s own mind. 
This representation may be more or less accurate than one thinks. Information about the 
environment obtained by the senses, though enmeshed in cultural and situational contexts 
and partly subjective, includes empirical facts. But empathy is brought to life through the 
imagination’s placing oneself in the other person’s shoes, as the expression goes.  
(ibid., p. 111) 
 
Empathy, in Lohmann’s view, is a process where sensory perceptions are used as a starting 
point for one’s own imagination. Similar views on empathy are quite common among 
anthropologists, as we will shortly see. 
4.1.7 Banaban, Fiji 
According to Hermann, the Banabans in Fiji “represent themselves, on the one hand, as 
possessing a special capacity to show pity for others and, on the other hand, as having a 
special claim on others when it comes to receiving understanding and compassion from them” 
(Hermann, 2011, p. 35). Banabans are originally from Banaba Island in west-central Oceania, 
but they have been living in Fiji for more than half a century. According to Hermann, the term 
te nanoanga comes closest to our notion of the term empathy. The literal translation would be 
something like “heart-giving” (ibid., p. 25), and it can be understood “in the sense of turning 
oneself and one’s feelings-thoughts to the other, the better to enable his or her situation to be 
grasped, and carrying with it the implication of a readiness to help” (ibid., pp. 29-30). 
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Corresponding feelings that make people feel inclined to help are evoked when people are 
described as “kananoanga or kawa – both of which mean “pitiable” or “to be pitied”” (ibid., 
p. 30). 
Hermann tells us that most Banabans tend to translate te nanoanga as “pity”, while educated 
Banabans also translate it as “sympathy” or “compassion”. It seems as if te nanoanga is most 
comparable to Polynesian terms like the Samoan alofa, the Anutan aropa, or Hawaiian aloha 
as it encompasses the same complex of associated concepts. Hermann says about the 
Banabans that “compassion is the basis for their capacity to bond socially with others” (ibid., 
p. 31). The suggested link between aspects of empathy and bonding is a very interesting one 
that will be further developed when it comes to Jeannette Mageo’s account of Samoan 
empathy in chapter 5. Hermann says that “compassion and pity for another involve 
understanding that other and imagining onself as being in the position of the other” (ibid., p. 
25). This matches the definition of Hollan and Throop who say “that empathy is a first-
person-like perspective on another that involves an emotional, embodied, or experiential 
aspect” (Hollan & Throop, 2008, pp. 391-392). To take over the perspective of another is 
already something children must learn. Hermann tells us of an expression used to chastise 
children: “tai karoa anne, ba ngke arona ba ngkoe, ko na kawa, “don’t do that, because if this 
[behavior] was done to you, you would deserve pity” (Hermann, 2011, p. 30). For Hermann, 
compassion and pity are the central components of what might be considered the Banaban 
form of empathy (cf. ibid., p. 25). Moreover, she says that in Banaban thinking neither 
understanding nor concern can be developed in the absence of imagination (cf. ibid., p. 30).  
Summing up, Hermann’s research among the Banabans provides another example for an emic 
concept (te nanoanga) that is related to such notions as love, compassion, concern, or pity and 
thus at least partially overlaps with our emic model of empathy. And, like Lohmann (2011), 
Hermann emphasizes the role of imagination. 
4.1.8 Vanatinai, Papua New Guinea 
Vanatinai is a volcanic island belonging to Papua New Guinea. According to Lepowsky, 
islanders “publicly, rhetorically deny the possibility of empathy, of imaginative understanding 
of and identification with the thoughts/feelings of another being” (2011, p. 49). Lepowsky 
asks the usual question that automatically arises when faced with radical opacity claims: “Is 
empathy, then – the imaginative experience of another’s state of being – culturally envisioned 
and even possible, given the Vanatinai worldview and concepts of person, and in particular 
the centrality of an overt denial of ever being able to imaginatively experience the renuanga 
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of others?” (ibid., p. 45). Among Vanatinai people, the term renuanga “refers to an interior, 
active, although covert, state of desire or feeling” (ibid., p. 45). A common answer of 
Vanatinai people when asked about why others behaved in a certain way or what others might 
be thinking is “We cannot know their renuanga” (cf. p. 44). However, Lepowsky goes on to 
report that in private, for example within the extended familiy or with more intimate friends, 
Vanatinai people “conjecture at length, in exacting detail, based upon a range of external cues, 
about what others are thinking and feeling, their renuanga, and how this may affect their 
interactions with others in the recent past, present, or future” (ibid., p. 49). Obviously, 
Vanatinai provide another example against strong opacity readings, since they clearly engage 
in mental-state-talk and mindguessing. However, against the background that one cannot 
know other persons’ true inner state of being, “speech and other forms of action are 
frequently, in local perspective, either ambiguous or intentionally deceptive” (ibid., p. 45). 
They are ambiguous because people suspect that more negative and asocial impulses might 
reside behind publicly expressed utterances and behaviour: “Greed, anger, and jealousy – that 
is, inner states and desires that conflict with cultural ideals of harmonious sharing – ideally 
remain concealed and thus do not disrupt the social fabric” (ibid., p. 47). The belief that such 
negative emotions might reside behind people’s public face gives rise to gossip, in which 
actions, thoughts and feelings of others are interpreted. In a certain sense, these negative 
emotions are opaque, since they are masked by social interactions that are “often deceptive” 
(ibid., p. 51) and in which “the motives of others – neighbors, affines, exchange partners, 
spouses, and kin – are suspect” (ibid.). Vanatinai people are therefore eager to compare 
whether actions of other persons are congruent with social expectations. Lepowsky 
convincingly argues that such a “kind of heightened sensitivity to, and clandestine 
interpretation of, the intentions, hidden meanings, and concealed emotional states of others” 
(ibid., p. 52) is typcial for places where the opacity of other minds is assumed. This 
heightened sensitivity triggers imaginative processes: 
 
On Vanatinai it is a customary and frequent, though covert, move to imagine another’s 
point of view, another’s emotional and cognitive state of being, imagining how one might 
oneself think and feel in the other person’s psychic situation. Islanders make this move of 
imagination and identification not, primarily, out of compassion for others or a desire for, 
or value on, emotional closeness, but out of concern, wariness, or outright fear. (ibid.) 
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Such a description is reminiscient of Theodore Schwartz, who claimed that a “paranoid ethos” 
is characteristic of the Melanesian region (cf. 1973). Moreover, those aspects of renuanga that 
must be concealed in public are exteriorized in various ways. For example, they might be 
exteriorized via “reported dreams and dream analyses, reports of spirit visitations” 
(Lepowsky, 2011, p. 51). On the other hand, people on Vanatinai strongly believe “in the 
power to aggressively project one’s desires or wishes onto, and within, the person of another” 
(ibid., p. 48). This idea reflects the belief in personal autonomy among Vanatinai. Magic, 
sorcery, and witchcraft, from this point of view, are ways of projecting one’s own desires onto 
another person. Interestingly, Lepowsky does interpret Vanatinai opacity claims in the light of 
this focus on personal autonomy – an interpretation Stasch (2008) has also offered for the 
Korowai (see above): “The philosophical principle of personal opacity, the interiority of 
others’ thoughts/feelings (renuanga), is closely bound to the islanders’ fierce insistence on 
personal autonomy, both as cultural ideology and as daily social practice” (Lepowsky, 2011, 
p. 47). Another interpretation for the prevalence of opacity claims on Vanatinai goes into the 
same direction as Feinberg’s interpretation of Anutan opacity claims described above:  
 
The island philosophy of the ultimate unknowability of the inner states of others serves as 
a useful caution, because it ultimately holds true for all interpersonal encounters in any 
society. We may think we know. The islanders publicly claim no such omniscience. 
(Lepowsky, 2011, p. 59) 
 
Summing up, Lepowsky provides another example of a Pacific place where opacity claims are 
prevalent while people in fact are concerned with others’ mental states – Vanatinai engage in 
mental-state-talk and mindguessing. Vanatinai mistrust public speech and behaviour since one 
cannot know what is really going on in a person and since public interactions are often 
deceptive. This sort of mistrust in how people present themselves publicly is also common in 
Yap (Throop, 2008, 2011) and among the Tzotzil Maya of Southern Mexico (Groark, 2008), 
as we will see. Opacity claims among Vanatinai, therefore, are not about the limits of what 
can be known. Rather, they reflect an emphasis on personal autonomy as well as a common 
caution since claims about others’ inner – potentially asocial – motivations might disrupt 
group harmony which is valued among Vanatinai as well as in many other small-scale 
societies.  
 80
4.1.9 Yap, Federated States of Micronesia 
Throop describes Yap as a culture “where local values tied to secrecy, concealment, and 
privacy place significant epistemological, communicative, and moral limits on possibilities 
for empathetic attunement between interlocutors” (2008, pp. 402-403). I will discuss Throops 
account in a bit more detail, since he offers a very elaborate and interesting account of opacity 
in Yap. Like in many other languages of the Pacific, there is no term in Yapese that could 
unproblematically be translated as “empathy”. However, Throop mentions the terms runguy 
and amiithuun as affiliated concepts (cf. 2008, p. 408). If someone is in pain or suffering, the 
appropriate response in Yap is to feel runguy. Throop says that this term “has a broad 
semantic range that at times appears to overlap with the concept of “empathy” but that I gloss 
here as “concern/pity/compassion”” (ibid.). The feeling of runguy is also what binds a father 
to his children (ibid., p. 409). Amiithuun can describe material causes of physical pain or pains 
that go along with certain illnesses, however, it is often used in ways that are similar to that of 
runguy (ibid., p. 410). Throop points out the differences to empathy in saying that runguy 
“seems to bear a somewhat closer resemblance to the concept of sympathy” (ibid.) whereas 
amiithuun “seems to suggest a dual directionality of mutual feelings between interlocutors 
that may not necessarily be operative in empathy as a self-decentering first-person 
approximation of another’s feelings, emotions, thoughts, and concerns” (ibid.).  
A socially fully competent person in Yap “is understood to be a person who is able to 
sacrifice his or her individual desires, wants, wishes, feelings, opinions, and thoughts to 
family, village, and broader community dictates” (Throop, 2011, p. 120). Throop says that 
Yap people endorse a “virtue of self-governance, a virtuous way of being-in-the-world that 
idealizes a disconnect between individual expressivity and an individual’s inner life” (Throop, 
2008, p. 412).  
This cultural logic is also encoded in a popular aphorism. The aphorism ke luul ni baabaay 
can literally be translated as “it ripened, a papaya” and is used to describe persons who cannot 
effectively control their expressivity and therefore fall short of the ideal of self-governance 
(cf. Throop, 2008, p. 414). Papayas clearly indicate the state of ripeness via their color, and 
such a direct – or transparent - expression of what is going on “inside” fails the virtues of self-
governance and concealment on Yap island. Rather, people should present an “opaque 
exterior” (ibid., p. 415). Throop states that the contrast “between internality and externality is 
at the heart of a number of other aspects of Yapese cultural logic in which metaphors based on 
the images of surfaces and depths, the visible and the invisible, and the apparent and the 
hidden are recurrently played out” (ibid., p. 414). The term opacity as analyzed in the first 
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chapter entails the idea that there potentially is something unperceivable inside an opaque 
container or behind an opaque barrier. With respect to Yapese cultural logic, the term opacity 
seems to describe quite well how differences between interiority and exteriority are 
conceptualized on Yap.  
Awochean is a Yapese term that refers to the face or front of a person (ibid., p. 415). 
Moreover, the term “entails the assumption that behind the expressive field of an individual’s 
face lies an inner world of thought and feeling that is occluded from view” (ibid.). On Yap 
island, the face and the eyes are believed to “represent that part of the person that is most 
susceptible to directly evidencing inner feeling states and thoughts” (ibid.). Therefore, people 
often avert eye gaze or turn their faces in direct interactions. People who are especially skilled 
at presenting a face that does not express what they might be thinking or feeling have a “good 
face” (feal awochean) (ibid.). Part of this aspect of Yapese folk theory is “the idea that 
comprehending another’s feelings or thoughts arises from the horizon of perception” (ibid.), 
more specifically, the perception of facial and eye cues. If a person cannot maintain a “good 
face” and expresses his inner feelings in front of someone else, this latter person might feel so 
ulum, a sensation that is referred to in English as “goose bumps”. So ulum arises “when an 
individual is put in the uncomfortable position of having to experience another individual 
inappropriately evidencing the emotional content of his or her mind“ (ibid., p. 417). Whereas 
the sensation of goose bumps as a result of listening to a classical piece of music, for example, 
might be pleasant, Throop tells us that the position of experiencing the content of another’s 
mind is rather “uncomfortable”. Such a reaction resembles Robbins’ description of Urapmin 
people who even react with disgust in similar situations.  
But not only the face should be opaque with respect to a person’s inner thoughts and feelings. 
The same cultural logic also applies to speech. Oblique communicative practices are common 
in Yap, and they are “an important means through which to produce and maintain ambiguity 
in the service of secrecy and concealment” (Throop, 2011, p. 124). Different verbal strategies 
are used to create a communicative context in which mental states “are rendered opaque” 
(ibid., p. 125). Some of the strategies mentioned by Throop are talking in opposites, being 
elusive, only providing the minimal amount of information necessary, deception or lying, 
benign and derogatory sarcasm, joking and teasing. Together with paralinguistic behaviour 
like avoiding eye contact and averting one’s front, people on Yap have a huge variety of 
strategies “to ensure that their interlocutors are never able to garner a clear idea as to what 
they are really thinking or feeling” (ibid., p. 129). 
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To sum up, people on Yap island are “effectively enacting expressive opacity” (Throop, 2008, 
p. 413). As a consequence, it seems to be difficult or might even appear impossible to gain 
access to another person’s subjective life. Because of this difficulty, people on Yap attend to 
the perceivable effects of activity (cf. Throop, 2008, 2011) rather than to their inner 
motivations or origins in order to judge or describe other persons’ behaviour. 
But if people conceal their inner states and interact with “opaque masks”, so to speak, while 
focussing at the same time on actions’ effects, is there any place left for empathy then in Yap?  
Let’s go back to the Yapese focus on perceivable behaviour and actions’ effects. In Yap, a 
communicative norm “requires that individuals explicitly express to others their intended 
actions prior to setting out to partake in a particular course of action” (Throop, 2008, p. 410). 
This helps people to anticipate and predict others’ actions on the basis of their own 
announcements, without having to figure out what is going on inside of them. Children are 
taught from early on not only to consider their actions and reflect on their consequences, but 
also to think of “how others might evaluate the merits of pursuing such action” (ibid., p. 411). 
In other words, own actions are considered from very early on as being under constant 
scrutiny. Questions like “Where are you going?” or “Where are you coming from?” are, from 
this point of view, more than just “small-talk”. Throop argues that “the psychological 
repercussions of having to think of an appropriate response to requests for information about 
one’s past and future courses of action, especially in light of the possible moral implications 
arising from blatantly deceptive expressions of one’s intentions, are quite arguably tied to a 
heightening of attention to the merits of engaging in reflection prior to setting off to 
participate in a particular activity” (ibid., p. 411). 
In other words, before acting or speaking, a socially competent adult in Yap thinks of how 
another might evaluate them and consequently form an opinion or judgment about him on that 
basis. From this point of view, every action and utterance is intersubjectively adjusted and 
performed with the other (or the others) in mind. This requires perspective taking at least in 
cases where standard rules of comportment and standard verbal formulae do not suffice.  
Interestingly, the concealment of inner states and the ability to think before acting are closely 
linked to each other. Not only does thoughtful deliberate action enable the concealment of 
personal motivations and intentions – norms of secrecy and concealment do also require 
people to think before acting (Throop, 2011, p. 122). 
Throop further argues that opacity on Yap makes people more sensitive to nonverbal cues: 
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Because of the pervasiveness of actors seeking to conceal their thoughts and feelings from 
others, individuals are confronted with the necessity of having to closely monitor their 
interlocutor’s expressions in the hope of achieving some glimpse, however attenuated that 
might be (i.e., a shaking leg), into the “actual” subjective state of the person that they are 
interacting with. (2008, p. 417) 
 
But Yap people are not only sensitive to nonverbal cues, the sensitivity towards the slightest 
evidence of another’s subjective life is also lexically indexed. Throop reports that salient 
lexical distinctions for the emotion of anger concern the extent “to which each variety of 
anger is detectable through either indirect-nonverbal or explicit-verbal means” (ibid., p. 416). 
In other words, there are various terms in Yapese for anger, and each term provides 
information about how clearly it is perceivable. Therefore, Throop argues, “these terms can be 
understood as culturally elaborated linguistic vehicles highlighting various degrees of 
explicitness in accessing the contents of another’s internal subjective state” (ibid., pp. 416-
417). 
This heightening of sensitivity is also evident in gossip. People on Yap acknowledge “that 
there is much of importance that is missed when an individual does not attempt to imagine 
what the possible motives for a particular individual’s actions might be” (ibid., p. 418). 
Throop says that “gossip about others’ feelings, intentions, motives, and reactions is a central 
part of everyday talk and interaction” (ibid.). It is in the context of gossip that Yap people 
analyze motives for action and engage in covert speculation. Therefore, gossip “serves as a 
privileged site for what I would like to term mitigated empathy” (Throop, 2011, p. 137). I do 
not think that the term empathy is the best suited one here. In gossip, people clearly do engage 
in mental state talk, they attribute mental states to others and engage in mindguessing. In my 
view, these terms capture more adequately what is going on in gossip. 
As an example, Throop presents an excerpt of two older women who, in talking about other 
people, discuss and interpret changes in voice of someone, guess about what another person 
might feel and wonder about the reasons for another’s action. The cultural logic on Yap is a 
good example for how deeply values of secrecy and concealment, in other words, of the 
opacity of other minds, affect everyday social interactions. Nevertheless, Throop does not 
vote for a strong reading: “That there are such pressures to maintain a nontransparent 
rendering of one’s inner life is not to say, therefore, that individuals are not interested in 
determining the content of others’ subjective states” (2008, p. 418). Throop repeatedly 
emphasizes this (cf. 2008, 2011).  
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On the basis of Throop’s account of Yap people, I have tried to argue that in spite of strong 
cultural norms to enact “expressive opacity”, people imagine what might be going on in 
others and speculate about it. I have tried to argue that people on Yap can predict other 
people’s actions because people should announce them. Therefore, an important function of 
what theory of mind is supposed to be developed for, namely, prediction, is differently 
realized on Yap, at least in many common everyday situations. Furthermore, the constant 
necessity to announce future actions and justify past ones forces people to think before acting. 
This necessity requires people to represent themselves as always being in the minds of others, 
as being under constant scrutiny. This requires not only perspective taking, which is part of 
certain definitions of empathy (see chapter 3), it also constitutes a more basic form of 
intersubjectivity, since the continuous experience of others’ scrutiny makes them implicitly 
present, so to speak, in an individuals’ own actions and speech acts.   
4.1.10 Tzotzil Maya, Southern Mexico 
Opacity claims were also observed in Central America. Kevin Groark’s research among the 
Tzotzil Maya in Southern Mexico is probably the most elaborate and original one in this 
context. For this reason, I will also outline his work in more detail. Although his work was not 
published in the issue of Anthropological Quarterly on the opacity of other minds, but in 
publications that focus on empathy (Groark, 2008, in press), Groark has a great deal to say 
about opacity. Groark explicitly speaks of “social opacity” (cf. 2008). He describes both how 
Tzotzil Mayan establish social opacity and which countermeasures they design to provide 
empathic access in the light of social opacity.  
According to Groark, Tzotzil Mayan believe that how people present themselves in public is 
not congruent with what is really going on in them. This reminds us of Stasch’s account of the 
Korowai and Throop’s description of Yap people. Behind people’s social presentation lies “an 
unknowable heart of experience that is morally ambiguous, and possibly dangerous” (Groark, 
2008, p. 434). Tzotzil Mayan believe that suppressed negative emotions fill other person’s 
hearts. Therefore, they think of others’ interiority as “an inner world of self-centered, 
antisocial feelings, desires, and motivations that press for expression” (ibid.). This belief leads 
people to the conviction that one cannot trust in what is publicly displayed, as such display 
reflects nothing more than general norms of comportment. Against this background, it is not 
surprising that Tzotzil Mayans hold opacity claims and consider the knowledge of what is 
really going on in another person to be difficult or impossible. Mayan people “posit a radical 
interiority, a largely occluded core of deep subjectivity that remains masked in everyday 
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social life” (ibid., p. 428). According to Groark, this leads to elaborate strategies for 
concealing inner states as well as to countermeasures designed to provide access to them (cf. 
2008).  
Let us first have a look at the strategies designed to conceal inner states. Haviland and 
Haviland said that living in the neighbouring Zinacantec community involves “constant 
circumspect hiding” (1982, p. 336). This is exactly what Groark describes for the Tzotzil 
Maya as well. According to him, “wary yet polite concealment” (Groark, 2008, p. 434) 
structures everyday interactions. Tzotzil Mayans occlude their subjectivity intentionally and 
rely on a “conversational style of surface courtesy”, or, in other words, on a “conventionalized 
positive politeness” (ibid., 436). In doing so, surface clues that might reflect inner states 
disappear. Like on Yap, Tzotzil Mayans demonstrate an “opaque exterior” (Throop, 2008, p. 
415), which results in “a heigthened sensitivity of social life and the relative difficulty of 
triangulating in on the motives and emotional states of others based on overt social 
interactions” (ibid., p. 436). Opaque exteriors thus frustrate the possibility “to directly infer 
the speaker’s inner state” (ibid.). The expression “directly infer” is interesting here. After the 
analyses in chapter 2, it should be clear that it is more accurate to say that opaque exteriors 
frustrate the direct perception of another’s mental states. As they cannot be perceived directly 
(or only rarely), inference based on other evidence is not frustrated but needed. According to 
Groark, such a “polarized view of social experience leads to a constant preoccupation with the 
degree of concordance between surface appearances and inner motivations” (ibid., p. 435) and 
therefore to a “constant monitoring” of others (ibid., 434). Moreover, imaginative 
speculations about what another might really feel and think are encouraged. In a place where 
people present themselves with opaque exteriors and develop strategies to frustrate any 
attempt of others to know what might be going on in oneself, it seems justified to say that 
other minds appear to be opaque – they are, to use the terminology of the first chapter, treated 
as if lying behind an opaque barrier. One might expect mindguessing-practices to be quite 
common in such a cultural environment. Indeed, Groark observes “a marked preoccupation 
with questions of surface and depth, inner and outer, and public and private” (ibid., p. 428). 
There are, however, specific domains in which transparent modes of self-disclosure are 
common and even expected. For example, Groark mentions “that we see some of the most 
direct expression of “honest’’ emotion and empathic connection” (ibid., p. 441) in prayer. Not 
only do people present themselves in transparent ways towards the deities, they are also self-
disclosing with respect to family members who might be present. In this context is “full 
empathic knowing of one’s inner states expected and experienced” (ibid.).  
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Another exception to the common opaque modes of interaction can be found in the 
relationship between patients and traditional curers (j’ilol), who have privileged access to 
their patients mental states and can expect them to present their problems in a transparent 
manner. In these encounters, “open communication and empathic knowing take place, and 
through the process of ritualized “confession,” an enhanced understanding of the inner states 
and motivations of others is facilitated” (ibid.). In this relationship, it is in diagnosis and 
consequent treatment where “interpersonal attunement and empathic knowing is played out 
most dramatically” (ibid.). The diagnostic power of the j’ilol “lies in the precision and 
accuracy of his social discernment” (ibid., p. 442). This becomes understandable since many 
sufferings that would, in Western contexts, be diagnosed as “psychosomatic”, have their 
origins in the wider social environment of a patient. Tzotzil Mayan presume antipathy as 
characterizing a great part of the social world. Malevolent others, however, are not merely 
imagined, they are “experienced in the form of sickness, misadventure, and death” (ibid., p. 
443).  
For Mayans, the heart is the respository of thought, feeling, and memory. The heart can 
deliver information about these mental states via blood flow. Therefore, “the blood provides a 
radically embodied communication of physical and/or social disorder that only the curer can 
hear and understand by “listening” to the pulse. The pulse, then, provides an involuntary (and 
unfailingly accurate) form of self-disclosure” (ibid., p. 442). In “listening” to the pulse, the 
curer can transform the illness of the patient “from a mute symptom into a claim about the 
interpersonal world” (ibid.). This is a paradigmatic example for a bodily kind of empathy. The 
antipathy of others manifests in one’s own body in the form of illness, which provides 
“opportunities for actual interpersonal attunement” (ibid., p. 443). However, “in a final ironic 
reversal, the curer’s empathically informed diagnoses tend to confirm and reinvigorate the 
view that it is antipathy and ill will rather than empathy and fellow feeling that permeate and 
structure everyday social life” (ibid.). The only felt sense of empathic attunement, then, exists 
in the relationship between curer and patient itself. The transparency and empathic exchange 
between patient and curer, however, is an exception to the prevailing, more opaque forms of 
social interaction. Yet what is especially interesting in Groark’s account is not so much his 
demonstration that there are exceptions to the rule, but his attempt to demonstrate how even 
opaque interactions are “empathically attuned” (ibid., p. 436). Groark argues that although 
others’ hearts and minds might be approached as opaque and occluded, this does not mean 
that they are unimportant and unknowable. He thus clearly denies a strong opacity reading. 
This becomes also evident in a recent paper, where Groark speaks of cultural preferences for 
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either self-disclosive or self-occlusive forms of interaction (cf. Groark, in press). Mayans 
gossip, question motives and attend to dreams and somatic experiences as oblique and more 
indirect forms of intersubjectivity. Groark argues that the existence of opacity claims and 
social opacity does not lead people to become disinterested in others’ inner life – rather, 
Tzotzil Mayan are highly occupied with the concordance or incongruence between social 
presentation and underlying mental states (cf. Groark, in press). It seems as if the 
establishment of social opacity on a societal level even presupposes what opacity claims 
deny, since it is precisely the acknowledgement of the potential knowability of others’ mental 
states that gives rise to their artful concealment. Groark further argues that empathic processes 
are necessary for the everyday defenses and strategic maneuvers designed to frustrate other 
people’s attempts to gain access to one’s own subjective life. The boundaries established 
between people through the display of opaque exteriors are therefore “sustained by the very 
empathic processes they seek to deny” (2008, p. 443). In this view, interacting with other 
“opaque exteriors”, so to speak, requires a form of empathic or affective attunement. That 
Groark really considers empathic processes to be at play here, is counterintuitive, since 
empathy normally involves getting a grasp of another person’s inner experience. 
Nevertheless, Groark (2008) repeatedly speaks of empathy-like processes several times, as the 
following quotes demonstrate: 
 
even in social contexts structured around privacy and the denial of social knowing, 
empathic processes are widespread and underlie the everyday defenses and maneuvers 
designed to frustrate such “knowing” by others – in other words, a preoccupation with 
questions of access to one’s inner states is predicated on the assumption that such access 
is, in fact, possible. (ibid., p. 430) 
 
Indeed, as we have seen, the boundaries that delimit such knowing are often sustained by 
the very empathic processes they seek to deny: conversational privacy and evasion are 
facilitated by felt respect for the boundaries of another’s “inner” life (ibid., p. 443)  
 
Yet there is a sense in which these circumspect interactions are indeed empathically 
attuned, inasmuch as they reflect the reciprocal cooperative work of maintaining intact the 
boundaries of another`s “private” space and experience. This game of politeness, then, 
involves a mutual empathic awareness of the boundaries of another’s privacy, and 
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therefore highlights the importance of face saving and the reciprocal performance of 
respect in “positive politeness”. (ibid., p. 436) 
 
One might argue that such a usage of the term empathy pushes the boundaries too much and 
that respecting another’s boundary requires nothing more than tactfulness. I think that this 
objection is indeed justified in many cases. Smooth everyday interactions can be regulated via 
general norms of comportment (tactfulness being one such norm), and the corresponding rules 
might allow for social interactions without the necessity to engage in empathic processes. 
However, I think that Groark’s interpretation is correct in situations where norms of 
comportment do not provide sufficient orientation for how to behave. As a matter of fact, we 
do sometimes not know what tactful behaviour in a specific situation looks like. Imagine you 
had an imporant appointment with a colleague which cannot be postponed without causing 
trouble. However, an uncle of that colleague surprisingly died. You meet your colleague on 
the corridor and he doesn’t mention the appointment with you. What is tactful behaviour in 
this situation? Asking whether the appointment is still valid might be impolite and not very 
sensitive. In order to determine whether such a question is possible, you need to consider 
former experiences with this person as well as his current nonverbal cues, his facial 
expression and posture, you need to weigh and evaluate each word of the conversation and 
check whether it reveals something about how sad your colleague really is and so forth. 
Instead of feeling into someone in the original sense of the term empathy, respecting the 
boundary of the other’s feelings requires a “feeling onto” this boundary, i.e., a form of 
attunement. Although attunement is not the same as empathy, it might presuppose empathy in 
order to determine where the demarcation of the other’s psychic boundary actually begins. In 
the given example, you must know something about the other’s inner experience, you must 
determine how deeply he is affected by the death of his uncle in order to be able to respect the 
boundary of his grief. Groark also speaks of “negative empathy” that reflects the 
understanding that too accurate a knowing of others’ inner states might be experienced as 
impingement or violation and argues that encounters among the Tzotzil are not unempathic – 
at an affective level, they are experienced as highly empathically attuned (personal 
communication).  
A final interesting aspect of Groark’s work is his attempt to develop a “multimodal” approach 
to intersubjectivity that considers the whole “relational field” (cf. Groark, in press). Since 
others’ minds are difficult to know in Tzotzil everyday life, people try to get access to other 
people’s inner life from domains that are normally not considered to provide information 
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about others, namely, one’s own somatic responses as well as dream experience (cf. Groark, 
in press). According to Groark, Tzotzil Mayan are hypervigilant and attend to their own body 
since its sensations are considered to point into the social world, indicating ill will and 
negative intentions directed at oneself. Let me shortly mention that both domains are subject 
to projective processes, dream experiences maybe even more than bodily sensations. 
Although one’s bodily responses as well as one’s dream experiences might be sensitive 
enough to really reveal something about the other, they might also be the mere result of 
projection onto others – especially in the light of a society where “a presumed 
antipathy…pervades the general view of the contours of the social world” (Groark, 2008, p. 
443).  
Groark is aware of the fact that his attempt to include “fantasies of intersubjectivity” (in press) 
into research on intersubjectivity might be reproached for mixing up projective processes with 
accurate assessment of what other people feel and think. For Groark, however, the accuracy-
aspect is value-laden and does not even capture the majority of our everyday encounters 
which are just as full of projection and fantasies about the other as in other locales. Therefore, 
he opts “for a minimalist position, in which intersubjectivity is understood as an always-
present and basic aspect of any interactive field constituted by two or more subjects, 
regardless of the accuracy of the intersubjective processes at work, or the abilities of the 
parties to relate to one another as unique subjectivities” (Groark, in press). In opting for such 
a minimalist position, he manages to include projective processes and fantasies about the 
other into research on intersubjectivity and takes the wind out of the sails of those critics who 
think that accuracy is important. Although Groark is certainly right in emphasizing how much 
our normal everyday encounters are shaped by projective processes, the question remains 
whether this adds anything to a research field which is primarily interested in how we come to 
understand others as others. I think that understanding others as others implies at least a 
certain extent of accuracy. The problem with projection is that it appears like mindreading, 
since one immediately knows what the other is up to, as if telepathy was at play. But the 
problem is that you are actually reading your own mind. Nevertheless, projective processes 
seem to be an influential factor in intersubjective encounters among the Tzotzil as well as in 
some places of the Pacific. Like Tzotzil Mayans, Asabano interpret certain bodily signs as 
indicating something about others (Lohmann, 2011). Stasch tells us that Korowai readily 
“attribute to others thoughts of ill-regard” (2008, p. 444) without any evidence for doing so, 
and Lepowksy (2011) reports projective processes among the Vanatinai. 
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Summing up, Groark reports opacity claims from a very different region, namely, the 
highlands of Central America. Groark doesn’t vote for a strong opacity reading and interprets 
the opacity of other minds among the Tzotzil Maya as a cultural emphasis on “purposefully-
occluded selves” (in press). Importantly, Groark’s work adds two if not three potentially new 
usages of the term empathy. First, Groark argues that empathic processes are also at play 
when people interact with opaque exteriors, so to speak. Second, Groark provides interesting 
examples of bodily empathy where others’ negative intentions are felt in one’s own body 
while somatic sensations are interpreted as telling something about others. Finally, Groark 
anticipates the critique that such a kind of “bodily empathy” might be nothing more than 
projection by arguing that projective processes and fantasies about others should not be 
dismissed since they are pervasive in many everyday interactions and encounters across 
cultures. 
4.2 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, I have tried to provide a summary of contributions that deal with the opacity 
of other minds phenomenon as well as with local forms of empathy. All of the authors cited 
above report opacity claims. However, they appear to interpret them in a slightly different 
way, either as a cultural dispreference for talking about what another might think (Schieffelin, 
2008), as pro-autonomy claims (Stasch, 2008; Lepowsky, 2011) or as evidence for a 
pervasive suspiciousness (Groark, 2008). Importantly, all of them interpret opacity claims in a 
weak sense, which is also supported by the fact that many authors emphasize their context-
specificity.  
4.2.1 Opacity claims 
In his afterword to the contributions in Anthropological Quarterly on the opacity of other 
minds, Webb Keane states that the opacity claim has “commonly been treated as an assertion 
about psychology” (2008, pp. 473-474), while the papers in the issue of Anthropological 
Quarterly “make it very clear that it is perhaps not about psychology at all, or at least that it is 
also about a great deal more than that” (ibid., p. 474). Contemplating over the different 
accounts, Keane says that the opacity claim “is surely a metalinguistic claim about the 
relations between public evidence and private states” (ibid.). With reference to the 
contributions of Alan Rumsey and Bambi Schieffelin, he specifies this and speaks of a 
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“metapragmatic claim”, i.e. a claim “about acts of revealing and acts of concealing and how 
those are or are not to be taken as evidence for private states” (ibid.). 
Keane comments that opacity claims refer more to the important capacity to hide one’s inner 
feelings. This fits well with the empirical examples provided by Robbins (2008) and Rumsey 
(2008), as both focus on the practice of confession. While confessing, people stop hiding what 
is going on in them and make themselves transparent. They deliberately lose the power to 
keep hidden what is going on inside of them. The focus of these accounts “is not on the 
knowability of inner thoughts, as an epistemological problem, but on the capacity to hide 
them, as a practical, moral, and even political problem” (ibid., p. 477). The importance to hide 
inner feelings is also stressed among the Vanatinai (Lepowsky, 2011), in Yap (Throop, 2008, 
2011) and among the Tzotzil Maya (Groark, 2008, in press). Keane (2008) concludes: 
 
So why should it be shameful to hear people talk about their inner thoughts? In many other 
cases here, it seems to be because you are not just intruding on someone’s interior or 
private space but you being made witness to the embarrassment of seeing them lose that 
ability to keep hidden what they ought to have kept hidden. The problem is not 
psychological, or at least not epistemological. The problem concerns a person’s capacity 
to hide their inner thoughts from others. It is not that inner thoughts are inherently 
unknowable, but that they ought to be unspeakable. (ibid., p. 477) 
 
Keane does not endorse the idea that the existence of opacity claims forces a rethinking of 
Western scientific ideas in psychology:  
 
But in the final instance these papers do not undertake the kind of frontal assault on 
Western psychology that such an argument seems to call for. Robbins essentially proposes 
this position and then in the end pulls back from it. And I think none of the papers in fact 
does make a direct challenge to familiar Western psychological claims. (2008, p. 474) 
 
As a consequence, the question for Keane is not so much the status of ToM in those 
communities – it is “what people in Melanesia think one should do about those other minds” 
(ibid., p. 475).  
I do not want to ignore a critical voice at this point. Anthropologist Laurence Goldman, who 
was working in Papua New Guinea among the Huli, is sceptical of opacity claims in general. 
According to Goldman, what becomes clear when reading ethnographic extracts where 
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opacity claims were made, “is that the reports of reluctance to judge and speculate about 
others’ ‘minds’ has not necessarily emerged from the study of naturally occurring 
conversation, but rather seems based on the reactions of informants in the context of 
anthropologists’ enquiries and interrogations” (1993, p. 283). In this view, they would not be 
more than a consistent pattern of how people react to an anthropologists curious questions, or 
in Goldman’s words: “What is reflected is an interactional norm consequent on a particular 
fieldwork methodology, not a conclusion about any orientation to ‘mind’ in the culture” 
(ibid.). In the same line, Duranti suspects that our “asking people to tell us what they imagine 
that others are thinking might be like asking them to spy for us” (2008, p. 493). 
So is there a reason at all to further pursue the question raised in the introduction whether 
opacity doctrines force a rethinking of topics such as theory of mind and empathy (Robbins & 
Rumsey, 2008)? Not only are there no strong opacity readings among the anthropological 
accounts presented above – it might even turn out that opacity claims are nothing more than a 
mere reaction to anthropological enquiries. However, I think there is still good reason to 
pursue the initial questions. Let me explain why. In a footnote, Stasch discusses Goldman’s 
criticism and finally objects to it: 
 
But when a large sample of consultants consistently use a certain verbal formula in 
response to a culturally-obtuse ethnographer, it is unlikely that the form of this formula is 
determined mainly by the exogenous interactional style of the ethnographer. The 
consistency of the Korowai formula as people used it in conversation with me is evidence 
that the formula is a compelling cliché in the verbal repertoires of people I was speaking 
with. (2008, p. 42) 
 
I think, however, that there are more convincing reasons why opacity claims should not be 
dismissed as simple reactions to anthropological enquiry. First, Goldman’s critique of how 
opacity claims are interpreted refers to older reports. Although the form these opacity claims 
take is similar to the ones presented above, the discussion I refer to has evolved only recently 
and it would therefore be necessary to check whether Goldman’s criticism does apply to the 
reports presented above. Second, and more importantly, the reports and empirical examples 
presented do not only rely on situations in which an anthropologist tried to get some answers 
out of his informants. For example, the observed struggles involved in practices of confession 
cannot easily be dismissed as being provoked by anthropological enquiry. The same is true for 
observed interactional patterns between children and caregivers among the Bosavi 
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(Schieffelin, 2008) or for the feeling of disgust reported by Urapmin people when witnessing 
another person confessing (Robbins, 2008). The whole debate apparently is about much more 
than the simple occurrence of those claims in the light of an anthropologist’s questions.  
But even if we can object to Goldman’s criticism: why should one pursue the question 
whether opacity claims force a rethinking of theory of mind or Western approaches to 
empathy when Keane concludes that “none of the papers in fact does make a direct challenge 
to familiar Western psychological claims” (2008, p. 474) and nobody endorses a strong 
opacity reading? I think because it is still an open empirical question how these phenomena 
shape local forms of intersubjective understanding, including theory of mind and forms of 
empathy. The rejection of a strong opacity reading still leaves open the question whether 
theory of mind and empathy in these communities are developed, shaped and enacted 
differently. If Bosavi people do not speculate about mental states of others and even teach 
children not to do so by refraining from expansions (cf. Ochs & Schieffelin, 1994; Schieffelin, 
2008), if Urapmin people even feel disgusted when hearing other people speak sincerely 
about their feelings (cf. Robbins, 2008) and if people on Yap island try to artfully conceal 
their inner feelings, why shouldn’t this influence for example the onset of theory of mind 
development or how empathy is exercised and enacted?  
This leads us to an important conclusion of this summary. Having said much on opacity 
claims, it is important to stress that they are more than simple verbal statements without 
further impact.17 In some of the places mentioned above, they also reflect the importance to 
hide inner feelings. This is endorsed by a virtue of self-governance and enacted by artful 
concealment and the social presentation of an opaque exterior. 18  In a sense, the social 
presentation of an opaque exterior can be understood as a nonverbal correlate of the opacity 
claim. With this in mind, it seems justified to analyse in more detail what these reports tell us 
about mindreading and empathy. Before, however, let us have a closer look at the “nonverbal 
opacity claims”: the opaque exteriors people in some locales present in public. 
 
                                                          
17
 Note, however, that both Feinberg’s and Lepowsky’s interpretation of opacity claims are different. Both 
suggest that opacity claims make something explicit which is, in a very literal sense, true for every society: that 
one cannot know for sure what is in another person’s mind, at least in most cases. Although both Feinberg and 
Lepowsky provide examples concerning the different shaping of empathy and intersubjective encounters in 
Anuta and Vanatinai, they might object to my conclusion that opacity claims are more than verbal statements 
without further impact. 
18
 Again, there are clear exceptions. The Korowai (Stasch, 2008) and the Bosmun (von Poser, 2009; 
forthcoming) from Papua New Guinea as well as Anutans from the Solomon Islands (Feinberg, 2011) are 
reported to value and engage in transparent expression. 
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4.2.2 Opaque exteriors 
In the above review of the anthropological reports, we repeatedly came across the observation 
that people in some locales artfully conceal their inner states, that they publicly present an 
opaque exterior or a “conventionalized positive politeness” (Groark, 2008, p. 436). Goffman 
famously wrote about the presentation of self in everyday life (1959). Let us reflect in a bit 
more detail on the notion of opaque exteriors. Watzlawick and Beavin (1967) say that “it can 
be summarily stated that all behavior, not only the use of words, is communication (which is 
not the same as saying that behavior is only communication), and since there is no such thing 
as non-behavior, it is impossible not to communicate” (ibid., p. 5). If it is impossible not to 
communicate and if it is impossible not to behave, then it seems reasonable to hypothesize 
that it is also impossible not to express. In this view, the artful concealment of private mental 
states and the demonstration of an opaque exterior is not simply an absence of expression – on 
the contrary, it expresses a cultural value and has a meaning for all members of society. It is a 
communicative act that conveys the very fact that mental states are and should be artfully 
concealed. Note, however, that artfully concealed and therefore unexpressed anger, to cite an 
example, is not simply an inner experience of anger that is not expressed. I do not think that it 
is very adequate to say that we experience an inner emotion and either express it or not, since 
this would imply that the inner experience of an emotion is completely independent from its 
expression. Unexpressed anger is not simply the same felt inner anger as if it were expressed. 
Unexpressed anger feels differently. If you are sad and struggle to maintain your composure, 
the inner experience of sadness is certainly different from what you experience when you 
allow yourself to burst into tears. If we take this insight seriously, it might also help us to 
understand the relationship between mindreading attempts and opaque exteriors from a 
different angle. Assessing someone’s inner state is either facilitated by deliberate expression 
or made more difficult by self-governance, by the presentation of an opaque exterior. But a 
successful assessment of another’s mental state in the latter case would, if I am correct, 
actually assess something different. What is important here is that the demonstration of 
opaque exteriors does not only make things difficult for those who try to assess another’s 
mental state. A culture that values the enactment of opacity might also influence how and 
what those presenting opaque exteriors feel.  
Finally, artful concealment is never perfect. A person who feels sad appears to others as a 
person struggling not to express sadness, an angry person as a person that struggles not to 
express anger, and so forth. Both the struggle and the emotion people are struggling with 
might be perceivable in the other’s observable attempt to conceal these states. It is precisely 
 95
the fact that humans are so good at directly perceiving what might be going on in someone 
which makes the successful concealment of one’s inner states an artistic accomplishment. 
Leudar and Costall put it like this way: “People can of course lie and occasionally hide their 
feelings, beliefs and intentions. However, it is hiding one’s experience – keeping it private – 
that is the real accomplishment, not revealing it” (2009c, p. 21).  
4.2.3 Opacity reports and ‘mindreading’ 
Although opacity claims consist in the assertion that one cannot know what is going on in 
another person’s mind, few anthropologists make the link to the opposite idea which stresses 
the possibility of ‘mindreading’. While most of the contributions summarized above talk 
about opacity and empathy, they do sometimes use the term mindreading without providing a 
clear definition and without clearly distinguishing it from other forms of empathic knowing. 
Feinberg, however, in line with Hollan (2011), says that empathy is not the same as 
mindreading and defines empathy as “an educated guess based on empirical evidence. If one 
guesses right, the other person issues signals that confirm the accuracy of the initial 
hypothesis” (ibid., p. 163). This definition seems to fit quite well with what I have called 
mindguessing in the previous chapter. But if Feinberg takes this to be a definition of empathy, 
then what is mindreading according to him? Feinberg does not provide a definition for it, but 
we can logically conclude that mindreading is not a matter of guessing based on empirical 
evidence for him. 
Hollan (2011) only mentions that “empathy is so often characterized and conceptualized as 
the mind reading capabilities of the empathizer alone” (ibid., p. 197) and emphasizes that our 
ability to understand others does strongly depend on whether they want to be understood and 
whether they provide us with appropriate cues. This is an important remark. But whether 
Hollan thinks of empathy and mindreading as equivalent or whether he argues that what 
distinguishes both is precisely the mutual character of empathic encounters, i.e. their 
dependency on the others’ willingness to be empathized with, remains an open question. Yet 
if this were his way of distinguishing both, the resulting account would still be a bit 
unsatisfying, since what distinguished mindreading from empathy would only depend on the 
other’s willingness to be understood. 
With regard to Urapmin people, Robbins points out how “difficult it is for a woman to ask 
that another person hear her speech as a reflection of her mind and how shameful it is for a 
man who agrees to listen to her to treat her speech in this way” (2008, p. 427). This practice 
serves, according to Robbins, “as evidence of how marked sincere speech and mind-reading 
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interpretation were (and still are) in traditional Urapmin understanding” (ibid.). I have already 
argued above that Robbins’ use of the term mindreading is odd, since mindreading in cases of 
sincere speech is rather superfluous. On the contrary, it seems that ‘mindreading’ – however 
one might define the term – rather comes into play in cases of insincere speech. But Robbins 
curiously uses the term for a situation where someone is engaged in sincere speech, thus 
providing the impression that it needs more than taking the uttered words at face value. 
For Stasch, the Korowai assertion that someone has his own thoughts “is an argument against 
an opposite idea people took to be implied in my questions, an idea of mind-reading” (2008, 
p. 444). This sounds odd, since mindreading is considered to be necessary precisely because 
people have their own thoughts. Stasch, however, interprets the Korowai formula that people 
have their own thoughts as a pro-autonomy claim (cf. Lepowsky, 2011). From this point of 
view, Stasch’s words make sense, since a radical view on others’ autonomy might lead to a 
dispreference for mindreading or mindguessing. In saying that his informants quite often 
answered his questions “about reasons for others’ actions with statements of those people’s 
motives” and that they “answered questions about others’ future actions with outright 
predictions of what those others would do” (Stasch, 2008, p. 444), Stasch implicitly works 
with the typical definition of mindreading/ToM, since both the explanatory and predictive 
aspects are constitutive for many common definitions of ToM.  
Summing up, we can conclude that the anthropological use of the term mindreading is rather 
vague and theoretically not very elaborated. But if we apply the conceptual tools developed in 
the second chapter to the different reports sketched in this chapter, it becomes obvious that 
contextreading, direct perception, mental state attribution, mental state talk, mental state 
inference and mindguessing actually do occur. There is no need to argue for the universal 
occurrence of contextreading, direct perception and mental state attribution. Contextreading, 
defined as the ability to make sense of situations, circumstances and the course of events 
without the necessity to infer mental states, for example by considering rules or norms, is an 
important ability in all societies of the world. Emotions are expressed everywhere, and if they 
are not (or less), this requires artful concealment, which must be trained precisely because 
emotions do press for expression, precisely because they might show up in one’s face as soon 
as one loses control. Therefore, emotion terms exist everywhere, and as soon as they are used, 
either publicly or silently, mental state attribution and mental-state-talk occur, although the 
latter might be tabooed and restricted to the domain of gossip. Moreover, Ku Waru “make 
inferences about other people’s intentional states” (Rumsey, 2008, p. 470), Kaluli “obviously 
interpret and assess one another’s available behaviors and internal states” (Schieffelin, 1990, 
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p. 72) although they are not acceptable as topics of talk, and Korowai know that people think 
silently without speaking (Stasch, 2008, p. 484) and are “wary in advance what others will 
infer or speculate about their own intentions” (ibid., p. 451). Anutans “show intense concern 
about each other’s “real” intentions” (Feinberg, 2011, p. 156), they “are concerned with 
feelings and intentions as predictors of future behavior” (ibid., p. 162), they “frequently 
formulate hypotheses about what others are thinking and feeling” (ibid., p. 157) and “they try 
to interpret the intentions behind others’ speech acts” (ibid.). Vanatinai “conjecture at length, 
in exacting detail, based upon a range of external cues, about what others are thinking and 
feeling” (Lepowsky, 2011, p. 49). 
Summing up, a great deal of what is usually associated with the term ‘mindreading’ is 
common in those places. Some reports even give the impression that attempts to assess others’ 
internal states might be hightened, since people in these locales are especially concerned with 
the level of congruence between outer appearance and social presentation on the one hand and 
inner motivations and intentions on the other. For example, Groark says about the effect of 
opaque exteriors among the Tzotzil: “The interlocutor’s ability to directly infer the speaker’s 
inner state is thereby frustrated, confounding direct access and encouraging imaginative 
speculations about what the speaker is really feeling and thinking” (2008, p. 436). In other 
words, the constant monitoring of others’ opaque exteriors might even result in heightened 
theorizing about what might really be going on in someone.  
Finally, it seems as if false belief understanding is the only element of the conceptual tool kit 
that cannot be proven by a closer look at the existing anthropological literature.  
4.2.4 Opacity reports and empathy 
At this point, let us reconsider what has been said on empathy in chapter 3 and bring it 
together with the results of this chapter. The analysis of the different reports from Central 
America and the Pacific islands makes things even more complex, but like Batson, I hope “to 
reduce confusion by recognizing complexity” (Batson, 2009, p. 8). Let us have a look again at 
Batson’s eight uses of the term empathy.  
 
Concept 1: Knowing another person’s internal state, including his or her thoughts and feelings 
Concept 2: Adopting the posture or matching the neural responses of an observed other 
Concept 3: Coming to feel as another person feels 
Concept 4: Intuiting or projecting oneself into another’s situation 
Concept 5: Imagining how another is thinking and feeling  
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Concept 6: Imagining how one would think and feel in the other’s place 
Concept 7: Feeling distress at witnessing another person’s suffering 
Concept 8: Feeling for another person who is suffering 
 
This list covers some of the usages we encountered in the anthropological reports above. 
Interestingly, however, it does not cover all, as we will see in a moment. Several of the 
anthropological authors cited above say that the people they studied want to know and come 
to know others’ internal states (concept one) in spite of opacity claims. Asabano (Lohmann, 
2011) as well as Banabans (Hermann, 2011) imaginatively take the perspective of others – an 
example for concept six. Groark (2008) explains how social opacity among the Tzotzil Maya 
gives rise to imaginative speculations about what others might feel and think (concept five). 
Hermann (2011) also tells us that Banabans represent themselves as having a special capacity 
to show pity, which at least fits quite well with concepts 7 and 8. 
But the anthropological reports do also add some new aspects. Hollan and Throop remark:  
 
Despite the attention recently paid to the opacity doctrine, it is equally important to 
remember that throughout the Pacific we find a strong cultural value placed on developing 
and maintaining emotionally positive and loving ties among people, especially among 
those designated as kin. (2011, p. 10) 
 
Indeed, many contributions from the Pacific share the observation of a “pan-Pacific emotional 
idiom of ‘love-compassion-concern-pity’” (Hollan & Throop, 2011, p. 11). Picking up this 
terminology and for the sake of brevity, I will henceforth speak of the LCCP-complex, or 
simply LCCP. In the reports presented above, we came across local forms of LCCP called 
aropa in Anuta (Feinberg, 2011), te nanoang among the Banabans of Fiji (Hermann, 2011) 
and runguy on Yap island (Throop, 2008). Throop says that this term “has a broad semantic 
range that at times appears to overlap with the concept of ‘empathy’ but that I gloss here as 
‘concern/pity/compassion’” (ibid., p. 408). With respect to the Anutan aropa, it is worth 
mentioning that very similar concepts are common in many other Polynesian communities 
across the Pacific (aloha, Hawaii; aroha, Maori in New Zealand; alofa, Samoa, see next 
chapter). Although Batson’s concepts seven and eight do cover aspects of LCCP, they do not 
fully grasp it, since LCCP means much more than feeling distress when confronted with 
another’s suffering or feeling for a another person who is suffering. The local concepts 
belonging to the LCCP-complex are understood as active orientations towards other persons. 
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They do not primarily focus on what might be going on inside the empathizer or empathizee, 
i.e. his feelings. Instead, they have a strong normative dimension. Hollan and Throop’s 
observation that LCCP is especially common among kin is an important one, since it points to 
the fact that what we consider to be an effect of an individual’s empathic process (caring, 
giving, providing help, etc.) might also be realized via kinship ties and corresponding norms. 
Nevertheless, it seems difficult to argue that LCCP might be a Pacific equivalent of empathy, 
since LCCP covers much of what we consider to be a consequence of empathy. So why 
should it not be a consequence of what we consider to be empathy in those places as well?   
Note, however, that empathic-like knowledge is also considered as a possible means to harm, 
shame or humiliate others in some places (e.g. Briggs, 2008; Groark, 2008). Therefore, the 
anthropological reports provide examples both for positive and negative forms of empathy. 
However, this does not necessarily support the view that empathy is basically neutral. As 
argued in the previous chapter, empathy might still be a primarily compassionate response 
that can be inhibited and transformed in order to be used for ill means. I will again come back 
to this point in the chapter on Samoa. 
Apart from the LCCP-complex, there are other original anthropological contributions to the 
research field on empathy. Groark’s (2008) idea that interactions with other people who try to 
conceal their inner states might require something like an empathic attunement in order to 
respect their psychic privacy is new and, I think, useful.  
Moreover, some anthropologists report a bodily form of empathy. In some locales, people use 
their own somatic reactions and bodily resonance as a source of information about the social 
world and as a starting point for imaginative processes (Groark, 2008; Lohmann, 2011). 
Likewise, people might attend very carefully to others’ bodily cues (Throop, 2008). If it is 
culturally prescribed to show a ‘good face’ in public or to enact expressive opacity (Throop, 
2008), people might become hypervigilant to their own as well as others’ bodily reactions. All 
this is important, since one’s own bodily resonance and the monitoring of subtle cues on 
another’s body might be what compensates for the lack of direct expression in places where 
opaque exteriors are presented. At this point, let me present another definition of empathy I 
did not mention in the previous chapter. It is a definition that is quite popular among 
anthropologists (cf. Hollan & Throop, 2011), and this is not by accident. According to Jodi 
Halpern (2001, 2003), empathy is a kind of emotional reasoning in which someone 
emotionally resonates with another’s experience while simultaneously trying to imagine the 
other person’s perspective. She describes “empathy in terms of a listener using her emotional 
associations to provide a context for imagining the distinct experiences of another person” 
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(2001, xv). According to Halpern, the own emotional associations or resonance shapes the 
way for the following process of imagination. Expressive behaviour, which, for example is an 
important cause of empathic responses in the account of Bischof-Köhler (2012), does only 
rarely tell very much about someone’s inner states in places were self-governance is valued 
and expected. This is not to say, however, that people do not affect others on a more basic 
level, i.e., on the level of bodily and emotional resonance. I think Halpern’s definition is so 
popular among anthropologists precisely because it manages to detect and conceptualize 
empathy in places where people show an opaque exterior. Halpern’s focus on bodily 
resonances and the imaginations triggered by them allows for empathy even when people are 
faced with opaque exteriors. Very similar views on empathy can be found in the contributions 
above by Lohmann (2011) and Hermann (2011).  
Another new aspect brought forward by some anthropological contributions are projective 
processes. I have criticized this since I believe that the ongoing research on how we come to 
understand other minds is explicitly about how we accurately assess another’s mind. 
However, it is an interesting aspect, since projection might give rise to an illusory kind of 
empathy. If I project hostility onto another person, I will experience him as hostile. This gives 
rise to the treacherous impression that I might have assessed what is going on in the other – 
from this point of view, the result of projection can falsely feel as if it were the result of an 
empathic process. But what if the other identifies with my projection? In this case, the mental 
state I project onto the other coincides with the mental state the other is experiencing. Melanie 
Klein’s (1946) famous work on projective identification, from this point of view, allows to 
understand projection as a form of empathic knowing if – and only if – the other identifies 
with the mental state projected onto him. We could call this projective empathy. Hollan and 
Throop confirm this:  
 
Projections may sometimes coincide with the other’s emotional state and therefore 
resemble empathy in certain respects. But more often they will not coincide and may 
themselves become a major source of misunderstanding among people, being instead 
interpreted as evidence of the lack of empathy. (2011, p. 3)  
 
Since the coincidence between what one projects and what the other feels is rather the 
exception, Hollan and Throop think that the “concern with accuracy, the willingness, indeed 
the necessity, to alter one’s impression of another’s emotional state as one engages with the 
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other and learns more about his or her perspective, is what distinguishes empathy from simple 
projection” (ibid.). 
A final important contribution will be Jeannette Mageo’s account of empathy in the chapter 
on empathy in Samoa (chapter 5). Aspects of her account, however, are already covertly 
present in some of the contributions presented in this chapter. Throop (2008) tells us that the 
feeling of runguy also binds a father to his children (ibid., p. 409). Hermann (2011) says about 
the Banabans that “compassion is the basis for their capacity to bond socially with others” 
(ibid., p. 31). Among the Ku Waru, “it is said to be possible for each member of a couple to 
know what is in the other’s mind because it is the same as what is in their own” (Rumsey, 
2008, p. 465). What these quotes have in common is the idea that there might be a link 
between empathy or aspects of it and attachment. This idea is made explicit by Mageo (2011), 
who thinks of empathy as “re-directed attachment” (ibid., p. 69), as “an as-if form of 
attachment” (ibid., p. 72). 
Summing up, we can say that the anthropological contributions to empathy research offer new 
and interesting perspectives – perspectives that make things even more complicated, as they 
broaden the scope of meanings of the term empathy even more. As a result, we can add the 
five following concepts to Batson’s original list. 
 
Concept 9:  LCCP-complex 
Concept 10: empathic attunement, negative empathy (sensu Groark) 
Concept 11: bodily empathy 
Concept 12: projective processes and projective empathy 
Concept 13: empathy as redirected attachment, as an as-if form of attachment  
 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that we should distinguish empathy from 
ToM/mindreading and suggested that it might be worth asking whether empathy really 
coincides with simulation or whether there is more to it. Aspects that might be relevant for 
getting a clear notion of what constitutes empathy in contrast to ‘mindreading’ and 
simulation, are the idea that the objects of empathic processes are typically emotions, that 
empathy involves a sharing of these emotions, that it is triggered by direct perception and that 
it gives us the possibility to understand how another person feels.  
What can we, on a more general level, learn from the five derived concepts just mentioned? 
First of all, the anthropological contributions allow for a conceptualization of empathy in 
places where opacity doctrines are common. On Yap (Throop, 2008) or in the highlands of 
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Central America (Groark, 2008), one might wonder how people can ever assess how another 
feels when people do neither talk about their feelings nor express them in their face or 
comportment. By providing concepts 10-12, however, the anthropological contributions offer 
a solution to this conundrum. According to Bischof-Köhler, empathic reactions “may be 
caused by the expressive behavior of the other or by the person’s situation” (2012, p. 41). The 
anthropological contributions refine this picture. Groark argued how even the attunement to 
people who show an opaque exterior necessitates empathic-like processes. In the examples of 
bodily empathy, empathic processes can start without another’s expressive behaviour and in 
absence of situational cues via one’s own bodily resonance. And the examples of projective 
processes, although they might be something very different from accurately assessing 
another’s mental state, are at least a means to shape and direct intersubjective processes 
despite of opaque exteriors. Therefore, concepts 10-12 allow us to think of how empathic 
processes might look like in cultures where more opaque forms of interaction are pervasive.  
Concepts 11 and 12 can also help us to arrive at a more general definition of empathy. Note 
that bodily reactions are also subject to projective processes. One can have bodily reactions 
even in the absence of others. Lohmann (2011) tells us that Asabano interpret sweat without 
exertion as indicating that someone will soon arrive (isi’sitibu). I would argue that it is highly 
questionable whether our own bodily reactions can tell us anything about others if they are not 
present. Interpreting own somatic phenomena in such a way is rather projection than 
something that deserves to be called empathy. In other words, bodily empathy seems to be 
possible mainly in cases where the other person is present. Moreover, projective identification 
seems to depend on another’s presence. Therefore, both bodily empathy and illusory empathy 
that results from projective identification support my argument from the previous chapter that 
there are good reasons to use the term empathy only for real human-human encounters. 
Finally, concept 13 suggests that empathy might have something to do with bonding, with 
attachment and kin, roughly speaking. The cross-cultural association of empathy with the 
LCCP-complex seems to support this view, since love, concern, care and compassion are 
paradigmatically enacted in primary attachment relationships between caregiver and children. 
We will hear more about this in the next chapter on Samoa. Yet if it makes at least partially 
sense to think of empathy as an as-if form of attachment or redirected attachment (Mageo, 
2011), then we would not expect it to be morally neutral, at least not primarily. This is not to 
say however, that it cannot be used for ill means as well: the world is full of sad stories which 
prove that caregivers can abuse their children’s attachment to them. Both attachment and 
empathy can be used for malicious means – however, their origin and function is rather tied to 
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LCCP. I think that we now have at least some reasonable arguments that support my attempt 
to restrict empathy to real encounters and to consider it as a basically compassionate 
response.19 The link between empathy and attachment will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter.  
All this said, we still have some reason to conclude that empathy is made more difficult in 
places where opaque exteriors are publicly presented. At the end of chapter 3, I defined 
empathy as a primarily compassionate reaction to another’s expressed emotional state that 
leads us to understand the ‘how’-aspect of another’s experience via a combination of 
imaginative processes and sharing. Against the background of the anthropological reports 
summarized in this chapter, let us now rethink and refine this definition in order to give it 
more cross-cultural validity. Empathy seems to be a primarily compassionate reaction which 
normally results in behaviours associated with LCCP. It is triggered by another’s expressed 
emotional states and one’s own bodily resonances and somatic reactions to them. Such a 
bodily form of empathy is also possible in places where people demonstrate an opaque 
exterior. These resonances give rise to imaginative processes that help to understand the 
other’s point of view and the ‘how’-aspect of his experience, which results in a willingness to 
share the other’s emotion. This sharing makes it very likely that the behavioural inclinations 
towards the other at the end of such an empathic process are at least minimally related to 
LCCP. The notion of bodily empathy allows for empathy even in places where people 
deliberately conceal their mental states. Yet if there is a stronger emphasis on social role and 
public face, then the difference between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ automatically becomes bigger. 
Such a lack of congruency between inner experience and outer presentation might also 
enhance projective processes and speculation. Although people in such places still react 
towards opaque exteriors via bodily resonance and imaginative processes, these are more 
prone to projection and speculation than in places where people value transparent expression 
and sincere speech. On the other hand, a heightened preoccupation with the level of 
                                                          
19
 Above, I mentioned Halpern’s view on empathy. According to her, own emotional associations start 
imaginative processes. In this view, empathy seems to be rather neutral, and one might draw on Halpern to 
object to my understanding of empathy. Clearly, another’s anger can affect me on the level of bodily resonance 
and start imaginary processes aimed at understanding why the other is angry with me. Is this not an example for 
a neutral, non-compassionate empathic reaction which also is not inverted in order to harm others? I do not think 
it is. If another person is angry, and if it is a person I do normally like, then my goal of understanding his anger is 
aimed at reestablishing our former, more harmonious relationship. Therefore, it is compassionate. On the other 
hand, if I do not care about the other person (maybe because I do not know him), then understanding his anger 
probably mainly serves the goal to avoid his anger or its physical consequences (since he might beat me up). The 
fact that my body resonates with his anger and that I try to figure out why he is angry is not enough to qualify the 
example as an example of empathy. My attempt to understand him is not aimed at understanding the ‘how’-
aspect, I do not want to share his anger. Therefore, it is rather an example of mindguessing. Mindguessing, too, 
can be triggered by my own emotions. But it must be distinguished from empathy as long as I am not concerned 
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congruency between inner and outer might also enhance aspects of ‘mindreading’ like 
mindguessing or mental state talk in gossip. Moreover, presenting an opaque exterior and 
interacting with other people who do so requires a specific form of empathic attunement 
(Groark, 2008). Nevertheless, I argue that opaque exteriors make empathy more difficult, at 
least if we understand it as requiring the sharing of another’s emotion and therefore the 
willingness of the empathizee. 
According to the above, we can now refine our definition of empathy. 
 
Empathy 
1) is a primarily compassionate reaction which normally results in behaviours associated 
with LCCP 
2) is triggered either by resonating with another’s expressed emotional state or by one’s own 
bodily resonances and somatic reactions towards another’s opaque exterior in his or her 
presence  
3) involves imaginative processes and sharing in order to grasp the ‘how’-aspect of another’s 
experience or empathic attunement in order to respect the boundaries of another’s 
subjective life 
 
I have said above that grasping how another person feels might help us to better understand 
him and therefore to engage in behaviours associated with LCCP. We might therefore ask 
how people can show LCCP in places where people empathically attune and might not be 
trying to grasp how it is for another to feel a certain emotion. In the next chapter, we will see 
that LCCP can also be realized via redirected attachment. This will help us to again refine the 
definition of empathy.  
At the end of this chapter, the resulting picture of the opacity of other minds phenomenon is 
still somehow unsatisfying. People are concerned with the level of congruency both in 
cultures where opaque expression is valued (Yap, Tzotzil) and in cultures where transparent 
expression is valued (Korowai). An emphasis and focus on the effects of another’s activities 
and actions instead of the underlying intentions can be found both in places where emotions 
are concealed (Yap) and in places where they are openly expressed (Anuta). Opacity claims 
are reported both in cultures where mental states are not a suitable object for speculation 
(Kaluli) and in places where people seem to engage in mindguessing, mental state talk and 
inferences like in Western cultures (Anuta). The resultant picture might leave one helpless. To 
come to grips with the complex picture of the opacity of other minds phenomenon as it 
emerged in this chapter, it might be helpful to focus on a single culture. Apart from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
with the how-aspect of the other’s experience and as long as there is no willingness to share it. 
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prevalent opacity claims, it seems difficult to capture an aspect of opacity which is common 
to all the locales described above. If the opacity of other minds cannot be defined generally, 
then the aim must be a more modest one, namely, to clarify opacity and its relationship to 
ToM and empathy in one specific locale. In the remainder of this work, I will therefore focus 
on a single locale: the Independent State of Samoa. 
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5. Samoa 
“How much of ourselves do we hide? From the rest of the world? From ourselves even? The 
silent unspoken. The ghost-words that flutter around us like invisible butterflies. How much of 
our past do we reveal to loved ones? How much of the present do we reveal to loved ones? To 
ourselves even? I don’t know.” 
 
Sia Figiel, They who do not grieve 
 
A lot has been said in the previous chapters on opacity, mindreading, and empathy. I have 
used anthropological reports from very different places in order to enrich – and complicate – 
our notion of empathy. By considering emically derived concepts and anthropological usages 
of the term, I came up with an account of empathy that might have more cross-cultural 
validity than the concepts common in Western places and scientific communities (cf. Batson, 
2009). Although many aspects of opacity and empathy as reported by cultural anthropologists 
are specific for a certain region or locale, it still became evident that some aspects are shared 
by a variety of locales and cultures, for example the striking similarities of the asserted 
opacity claims or the importance to conceal and control private mental states such as emotions 
in order to present an appropriate public face that is in line with culturally valued norms of 
comportment. With respect to empathy, a focus on what we consider to be consequences of 
empathy (LCCP) is typical for many places. Yet while all these commonalities have been 
derived from different locales, the resulting model or aspects of opacity cannot easily be 
transferred to a new place. Such an imposition might be inappropriate for a specific place. For 
the rest of this work, I will therefore focus on one specific locale, namely, Samoa. In the 
course of the following chapters, it will become evident that Samoa is an interesting place for 
doing research on the relationship between opacity doctrines on the one hand and forms of 
‘mindreading’ and empathy on the other. Cultural anthropologists have been interested in 
Samoa since Margaret Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa (which was first published in 1928) 
and so there is a great amount of anthropological literature available on Samoa. Moreover, to 
my knowledge, there are only two locales discussed in the context of opacity doctrines where 
theory of mind research was done. Oberle conducted false belief studies on the Micronesian 
islands of Fais and Yap (2009), and Callaghan et al. (2005) presented false belief data from 
five different places including Samoa. Samoa therefore seems especially suited when it comes 
to answering the question whether opacity doctrines force a rethinking of common 
assumptions like theory of mind (cf. Robbins & Rumsey, 2008). Focusing on a single locale 
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will not only help us to develop a richer and more detailed account of what opacity in a 
specific place amounts to, it will also help us to spell out some of the more general and 
theoretical aspects which have already been mentioned in previous chapters in more detail. 
While the anthropological reports sketched in the previous chapter were presented en bloc, I 
will now proceed in a more structured way. After providing some very basic information on 
the Samoan islands, including some words on the history and social structure, I will focus on 
childhood in Samoa, on Samoan folk psychology and socialization practices. While the 
subchapter on childhood in Samoa will outline some basic or, in a sense, more structural 
characteristics of Samoan childhood, the chapter on Samoan folk psychology will introduce 
Samoan concepts of person, inner experience and behaviour. The subchapter on childhood 
socialization draws on both what has been said in the chapter on childhood in Samoa and 
Samoan folk psychology – it is, in a sense, a synthesis of these two, since socialization 
practices are both a fundamental part of what children experience and a transmitter as well as 
a reflection of Samoan folk psychology. 
But first of all, Samoa must be identified as a culture that fits into the debate about the opacity 
of other minds. The most obvious criterion that would make Samoa a suitable candidate in 
this context would be the prevalence of opacity claims which, as we have seen, are reported 
from many different places across the Pacific. Characteristic for these claims is the assertion 
that one cannot know what is in another person’s mind. As this chapter focuses on Samoa, I 
will first have to identify Samoa as a suitable candidate in this context. Ochs says that 
“Samoans generally display a strong dispreference for guessing at what is going on in another 
person’s mind” (1988, p. 143). Duranti observed that “Samoans often seem to ignore the 
speaker’s alleged intentions” (1986, p. 240) and cites his own work in Samoa as an example 
that documents the opacity doctrine phenomenon (2008, p. 485). Shore observed a “reluctance 
to discuss or pursue purely private experience” (1982, p. 149) in Samoa. Mageo said that 
Samoans “assert the opacity of others’ minds and hearts” (2011, p. 76) and that “Samoans are 
generally indefinite about their own interior life and forswear the possibility of fathoming 
anyone else’s” (1998, p. 64). Gerber stated that “Samoans frequently say, with the full core of 
self-evident conventional wisdom, ‘we cannot know what is in another person’s depth,’ or 
‘we cannot tell what another person is thinking’” (1985, p. 133). These examples identify 
Samoa as a culture where opacity claims apparently do exist and make it a suitable candidate 
for a more detailed analysis on how opacity doctrines, ToM and empathy might be related to 
each other. Against this background, I will begin this chapter as outlined above with a short 
introduction to the Samoan islands. 
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5.1 The Samoan islands 
Samoa is located in the South West Pacific and divided into two states by the 171st meridian. 
To the West is Independent Samoa and to the East lies the US territory of American Samoa. 
Independent Samoa20 is comprised of two main islands, Upolu with the capital Apia and 
Savai’i. Both islands are volcanic and mountainous with rain forest covering the inner parts of 
the islands (see Figures 1-3). Two smaller islands are inhabited as well, Manono and 
Apolima.21  
According to the preliminary count of the Samoan population on the 7th of November in 2011 
by the Samoan Bureau of Statistics (Samoa Bureau of Statistics [SBS], 2012a), Samoa has a 
total population of 186.340 people, with 36.853 people living in the urban area of the capital 
Apia on Upolu and only 44.387 people living on the biggest island of Savai’i (ibid.).  
Over a quarter of the population live in Apia. The vast majority of the population is 
concentrated in villages along the coastline. Savai’i is bigger than Upolu and the biggest 
island of all Samoas, but only about a quarter of the total population of Samoa is living here.  
In the course of Samoan history, the islands were profoundly influenced by Western contact. 
Contact to pālagi (white people/Europeans) intensified after the arrival of missionary John 
Williams of the London Missionary Society in 1830 (Meleisea et al., 1987, pp. 43-46; Va’a,  
2001, p. 48). The missionary activites were so “successful” that the original Samoan religion 
was virtually buried in oblivion. Nowadays, Christianity – represented by many different 
denominations across and within villages – plays an important part in people’s everyday life 
as well as in public life.  
In 1899, Great Britain, the United States of America and Germany settled their rivalry and 
territorial claims by signing a treaty which left the western islands of Savai’i and Upolu as a 
German colony while the eastern part (Tutuila and the Manu‘a group) was put under control 
of the USA (Hiery, 1995, pp. 102-103; Liuaana, 2004, p.37). Till the outbreak of World War 
I, Samoa was under German rule. After the end of German colonial rule, it was put under full 
control by New Zealand as a League of Nations C class mandate (Meleisea & Schoeffel, 
1983, p. 85; Hiery, 1995, p. 107; Ward & Ashcroft, 1998, p. 1; Liuaana, 2004, pp. 119-120). 
The Western part of Samoa finally became independent as the “Independent State of Western 
Samoa” in 1962. In 1997, the word “Western” was dropped (Hiery, 1995, p. 109; Meleisea 
                                                          
20
 Although the name Samoa historically refers to all of the islands that now belong to Independent Samoa and 
American Samoa, I will henceforth use the term Samoa to refer to the Independent State of Samoa. If American 
Samoa is meant, I will say so. 
21
 Unfortunately, I cannot present one of the rare better maps of Samoa due to copyright reasons. The position 
and shape of the Samoan islands, however, are well illustrated in Mageo (2011). 
 109 
1987; Meleisea & Schoeffel, 1983, p. 86; Ward & Ascroft, 1998, p. 1). Up until the present, 
the eastern part of the archipelago (American Samoa) is controlled by the United States of 
America as an unincorporated territory (Kreisel, 2004, p. 181; Va’a, 2001, p. 50, p. 60).  
In the second half of the 20th century, many Samoans migrated overseas. As a consequence of 
Western influence, the mere reliance on subsistence economy in Samoa became less and less 
attractive. Nevertheless, subsistence economy is still important. Most Samoans who migrated 
overseas live in New Zealand (with a majority living in the metropolitan area of Auckland) – 
however, the US and Australia are further common destinations. Nowadays, about half of all 
Samoans live outside Samoa (Gough, 2006, p. 88; Ward & Ashcroft, 1998, p. 43).  
Although Samoa was deeply influenced in the course of its history by Western culture, it still 
managed to maintain its own local variety of Polynesian culture which is known as fa‘a 
Sāmoa (literally meaning “the Samoan way”) or aganu’u Sāmoa (Va’a, 2001, p. 47, 2006, pp. 
119-120).  
 
Figure 1: Southeastern Savai’i 
 
 
Figure 2: Northern Savai’i, volcanic soil  
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Figure 3: Beach on the southern coast of Upolu. 
5.2 Social structure 
Like other Polynesian cultures, Samoa is highly stratified and has an elaborate chiefly system 
(fa’amatai). According to Ochs, rank in Samoa “is assessed in terms of political title (e.g. 
chief, orator, and positions within each of these statuses), church title (pastor, deacon, etc.), 
age, and generation, among other variables” (1988, p. 137). Correspondingly, respect 
(fa’aaloalo) for socially higher ranking persons as well as obedience and service (tautua) to 
the community are core Samoan values.  
The central unit of Samoan society is the extended family (‘āiga), which can span up to four 
generations and consist of up to 30 persons (cf. Kroeber-Wolf, 1998, pp. 249-250). Every 
‘āiga is headed by a matai (titled person). There are two main categories of matai: the higher 
ranking ali’i (sacred or high chiefs who claim ultimate descent from the creator god Tagaloa-
a-lagi) and tulāfale (orators or talking chiefs who act as spokespersons and executive officers 
of the ali’i). Several ‘āiga make up a village (nu’u). Samoan villages are associated with a 
section of land and sea. They stretch from the mountain ridges in the islands’ interiors down 
to the coast and the lagoons. Beyond the villages and more inland are the plantations, where 
cocoa, coconuts and taro are cultivated. Each ‘āiga can use a certain proportion of these areas 
for subsistence and residential use. The nu’u as a whole is governed by the council of matai of 
the village (fono a le nu’u) which traditionally combines executive, legislative and judicial 
powers. Still today, many issues are settled on this level.  
In contrast to closed houses, traditional open-built fale (Samoan house) with thatched roofs 
have neither exterior nor interior walls (see Figures 4 and 5).  
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Figure 4: Traditional open-built fale (Samoan house) 
 
 
 
Figure 5: View from the inside of an open-built fale, photographs of ancestors on top of the columns 
 
Family households are spatially organized together in a single compound. A number of fale 
for different members of the extended family and for different functional uses (e.g. kitchen) 
constitute the ‘āiga’s traditional residential site. In recent times, however, closed Western 
style houses with walls and corrugated iron roofs have become more and more common. In 
comparison to Western Europe or North America, the average number of children per family 
is relatively high: in 2006, a Samoan woman gave birth to 4.2 children on average during her 
life (Samoa Bureau of Statistics [SBS], 2012b).  
Thus, children in Samoa grow up with many brothers and sisters and other peers around them 
(cf. Kroeber-Wolf, 1998, pp. 248-250). As a result of more than fifty years of mass migration 
to overseas, Samoan social structure has become more complex, since the Samoan‘āiga now 
extends far beyond the traditional village setting. Nowadays, it is very common that Samoans 
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receive remittances from their relatives living overseas. This money constitutes a significant 
source of income for many families in Samoa (Gough, 2006, p. 91). 
5.3 Childhood in Samoa 
Children in Samoa are growing up in the middle of their ‘āiga , i.e. the greater family 
including uncles, aunts, cousins etc. Samoan children can use the word tinā (mother) for all 
female relatives in the mother’s generation and the word tamā for all male relatives in the 
father’s generation. Moreover, Samoan language does not differentiate between siblings and 
cousins of the same sex, since all are referred to as uso. It is relatively common that some 
children do not sleep in the same house with their biological parents but in the house of 
someone else who belongs to the ‘āiga. Mageo even tells us that in pre-Christian times, 
children often grew up in households other than those of their biological parents when another 
tama or tina of the extended family wanted a particular child or because of the child’s own 
preferences (2010, p. 129). This suggests that the central unit of the Samoan social structure 
in which a child is raised is the extended family rather than the nuclear family. These and 
other factors like the relatively high number of children per family create a populated 
environment and Samoan children learn to interact with several members of the greater family 
early on in life (Ochs, 1988). Apart from their extended family, Samoan children are part of 
the village community (nu’u) and engage in communal activities as well as play with peers 
belonging to other‘āiga. 
The structure of Samoan villages and the traditional open-built architecture enhance social 
interaction and make privacy almost impossible. In a sense, one could speak of an 
architectural transparency in Samoa which is interesting given the fact that Samoa was also 
mentioned in the context of the debate on the opacity of other minds. In Samoa, individuals 
are under constant scrutiny. With respect to children, we can conclude that both infants and 
children are almost always under the observation of someone (Kroeber-Wolf, 1998, p. 250).  
The large number of children in Samoa and their early involvement in extended family 
networks as well as wider village communities does not mean that they are attributed a central 
position in social life, however. As a matter of fact, children are not given any high degree of 
attention. On the contrary, children in Samoa have “a status ranking only just above that of 
the family dogs” (Shore, 1982, p. 188), or, more neutrally put, their position in the Samoan 
social hiearchy is “at the bottom of the ladder” (Va’a, 2006, p. 121). The core Samoan values 
of respect (fa’aaloalo) for socially higher ranking persons as well as obedience and service 
(tautua) to the community are taught to children from very early on (Kroeber-Wolf, 1998).  
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Kroeber-Wolf (1998, pp. 252-258) distinguishes between different main stages in the 
socialization of Samoan children. In the first months of life, infants are the focus of attention 
and have strong ties to their biological mother. Babies are warmheartingly accepted by the 
entire ‘āiga and this period is characterised by the demonstration of strong affection (ibid., p. 
253). Early care is sensitive (cf. Mageo, 2011, p. 74). From very early on, parenthood is 
distributed among the other members of the ‘āiga and children learn to accept that these 
others might soothe and help them as well. This period is followed by a dramatic shift 
(Kroeber-Wolf, 1998, p. 253) regarding the attention and affection offered to the child. From 
18 months of age onwards, children are distanced by those caregivers of higher rank. They are 
left alone more often and often not comforted when they cry. Instead, they receive harsh 
commands to stop crying (Aua le pisa!) and are made to perform small tasks and duties. In 
Samoa, care is delegated from higher-ranking members of the ‘āiga to lower-ranking ones. 
Adult caregivers might tell an older sister to take care of the young one. But as soon as there 
is another sibling available, the older sister will tell her brother or sister to take care of the 
young one. Samoan children thus grow up in a group of siblings and the resonsibility is given 
to children that themselves often are not older than five or six years. At about the age of ten, 
children work almost as much as adults do. They have to deliver messages, buy small things 
in a village’s shop, help in the family plantation, clean up, fetch water, and look after younger 
ones.  
Summing up, we can say that childhood in Samoa is characterised by a high degree of social 
interaction with peers and all other age groups from early on. Children learn to attach to 
various members of the extended family and are cared for by older siblings as soon as the 
biological caregiver’s primary care is no longer necessary and children are able to attend 
others’ orders and instructions. Moreover, Samoan children have various obligations and 
duties towards family members from early on in their lives. 
5.4 Samoan folk psychology 
In this subchapter, I will introduce and describe different concepts that are important to 
Samoan thought and for the purpose of this work. After saying something about the concept 
of person, I will talk about the role of individual intentions before Samoan concepts of inner 
experience and behaviour are introduced. The loto is where Samoans localize individual will. 
Two different kinds of behaviour are described by the Samoan terms āmio and aga. Finally, I 
will talk about Samoans’ relational orientation and the concept of alofa. 
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5.4.1 The concept of person 
Bradd Shore conjectured that there is perhaps “no more powerful barrier to our accurate 
perception of Samoan culture than a complex set of assumptions that most Westerners (and 
perhaps especially contemporary Americans) hold about the nature of the person” (1982, p. 
133). This set of assumptions has famously been described by the anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz:  
 
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, 
and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other such 
wholes and against other social and natural background is, however incorrigible it might 
seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures. (1975, p. 48) 
 
A detailed depiction of the Samoan conception of person is therefore an important part when 
trying to provide an account of Samoan folk psychology.  
Ochs (1982) observed that Samoan children do not try to get out of trouble by saying “I did 
not do it on purpose” as in Western cultures. Instead, they deny having done the deed at all. 
One explanation for such behaviour is given by Ochs (1982):  
 
From a Samoan perspective, people have little control over their actions. Persons are not 
conceptualized as integrated beings; they do not have a central control mechanism that 
organizes and directs human actions and states. Bodily actions and functions are 
associated with particular body parts and not with a focal governing source. (ibid., p. 89)  
 
The lack of a “focal governing source” seems to be echoed in Samoan language. Samoan, in 
contrast to English, is an example of an “anti-person-oriented language” (Mosel, 1991). 
Samoans often use expressions where the perceiving subject is not mentioned: ua lavea le 
lima (literally: the hand was cut) instead of “I cut myself,” mamafa le isu (lit.: the nose is 
heavy) instead of “I have a cold.” This omission of the perceiving subject is extended to third 
person expressions as well: Leaga le ulu (lit.: the head is bad) instead of “he/she is crazy,” 
vave le lima (lit.: the hand is fast) instead of “he/she is a thief”, etc. As these examples show, 
“Samoan language does not have a reflexive pronoun and there are no such expressions as ‘I 
hurt myself’ or ‘he cut himself’” (Duranti, 1985, p. 48). Ochs (1982) supports Duranti’s 
linguistic observations: “All of these linguistic facts suggest a concept of person that is 
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fragmented and not strongly in control of actions and states” (ibid., p. 90). Such a fragmented 
concept of person is also supported by Shore’s observations, as the following two quotations 
demonstrate: 
 
When speaking of themselves or others, Samoans often characterize people in terms of 
specific “sides” (itū) or “parts” (pito) or particular “characteristics” (’uiga). No attempt is 
made to provide a summary characterization of a whole integrated person. (1982, p. 137) 
 
Samoans commonly talk about actions and feelings as if the body were a decentralized 
agglomeration of discrete parts, each imbued with its own will. Thus, such constructions 
as “my thoughts are angry,” “my feelings are happy,” “my eyes cried,” “his feelings are 
pained,” “the desire to sleep/eat/go has come,” “his hand touched (i.e., stole) the money,” 
and “the sadness has sprung up” are all common ways of relating an actor to actions or 
feelings. (ibid., p. 173) 
 
According to Shore, there are no terms in Samoan like the English “personality”, “self” or 
“character” (ibid., p. 136). Mosel (1991) acknowledges that linguistic differences correspond 
to cultural differences. She mentions several examples demonstrating that it is possible in 
Samoan language to make statements about actions without mentioning the agent at all and 
says that in Samoan “there is a clear tendency to avoid expressions which foreground the 
person” (ibid., p. 299). However, she says that it might be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
say “whether or not a certain way of expression says anything about a person’s way of 
thinking” (ibid., p. 302). 
5.4.2 Intentions 
Alessandro Duranti did his research in the village of Falefa on Upolu. Duranti was mainly 
interested in linguistic anthropology and, more specifically, in the role of intentions in 
interpreting speech. He criticized speech act theorists who assumed that meaning is already 
fully defined in a speaker’s mind before the act of speaking (cf. 1988, p. 14) by providing 
examples from his study of the Samoan fono. A fono is a particularly important social event in 
Samoa where important, high-ranking people meet. Duranti’s examples are from a special 
convocation where Samoan title holders – chiefs (matai) and oratores (tulāfale) – meet to 
function both as a high court for matai crimes and as a legislative body for village affairs (cf. 
Duranti, 1988, p. 16). His observations led him to the following conclusion: “Rather than 
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taking words as representations of privately owned meanings, Samoans practice interpretation 
as a way of publically controlling social relationships rather than as a way of figuring out 
what a given person ‘meant to say’” (1988, p. 15). In a social context like the fono, the 
individual intentions of a speaker are of minor importance, as “it is not the individual actor 
but his dramatis persona that is to be considered as the reference point” (Duranti, 1988, p. 15). 
In other words, Samoans seem to focus on someone’s social role rather than on his individual 
intentions. As a consequence, it is the words themselves that have to be judged and 
interpreted: 
 
Samoans often seem to ignore the speaker’s alleged intentions and concentrate instead on 
the consequences of someone’s words. Rather than going back to speculate on what 
someone ‘meant to say’ … participants in the speech event rely on the dynamics between 
the speaker’s words and the ensuing circumstances (audience’s response included) to 
assign interpretation. (Duranti, 1986, p. 240) 
 
A speaker in a Samoan fono has no privileged position with respect to the meaning of his 
words. Interpretation, consequently, “is based on the ability (and power) that others may have 
to invoke certain conventions, to establish links between different acts and different social 
personae” (ibid., p. 241). Meaning is jointly negotiated, or, in other words, it is “seen as the 
product of an interaction (words included) and not necessarily as something that is contained 
in someone’s mind” (Duranti, 1988, p. 27). 
In Samoa, it is usually the orator who speaks on behalf of a matai. Orators can gain prestige as 
well as material gratification for doing so, but they can also get in trouble and get blamed if 
something in an interaction or transaction goes wrong (cf. Duranti, 1988). For example, “an 
orator can be held responsible for having announced something on behalf of a higher ranking 
matai. Retaliation may take place against him if people cannot have direct access to the 
original ‘addressor’ of the message” (ibid., p. 16). 
The following example is taken from Duranti (1988). An orator called Loa is accused for 
announcing the coming of the district’s Member of Parliament (M.P.). Chiefs and other 
important people from seven subvillages gathered together and waited, but the M.P. did not 
come. Since the orator Loa announced the M.P. and because he is also related to him, Loa is 
accused and Iuli, one of the two highest ranking orators, suggests to heavily fine Loa. Duranti 
comments: 
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No one challenges Iuli’s accusations by introducing the issue of Loa’s motivations or his 
possible intentions. The consequences of the orator’s words are instead discussed, more 
specifically, the fact that his words are seen as having caused the inconvenience of 
important people and contributed to their public loss of face. (1988, pp. 19-20) 
 
Nobody stands up for Loa and refers to his good intentions because “Samoans do not evoke 
‘good will’” (Duranti, 1988, p. 16). In another example, the orator Fa‘aonu‘u favours the 
decision of chief Savea to go to court to confront the M.P. with whom he had a dispute. 
Savea, however, later changes his mind under pressure from important council members. 
Consequently, Fa‘aonu‘u is reprimanded by the higher-ranking senior orator for having said 
something that was contradicted by the chief Savea - although at a later point. This suggests 
that the practice of having orators speak on behalf of a chief provides a possibility for the 
chief “to change his opinion without loss of face” (ibid., p. 22). 
Duranti’s study of the Samoan fono led him to conclude that individual intentions are of 
minor importance in interpreting speech. This does, however, not necessarily imply that 
Samoans generally stick to a doctrine of the opacity of other minds. Duranti observed that 
orators often speak in the first person plural form, since they speak on behalf of a matai and 
his extended family (‘āiga) or even on behalf of a subvillage, village or a whole district. In his 
study, however, Duranti said that “the two highest ranking orators, Moe‘ono and Iuli, usually 
speak in the first person singular: They are clearly the leading forces of the local polity and 
people are concerned with what each of them thinks” (1988, p. 25). 
Apparently, high-ranking people can afford to have their own mind. Their individual 
intentions and thoughts are of interest and they have the authority over the meaning of 
whatever they have in mind. Whether intentions are considered or not in Samoa is therefore 
something that seems to depend on rank. 
5.4.3 The “loto” 
Against the background of a “decentralized” or “fragmented” concept of person and Samoans 
de-emphasis of individual intentions, it might come to a surprise that Samoans clearly localize 
the personal side of the self in the loto. Mageo dramatically states: “The unknowable loto is a 
pool of darkness that one cannot fathom” (2011, p. 76). According to Milner’s (1993) Samoan 
Dictionary, the word loto basically has three meanings. First, loto can refer to a “pool, stretch 
of deep (or deeper) water” (ibid., p. 112). Second, it means “heart, feeling (as opposed to 
mind and soul)” (ibid.). Third, it can refer to the will (ibid.).  
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In line with this, Mageo (1998) says that the word loto “is derived from the word loloto. 
Loloto is the word used for depths in general and in particular for the depths of the sea; a loto 
is a small deep, such as one finds in a river, a lagoon, or a person” (ibid., p. 64) Moreover, the 
term loto “denotes the subjective dimension of experience” (ibid., p. 139) and does 
particularly refer to individual will (ibid., p. 145). Mageo argues that loto, used as a verb, can 
be translated differently as “to will”, “to feel”, or “to think” (Mageo, 2010, pp. 123-124). The 
term thus “conflates what we consider subjectivity’s distinctive activities: willing, thinking, 
feeling, and desiring” (ibid., p. 124). Although the term can be translated differently, Mageo 
repeatedly argues that personal willfulness is one of its most important semantic shadings: 
 
Willing is the most salient activity of the loto. When one adds fai to loto – literally “to do 
loto” – one does not get “to think,” “to feel,” “to desire,” or “to remember,” but “willful,” 
a word that implies judgment and hence a moral problem. (ibid., p. 124)  
 
Other Samoan terms partly overlap with the concept of loto. Māfaufau, used as a verb, can be 
translated as “consider, reflect” or “think out, devise” (Milner, 1993, p. 119). As a noun, it can 
be translated either as “mind”, “brain”, or “memory” (ibid.). Another closely related term is 
manatu, which is mainly translated as “to think” (ibid., p. 128). Nevertheless, the term loto 
seems to be the more important concept. This is reflected in the fact that a huge variety of 
Samoan mental state terms (mainly emotion terms) are built around the word loto. Some 
examples from Gerber’s work (1985) on Samoan emotion terms are lotofuatiaifo (voluntary 
choice), lotomaualalo (humility), lotomamā (absence of angry thoughts), lototele (brave), 
lotomaualuga (arrogant), lotoleaga (jealousy), fa’alotolotolua (indecision) and so forth (ibid., 
p. 140). In her research on Samoan emotion terms, Gerber (1985) adds another important 
piece of information: 
 
The kind of thoughts most closely associated with the loto are thoughts that arise 
spontaneously. A person may, for example, suddenly think of going to visit a friend: the 
desire, the thought, and the plan of action are all believed to arise in the loto. (ibid., p. 136) 
 
Interestingly, while mental states such as spontaneously arising desires, thoughts, and plans of 
action are considered to cause and guide behaviour in the ToM-framework, Samoans often 
consider behaviour driven by these states as either childish or inappropriate. A mature 
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Samoan should precisely not act on the basis of his spontaneously arising desires and 
thoughts, but on the basis of his social role. This leads us to Samoan concepts of behaviour.  
5.4.4 “Āmio” and “aga” 
Whereas loto denotes the origin of personal impulses, āmio denotes the behaviour that stems 
from it and represents “the socially unconditioned aspects of behavior that point away from 
social norms, toward personal drives or desires as the conditioning factors” (Shore, 1982, p. 
154), it denotes behaviour originating in a person’s own will (Mageo, 1998, p. 145) and “is 
best understood as a derivative of that part of the self which Samoans call the loto and which 
we call subjectivity” (Mageo, 1989, p. 181). Another term, aga, refers both to the essential 
nature of persons and things and to “characteristic social behavior and to the roles one plays” 
(Mageo, 2002, p. 341). It is “prescriptive, suggesting categories of abstract behavioral styles 
appropriate to certain socially defined statuses” (Shore, 1982, p. 154). A very illuminating 
explanation was given by one of Shore’s informants:  
 
The word āmio means the things you do that originate from yourself. It’s your own choice; 
your āmio is your option. But the word aga, that’s the view of the other people as they 
observe you (faitauina ’oe). That’s the considered judgment (maitau mai) of others about 
you…. Whereas you can say to yourself “my āmio,” you can never say “my aga” referring 
to yourself. That’s an expression used by others when they judge you. (cited in Shore, 
1982, p. 154) 
 
The Samoan word for “bad” is leaga, which literally means “no or without aga” (Shore, 1977, 
cited in Ochs, 1982). Good behaviour is consequently behaviour that others consider as 
appropriate. Since children act without aga, it is not surprising that Samoans think of children 
as being “naughty, willful, easily angered, and cheeky, that is, generally hard to control” 
(Ochs, 1988, p. 159). Therefore, “social control is understood by Samoans as public constraint 
over private impulses or, in other words, as the imposition of aga over āmio” (Shore, 1982, p. 
186). If Samoans meet or see someone on the road, the first question is not “How are you 
doing?”, like in many Western cultures. The common question is “O fea e te alu ai?” (Where 
are you going?). Throop (2008) tells us that people on Yap have to think of an appropriate 
response to the same question in the light of possible moral evaluations from the side of the 
questioners. Duranti’s interpretation of the question in Samoa is quite similar:  
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To ask “Where are you going?” is a request for an account, which may include the reasons 
for being away from one’s home, on someone else’s territory, or on a potentially 
dangerous path. To answer such a greeting may imply that one commits oneself not only 
to the truthfulness of one’s assertion but also to the appropriateness of one’s actions. It is 
not by accident, then, that in some cases speakers might try to be as evasive as possible. 
(Duranti, 1997, p. 84) 
 
Learning to act with aga does presuppose to consider the other’s judgment about oneself in 
one’s own behaviour. Behaving appropriately, then, becomes only possible by a continuous 
reflection of what others might possibly think of oneself. A precondition for such a 
continuous reflecting, however, is that one must care about what others think.  
5.4.5 Relational orientation and “alofa” 
For Samoans, relationships and the mutual dependency must be of great importance for an 
“imposition of aga over āmio” (Shore, 1982, p. 186) to occur. Such a relational orientation is 
part of Shore’s account of Samoa: 
 
A clue to the Samoan notion of person is found in the popular Samoan saying teu le vā 
(take care of the relationship). Contrasted with the Greek dicta “Know thyself” or “To 
thine own self be true”, this saying suggests something of the differences between 
Occidental and Samoan orientations. Lacking any epistemological bias that would lead 
them to focus on “things in themselves” or the essential quality of experience, Samoans 
instead focus on things in their relationships, and the contextual grounding of experience. 
(1982, p. 136) 
 
Social relationships in Samoa are generally known as vā. Mageo (2011) argues that socially 
oriented cultures consider the group as the main social actor, whereas Western cultures focus 
more on the individual. 22  In traditional Samoan society, a single person acted as the 
                                                          
22
 Although Mageo argues for a multidimensional model of the self (Mageo, 2002) and speaks of the “infamous 
division of cultures into egocentric and sociocentric” (2002, p. 339), she still makes heuristic use of such binary 
distinctions as “more individually oriented places” and “more socially oriented locales” (2011, p. 76). This 
distinction is a commonly used one in the field of cross-cultural psychology and yielded a variety of studies 
which relate different measures to it. Hofstede (1991) distinguishes between individualism and collectivism, 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) between independent and interdependent self-construals, and Keller (2007) 
between a focus on autonomy vs. relatedness in caregivers’ socialization practices. According to Kagitçibasi, 
“there is evidence supporting the view that these concepts do not necessarily form opposite poles and may 
coexist in individuals or groups in different situations or with different target groups” (1994, p. 56). 
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representative of the whole group. An impressive example is ifoga, a ceremonial request for 
forgiveness: 
 
It was not the individual who redressed crimes, but his or her chief in a ceremony of 
apology to the offended family. The chief and his retinue would sit in the sun before the 
offended family, bearing with them baskets of stones and wood. Stone and wood, the 
materials for an earth oven, symbolized that if the offended family chose not to forgive, 
they could cook and eat the supplicants. This offer was not literal, of course, but 
symbolized abject regret. (Mageo, 2011, p. 72) 
 
An individual who commited a crime was thus protected by his group. To take care of one’s 
relationships (teu le vā) means to engage in corresponding acts. This brings us to another 
important concept of Samoan thought, namely, the concept of alofa, which is commonly 
translated as “love” (Milner, 1993). Alofa is another example of LCCP and clearly related to 
what Anutans call aropa (Feinberg, 2011), conceptually as well as in terms of etymology. 
Gerber says: “This is a major way in which Samoan values about mutual help and giving are 
expressed. The idea of giving is the concept most commonly associated with the feeling” 
(1985, p. 145). According to Gerber, Samoans invoke typcial scenarios to illustrate cases of 
alofa, and he concludes that “the feeling of alofa approaches the sense of compassion, 
empathy, or pity” (ibid.), with giving and helping being the most important behavioural 
correlates. 
A fragmented concept of person on the one hand and the development of a largely relational 
identity that stresses the social role rather than personal will and values alofa on the other, 
must have its origin in very specific experiences Samoans make, experiences that are 
transmitted from one generation to the next via specific socialization practices. If it were not 
only Samoan language that does not foreground the individual person, but Samoan culture in 
general, then one would expect Samoan socialization practices to teach children exactly what 
is reflected in language: not to foreground individual persons and to impose aga over āmio. 
To sum up this chapter, no better words could be found than the following remarks by Shore: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Nevertheless, I will use these distinctions in the remainder of this work and locate Samoans on the more 
interdependent, socially oriented side where people focus on relatedness. Against the background of the 
anthropological reports on Samoa in this chapter, I think that this is justified. However, this is not to say that 
more individually centered motives and orientations do not exist in Samoans.   
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To assert as I have that Samoans do not clearly formulate a conception of personality or 
focus on “the self” is not to say that no personal feelings and inner demands exist for 
Samoans. On the contrary…Samoans have a very lively conception of private experience, 
but it is a conception of forces that are understood as an ineradicable residue of destructive 
energy, or will, against which social life is set. Samoans live most of their lives in a very 
public arena. The more private aspects of experience are strongly discouraged by the 
absence of walls in a Samoan house, and by powerful norms of social life, which keep 
people in almost constant social interaction. (1982, p. 148) 
5.5 Learning how to be Samoan: Socialization practices 
“For she was simply fed up with the layers people clothed themselves in. The layers of 
clothes. But more particularly the façades people wore on their faces and how they passed on 
such façades to their children. For that is how she was raised.” 
 
Sia Figiel, They who do not grieve 
 
According to Elinor Ochs (1988), mental states of others are not a suitable object for 
speculation in Samoa (cf. Schieffelin, 2008). Ochs – like Duranti - did her fieldwork in the 
village of Falefa on the island of Upolu and was mainly interested in language socialization. 
She observed that Samoan children do not only grow up in a highly stratified environment, 
but that child care, too, is organized by rank (cf. Ochs, 1988). This results in interactions 
between children and caregivers that are “strikingly different from those described in Western 
societies” (Ochs, 1982, p. 86). Ochs was especially interested in linguistic interactions that 
differed from those prevalent between mothers and children in western-middle class societies. 
She observed that Samoan caregivers do not engage with their children in verbal exchanges 
which are typical in Western cultures, where caregivers expand what their children say and try 
to interpret vocalizations as well as gaze or gestures and to mirror these interpretations to the 
child. Ochs detected differences in the use of expansions and clarifications as well as explicit 
guessing and speculation. In Samoa, Ochs observed an absence of expansions (1982, p.87). 
Caregivers in middle-class Western societies typically expand utterances of a child. In doing 
so, a caregiver is: 
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1) assuming or acting as if the child has performed an intentional, social act, i.e., as if the 
child directs his action towards a social goal; 
2) providing an interpretation of an unclear intention (i.e., making an hypothesis); and 
3) adopting, in part, the perspective of the child (decentering), so that the intent may be 
assessed; in so doing, the caregiver adjusts to the child’s egocentrism. 
 
(Ochs, 1982, p. 88) 
 
According to Ochs, expansions are themselves an “act of interpretation” (1982, p. 92), as 
infants’ unclear utterances are treated as if they conveyed meaning, as if there was an 
intention behind every expression of the infant. In so doing, the caregiver “is demonstrating 
that intentions are important” (ibid., p. 99). In using expansions, mothers treat the infant “as a 
social being and as an addressee” (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1994, p. 480) and mothers take the 
perspective of their child in order to interpret what the child meant to say. In doing so, a 
certain aspect of Western folk psychology is transmitted: “In terms of transmission of culture, 
the caregiver is demonstrating that intentions are important” (Ochs, 1982, p. 99). Ochs 
believes that such behaviour is culturally constructed and that this interest in intention is not 
matched in Samoa. Expansions are very much comparable to explicit guesses. Expressed 
guesses of caregivers give “the child a role in the assignment of meaning; the child is given 
veto power, so to speak, over the caregiver’s understanding. In the expressed guess, then, 
meaning is negotiated before it is assigned” (Ochs, 1988, p. 136). The child can confirm or 
reject the guess of the caregiver. In Samoa, one finds a “reluctance to make guesses” (Ochs, 
1982, p. 94). Since caregiving in Samoa is socially stratified (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1994; Ochs, 
1988), “high status persons tend not to evidence an awareness of interest in the activities of 
lower status persons immediately around them” (Ochs, 1982, pp. 81-82). This cultural rule 
also characterizes adult-child interactions in Samoa. Therefore, Samoans think that “the 
burden of intelligibility rests with the child (as lower status party) rather than with more 
mature members of the society” (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1994, p. 497). Whereas mothers in 
Western middle-class societies are considered to be good mothers when they “assist the child 
in clarifying and expressing ideas” (ibid., p. 492) by decentering themselves, good mothering 
in Samoa is almost the reverse:  
 
A young child is encouraged to develop an ability to take the perspective of higher ranking 
persons in order to assist them and facilitate their well-being. The ability to do so is part of 
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showing fa’aaloalo (respect), a most necessary demeanor in social life. (Ochs & 
Schieffelin, 1994, p. 492) 
 
In Samoa, it is not the mother, but the child that has to decenter in order to attend to and serve 
higher-ranking persons. This explains caregivers’ reluctance to guess what a child meant to 
say. Expanding, guessing and ascertaining the meaning of an utterance are procedures for 
clarification, and “the burden of clarification” (ibid., p. 491) tends to rest with lower-ranking 
hearers in Samoa. Corresponding lessons are already taught to children when their utterances 
are not expanded. Moreover, learning to decenter in Samoa is also accomplished through the 
process of elicited imitation, which “in at least one way is the reverse process of caregiver 
expansion” (Ochs, 1982, p. 99). Ochs explains the difference between the two as follows: 
 
In expanding, the caregiver attempts to repeat what the child has expressed. In elicited 
imitation, the child attempts to repeat what the caregiver has expressed. In expansions, the 
caregiver engages in some degree of decentering. In imitations, the child engages in 
limited decentering. We find in traditional Samoan society, a heavy reliance on the latter 
and minimization of the former. (1982, p. 99) 
 
Caregivers in Samoa want their children to repeat utterances and exercise this with children 
from very young age. Samoan children soon become apt at delivering messages from one 
household to the other, and children “at the age of 3 are expected to deliver verbatim 
messages on behalf of more mature members of the family” (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1994, p. 
491). 
Ochs draws an important distinction between paths to knowledge and limits of knowledge and 
concludes with respect to Samoa: “As paths for knowledge, traditional Samoan speakers 
prefer to elicit repetitions of utterances rather than to explicitly guess at the intended meaning 
of utterances….As for limits of knowledge, generally Samoans disprefer guessing at the 
unclear thoughts of others” (1988, p. 144). 
In line with the above said, Samoan caregivers do generally not simplify their speech in 
addressing small children. Neither do they break down propositions into rhetorical questions 
and answers, nor do they express propositions with children through test questions or answers 
and sentence completions. Furthermore, they do not engage in labelling routines with small 
children because Samoan caregivers “do not ask children questions to which they know the 
answers” (Duranti & Ochs, 1986, p. 226). In contrast, such practices are very common among 
 125 
caregivers in Europe and North America. These differing practices must be seen against the 
background of socialization goals in Samoa. According to Ochs (1982), one of the major 
socialization messages to the child is not to draw attention to himself or herself and not to talk 
about the ego. Instead, the focus lies on properties and actions of others. However, since 
caregivers do not guess what a child might intend because children are hierarchically lower-
ranking, one might suspect that mental states are not per se an unsuitable object for guessing 
and clarification. Although mental states of others are generally not a favoured object of 
speculation and although explicit guessing focuses on the “nature of some external event or 
state of affairs rather than some internal psychological event or state” (ibid., p. 140), 
mindguessing still occurs, especially when it might help to follow the order of a higher-
ranking person: 
 
when a higher-ranking person orders a lower-ranking person to carry out some action, the 
personal intentions of the speaker are also of primary importance. The lower-ranking party 
cannot assign his own interpretation but rather must grasp that intended by the higher-
ranking speaker. (Ochs, 1988, p. 142) 
 
Therefore, lower-ranking persons may clarify by guessing when a higher-ranking person 
directs them to do something. In such a case, “the explicit guess is part of serving the higher-
ranking party” (ibid., p. 139). 
At this point, we are able to better contextualize one of the opacity claims mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter. Ochs said that “Samoans generally display a strong dispreference 
for guessing at what is going on in another person’s mind” (1988, p. 143).23 I have described 
how this dispreference is transmitted via socialization – however, it became also evident that 
such a dispreference is especially salient when a higher-ranking person should guess what is 
in a lower-ranking person’s mind and that people might engage in mindguessing when it 
comes to grasping what a higher-ranking person has in mind. Ochs does therefore not endorse 
a strong opacity reading. 
Jeannette Mageo highlights another aspect of Samoan socialization practices. She lived in 
Samoa for several years and was interested in a variety of research questions, among them 
                                                          
23
 In line with this is the behaviour of Samoan children when they have done something wrong. As mentioned 
before, children might try to avoid punishment by “denying that they did that culpable act, but they do not try to 
worm out of it by saying, ‘I didn’t mean it’, ‘It was just an accident’, ‘I did it by mistake’, ‘I didn’t do it on 
purpose’”, etc. (Ochs, 1988, pp. 141-142). I haved used this example when I was talking about the Samoan 
concept of person and the belief that people have little control over their actions, but the example also illustrates 
that caregivers might not be willing to excuse children’s misdeeds by considering what they intended to do. 
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self-psychology, socialization practices, gender issues and dream interpretation. According to 
Mageo (1998), one important aspect of Samoan socialization practices is to teach children to 
hide their inner feelings and desires and to restrain their expression. This is tantamount to 
teaching children to be strong and brave (lototele). Comparing Samoa with US culture, Mageo 
says: 
 
In Samoa, by way of contrast, one never shows or shares personal feelings. Even upon the 
death or departure of a loved one, a person of character expresses only appropriate 
sentiments – they do not cry or carry on: they are lototele. Neither does one console when 
others display personal feelings. (2011, p. 85) 
 
Different practices like shaming and teasing serve the function to cloak this personal side of 
the self. Mageo argues from a psychoanalytic point of view. The child’s desire for individual 
attention is labelled with negatively connotated fia-terms. The Samoan word fia designates 
desire and can be translated with the English verb to want. There are a number of terms that 
negatively label children’s desire for individual attention, for example fiapoto (want to be 
smart), fiasili (want to be the best), and fiafa´alialia/fiasiō (want to make a show, to show 
off). Considering these terms, what children desire is not simply attention, it is the desire to be 
perceived as being different, unique, or better than others. This desire is not only negatively 
labelled, it is also transformed into something undesirable through the practice of teasing, 
since teasing “gives the child attention in an unpalatable form” (Mageo, 1998, p. 63). In this 
way, the desire for individual attention is also linked with a negative emotional experience. 
As a consequence, children learn that individual attention can be painful. A special kind of 
this practice is called faipona, which is “directed either at personal shortcomings and 
deformities or at the private side of experience” (ibid., p. 64). Although teasing in Samoa is 
generally a playful style of relating with children, it is more than that. Teasing focuses on 
personal things and the private aspects of the self. The observed Samoan “tendency to cloak 
the personal side of the self is also the effect of teasing” (ibid., p. 67). Being teased, therefore, 
results in specific feelings like matamuli (lit. eyes behind, shy) and mā (embarassed) (ibid., p. 
98). These feelings might be the first felt contact with what others have called opacity 
doctrine (Robbins & Rumsey, 2008), and teasing might precisely be an early lesson that 
implicitly teaches this doctrine: 
 
The child who is mā resolutely conceals inner thoughts and feelings. This habit of hiding 
an aspect of the self from others leads to hiding it from oneself: Samoans are generally 
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indefinite about their own interior life and forswear the possibility of fathoming anyone 
else’s. (Mageo, 1998, p. 64) 
 
Being indefinite about one’s own inner life and forswearing the possibility of fathoming 
anyone else’s are not two different results of Samoan socialization – they belong together in 
Mageo’s view: “What one cannot fathom in oneself cannot be shared with another” (1998, p. 
64). Forswearing the possibility of fathoming anyone else’s inner life is tantamount to 
expressing opacity claims. Mageo does therefore not only confirm the existence of opacity 
claims in Samoa, she also provides an explanatory account of how these claims might arise as 
a consequence of specific experiences and she offers a detailed description of how caregivers 
impose aga over āmio, to use Shore’s terminology again (1982, p. 186). 
Derek Freeman, the famous anthropologist who challenged Margaret Mead’s account of 
adolescent sexuality in Samoa, arrived at a conclusion that fits quite well to Mageo’s account: 
 
The child learns early to comply overtly with parental and chiefly dictates while 
concealing its true feelings and intentions. As a result, Samoans, whatever may be their 
real feelings about a social situation, soon become adept at assuming an outward 
demeanor pleasing to those in authority (…) it is usual, especially in demanding social 
situations, for Samoans to display an affable demeanor which is, in reality, a defensive 
cover for their true feelings. (1983, pp. 216-217) 
 
If Samoans assume an “outward demeanor pleasing to those in authority”, they engage in a 
concealing strategy which makes it difficult for others to realize the true feelings and thoughts 
of someone. This is also confirmed by Mageo (1989): “As with private thoughts, however, 
one controls and conceals personal feelings in order to play the appropriate social part” (ibid., 
p. 192). Since Samoans appear to assume an outward demeanor which conceals personal 
feelings, they can also be said to publicly present an “opaque exterior” (Throop, 2008, p. 
415).  
But why is it so important that Samoan children learn to cloak the personal side of the self?  
Samoans “tend to regard the loto as morally suspect” (Mageo, 1998, p. 145). Bradd Shore 
concluded on the basis of interviews with approximately 50 informants that in the Samoan 
conception, “human nature appears to be selfish, impulsive, and destructive” (Gerber, 1982, p. 
158). This aspect of human nature, residing in the loto, is most active in children who have 
not yet learned to suppress it. The loto “impels children to be cheeky, challenging the status of 
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elders” (Mageo, 1998, p. 86). Children who challenge the status of elders are supposed to 
learn where their position is, and so “the most common reproach made to children is that they 
are tautalaitiiti, which literally means “to talk above one’s age” and refers to cheeky behavior 
through which a person presumes to be above his or her station” (Mageo, 1998, p. 72).  
The loss of the caregiver’s exclusive attention towards oneself and its replacement by forms 
of negative attention (teasing, shaming) should, from a psychoanalytic point of view, result in 
feelings of anger. Samoan socialization practices teach children to take their appropriate 
position in the social hierarchy. Consequently, “there is literally no socially acceptable way of 
directly expressing anger against one’s parents” (Gerber, 1985, p. 154). In Samoan language, 
several terms exist which indicate covert responses of anger to parental demands. Gerber 
mentions “’augatā, ‘laziness’, ’o ’ono, ‘suppressed anger’, fiu, ‘fed up’, and musu, 
‘reluctance’” (ibid.) and says that what these terms have in common is “not only semantic 
similarity but also the fact that they express resistance to parentally assigned work” (ibid.). 
The most common and broadly accepted term in this respect is the word musu which parents 
use to characterize their resistant children and which can be translated as “be utterly 
uncooperative, sullen and obdurate” or simply with “to refuse” (Milner, 1993).  
Gerber gives a very lively description how musu might show up among a group of young 
people who: 
 
will talk together, play guitars and sing quietly, the girls may comb each other’s hair. 
When a call comes from the front room, all this pleasant interaction ceases; the look of 
annoyance can be plainly read on all faces. Typically, the girls will arise clumsily with an 
exaggerated show of exhaustion, and sometimes they will whisper “Alas.” Genuine anger 
may flash briefly as the servitors grimace and quietly mimic the words of the command. 
(Gerber, 1975, cited in Mageo, 2010, p. 126) 
 
Since the direct expression of anger is not acceptable, Gerber comes to the following 
conclusion: 
 
To the extent they can, people will channel their anger into these mild, less disruptive 
feelings. To the extent they are successful, they may be unaware of how deep their anger 
is. It is likely, however, that they will continue to experience residues of socially 
unacceptable rage which they are unable to express, and of which they may not be aware. 
(1985, p. 154) 
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The consequences of the early experiences described in this subchapter can be far-reaching. 
Gerber explains that most Samoans say of themselves “that they are aware of no particular 
bodily feeling that accompanies emotions, yet it is apparent that they undergo many of the 
same physiological disturbances that have been investigated by psychologists” (1985, p. 128). 
Her informants “almost never mentioned proprioception of bodily sensation spontaneously”, 
nor did they “tend to describe the subjective quality of affective experience” (ibid., p. 137). 
Gerber believes that “Samoans experience these physiological aspects of affective arousal on 
some level, but their explicit verbal emotion system does not define them as particularly 
relevant or memorable” (ibid., p. 128). Therefore, although they experience internal sensation 
associated with certain emotions, “they are generally unable to express it verbally” (ibid., p. 
138). However, Gerber found some informants “who were particularly able to supply 
descriptions of proprioceptions” (ibid.). Otherwise, Gerber would probably not have been able 
to cluster Samoan emotion terms at all. The fact that many Samoans could not provide 
adequate descriptions of how certain specific emotions feel from the inside is, according to 
Gerber, due to “Samoans’ concentration on the social pole of emotion” and therefore “a 
matter of relative attention” (ibid.). When her informants talked about emotions, they 
described them “in terms of the actions the feelings called forth, the stereotyped scenarios in 
which the feelings would be an appropriate response, and the specific relationships with close 
associates (e.g., parents, siblings, and friends) common to those scenarios” (ibid., p. 137). 
This suggests that Samoans orient “toward social or situational referents rather than internal 
sensations” (ibid., p. 135). This again, resonates with Shore’s account. Gerber suggests that 
we might “think of body cues as available for notice, but generally ignored, while social and 
external cues have been highly elaborated” (ibid., p. 141). Mageo (2002), by contrast, cannot 
confirm this. Referring to her teaching experiences in the 1980s, she says that this focus on 
external aspects of emotion might have shifted more into the direction of its internal aspects 
(ibid., p. 347). 
Nevertheless, the general picture we have arrived at depicts Samoan socialization practices as 
a repression of personal impulses and individualistic motives. Elinor Ochs (1988) also 
described control strategies of Samoan caregivers and mentions the use of bald imperatives 
and the arousal of affects like shame and fear. The latter two have the function to stop 
children from behaving in unwanted ways, with shame being elicited either by shaming 
practices or challenging children. Although this partially confirms the general picture, Ochs 
also mentions that caregivers invoke positive feelings to influence children’s behaviour. 
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According to Ochs, caregivers “often try to evoke empathy or love in a small child, 
particularly when they want the child to behave in a certain way. These feelings are referred 
to generally by the term alofa” (1988, p. 149). In Ochs’ view, Samoan children are not 
completely powerless. Somewhat surprisingly, she mentions caregivers’ “willingness to let 
young children be sassy and assertive in family contexts (i.e. with no guests present)” (1988, 
pp. 157-158). For example, a caregiver “often giggles behind the palm of the hand when a 
two-year-old acts defiantly – swears, talks back, threatens, and so on” (ibid., p. 160) and 
caregivers “often say that their young charges are ulavale ‘naughty’ and tautalaititi ‘cheeky’ 
with grins on their faces” (ibid., p. 161). She says that within a family, “it is the incorrigible 
child, the troublemaker, who is often the darling and the favorite of the parents” (ibid.).  
These observations contrast with the picture that evolved above, where socialization appeared 
purely authoritarian and repressive. Ochs’ contribution is therefore an important corrective 
and she helps us to make sense of what Mageo describes when she says that caregivers “do 
indeed approve of boldness and assertiveness in small children. What Samoan children need 
to learn is the set of contexts in which this behavior is desirable and when it is not” (ibid.). 
Mageo’s account of socialization in Samoa is therefore still valid, however, it does not 
provide the whole picture. Interestingly, the mere fact that Ochs tells us about the invocation 
of alofa in children in order to positively influence their behaviour can help us to see what has 
been said so far in a new light. Teasing and shaming are, from this point of view, not merely 
practices that are meant to inhibit impulses arising from the loto. Their aim is not simply to 
repress such impulses for the sake of repressing, but to pave the way for children to be able to 
show alofa, since alofa implies an active attitude of giving and helping others - and such 
prosocial behaviours are often rather at odds with the pursuit of personal motives and 
preferences. This brings us closer to an answer to the question why Samoans teach opacity 
doctrines – understood as described above – at all. Shore said that the “reluctance to discuss 
or pursue purely private experience is understandable in light of the largely relational 
identities that Samoans develop” (1982, p. 149). In this view, opacity claims become 
understandable in the light of Samoans’ focus on relationships. Mageo points into the same 
direction: “In societies where most people experience themselves primarily as group 
members, subjectivity tends to be obscure. To the degree that people experience themselves 
primarily as individuals, connectedness to others becomes obscure” (2002, p. 342).  
In Samoa, a focus on the group and on relatedness appears to be intimately tied to the 
enactment of alofa. That alofa might be as important as the repression of personal impulses 
and resulting anger was also noticed by Gerber. The focus in her work on Samoan emotions 
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was both on anger and alofa. She argues that “the available cultural expressions of anger do 
not permit Samoans to channel effectively all their hostile feelings, particularly when the 
objects of these feelings are social superiors” (1985, p. 122) and that the consideration of the 
conflict between anger on the one side and alofa (love) and fa’aaloalo (respect) on the other 
side might help to explain the contradictory accounts that sometimes depict Samoans as 
gentle, warm, unaggressive and full of respect (Mead, 2001) and sometimes as impulsive, 
aggressive and full of suppressed anger (Freeman, 1983).  
At this point, some readers might wonder why a chapter on Samoan socialization practices 
does not (or only casually) include the work of the most famous Samoan anthropologists, 
namely, Margaret Mead and Derek Freeman. Mead’s study in 1928 and its extensive criticism 
by Derek Freeman in the early 1980s were followed by a academic and public debate that 
brought adolescence in Samoa as well as Samoan socialization practices to a worldwide 
public audience (Mead, 2001 [1928]; Freeman, 1983; cf. Kroeber-Wolf & Mesenhöller, 1998, 
pp. 16-20). Although Gerber (1985) values Freeman’s observation of the ambivalence 
between outward appearance and inner experience among Samoans, she criticizes him for 
giving “more weight to the feelings of anger than to the feelings of love and respect” (ibid., p. 
156) which are, according to Gerber, at least as important for Samoans and which are also 
valued individually among Samoans. Freeman, in contrast, “gives little credence to the 
subjective reality of the generous, agreeable, and submissive ones” (Gerber, 1985, p. 157). I 
agree with Gerber’s conclusion: “Rejecting the importance of these feelings is a mistake 
equally as great as, and directly opposite to, Mead’s inability to see the potential for anger in 
the Samoan character” (ibid.).  
The argument between Mead and Freeman and the critique of both accounts have a long 
history, much too long for the present work to delve into it. Both accounts, however, are 
considered by many anthropologists not to represent truthfully Samoan reality in its 
complexity and remain by and large merely of interest to the history of anthropology. 
However, I think that Freeman’s description of the negative feelings existent in Samoa is, 
although exaggerated, at least supporting Mageo’s more careful and subtle descriptions.  
At this point, it is not clear whether what has been described so far leads to a real desinterest 
in others’ mental states, or, on the contrary, to a heightened preoccupation with them, since 
we have seen in other places (e.g. among the Tzotzil Maya; Groark, 2008) that opaque 
exteriors might pique people’s curiosity to explore what is beyond the surface of others’ 
apparent behaviour. Moreover, shouldn’t we expect people to be especially occupied with 
others’ mental states in a place where it is an explicit goal of socialization practices to focus 
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on others, on social interactions and relationships? Wouldn’t we expect such people to be 
especially skilled in ‘mindreading’-practices and empathy? Yet why, then, do they assert the 
opacity of other minds?  
Let me try to answer these questions. I argue that the questions just raised are just another 
example of how influential ToM and corresponding ideas about how we manage to interact 
with each other presently are. As long as we think that a heightened focus on others and 
relationships must necessarily go hand in hand with more ‘mindreading’ or empathic 
knowing, we will not be able to find a way out of this dilemma. The only solution would be to 
provide a theoretical account which allows to think of a hightened focus on others and 
relationships as independent from ideas associated with ‘mindreading’. I think that Victoria 
McGeer’s (2001, 2007) account is of much help here. It is an account that brings us much 
closer to what we can actually learn from case studies in cultures where the opacity of other 
minds is asserted. Victoria McGeer recently proposed a so-called “regulative conception of 
folk psychology” (2007). She argues that folk psychology is not simply about explaining and 
predicting behaviour – in her view, it is a normative practice: 
 
our folk-psychological competence consists in our aptitude for making ourselves 
understandable to one another, as much as on our aptitude for understanding one another. 
And we do this by making (self and other) regulative use of the norms that govern 
appropriate attributions of a range of psychological states. (2007, p. 148) 
 
McGeer prefers to talk of “psycho-practical know-how” or “psycho-practical expertise” 
(2001, p. 110). Instead of heaving to know how behaviours interact with private mental states, 
interactions succeed if one knows how behaviours interact with social roles, norms of 
comportment and rules. Based on this knowledge, people adjust their own behaviour and 
interpret the behaviour of others. This of course also impacts how people predict and explain 
each others’ behaviour. A constant reference to individual mental states becomes superfluous 
– instead, people refer to social roles and how one should behave according to the shared 
norms. The consequences of McGeer’s view are radical since they question the importance of 
ToM and ‘mindreading’-practices in our everyday life: 
 
much of the work of understanding one another in day-to-day interactions is not really 
done by us at all, explicitly or implicitly. The work is done already and carried by the 
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world, embedded in the norms and routines that structure such interactions. (McGeer, 
2001, p. 119) 
 
I have described above how socialization in Samoa can be summarized as an “imposition of 
aga over āmio” (Shore, 1982, p. 186). This actually confirms McGeer’s theoretical account, 
since “skilled psycho-practioners are not just able to read other people in accord with shared 
norms; they also work to make themselves readable in accord with those same norms” 
(McGeer, 2001, p. 118). And this is precisely what Samoans, according to the anthropological 
accounts presented above, do. They learn via socialization to repress impulses arising from 
the loto in order to behave in line with aga. At the same time, they learn that others behave in 
accordance with their social role rather than with their private desires and motivations.  
Note, that all this is not about an “either-or”, but a matter of emphasis. In applying McGeer to 
the Samoan case, I do not want to suggest that Samoans stick to norms while we Westerners 
are mindreading all the time. On the contrary, the Samoan case might help us to detect a 
blind-spot in our own theorizing, which is heavily influenced by ToM ideas and often neglects 
the role of shared norms. Sticking to shared norms and mindreading is something both we and 
Samoans do – however, each culture might emphasize different aspects. Yet such different 
emphases do not force a rethinking of theories of mind and empathy per se – they only force a 
rethinking of the explanatory power we ascribe to such theories. Having said this, let us now 
have a look at the status of ‘mindreading’ and empathy in Samoa. 
5.6 ‘Mindreading’ in Samoa 
First of all, it is necessary to say that the Samoan concept of the loto and resultant behaviour 
(āmio), although disavowed, is a clear indicator that Samoans do know about the private 
aspects and individual drives of other persons. As a matter of fact, the loto is never 
“socialized away” completely. Repressed impulses do never completely disappear. On the 
contrary, a society will either have to cope with occasional outbursts or establish culturally 
legitimate forms of how these repressed aspects can be expressed (for more information see 
Mageo, 1998). In gossip, for example, people talk about absent persons in a manner not 
appropriate for conversations in public. According to Mageo (1998), to say that talk is gossip 
“is also to infer that it is motivated by personalistic animus, rather than proper moral 
concerns” (ibid., p. 72). So the awareness of such personalistic impulses that arise in the loto 
seems to persist. This becomes also obvious when considering the fact that Samoan’s often 
accept children’s reluctant behaviour (musu). When labelling children’s resistance as musu, 
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Samoans are at the same time aware of the private inner motivations and feelings that lead to 
this kind of resistance. Gerber explains this as follows: 
 
the existence of the cultural definition of musu can assist Samoans in remaining unaware 
of their own conflicts, or at least in masking them. The term seems to function as much to 
conceal the nature of a particular inner experience as it serves to express it. (1985, p. 129) 
 
The ongoing existence of personalistic impulses is also acknowledged and institutionally 
accepted by the Samoan figure of the double (soa). The double comes into play in situations 
of courtship. The Samoan term fa’asoa can be translated as “to mediate in love affairs” 
(Shore, 1982, p. 164). The double is allowed to speak about the personal sentiments on behalf 
of the absent lover. In doing so, “a double also personifies the personal side of the self, or loto 
– repressed or channeled in all former discourses – now virtually free“ (Mageo, 1998, p. 107). 
The institutionalization of the double can be seen as an example of the Samoan 
acknowledgement that there are inner feelings, thoughts, motivations and desires. The double 
“embodies a loto throroughly trained to act in the service of sociocentric values” (ibid.) and 
thus mediates between individual will and sociocentric values.  
Another important argument brought forward by Kevin Groark (2008) was already mentioned 
in the previous chapter. Groark (2008) argued that the establishment of social opacity on a 
societal level presupposes knowledge of others’ inner states. The very fact that private mental 
states must be artfully concealed via the presentation of opaque exteriors and various 
manoeuvres designed to frustrate others’ ‘mindreading’-attempts is an acknowledgment that 
people know about the possibility to gain insight in others’ mental life. While direct exchange 
about personal impulses and feelings is frustrated by opaque exteriors and strategies of active 
occlusion among the Tzotzil, imaginative speculations about what the other is really thinking 
and feeling become more important (Groark, 2008). 
From all the anthropological studies that deal with the opacity of other minds phenomenon, 
the contribution of Alessandro Duranti (2008) in the Anthropological Quarterly issue on the 
opacity of other minds is probably the most straightforward and conceptually elaborate 
attempt to clarify whether opacity doctrines have an impact on mindreading. According to 
Duranti, “conscious and explicit reading of other minds is one of the possible routes to 
understanding a situation retrospectively and prospectively” (2008, p. 492). The reference to 
the theory of mind framework is obvious. Interestingly, mindreading is a conscious and 
explicit process for Duranti. Although some scholars support the view that something like 
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implicit mindreading exists, Duranti focuses on the explicit and more conscious forms that 
would certainly best be captured experimentally by tasks of the explicit verbal prediction type 
(see chapter 2). Although he thinks that “communities (and individuals) vary in the extent to 
which reading other minds is recognized, verbalized, and justified” (ibid., p. 492), Duranti 
thinks that “some kind of mind reading obviously goes on in Samoa, like in any other place in 
the Pacific or elsewhere” (ibid., p. 490). He suggests to examine spontaneous interactions in 
everyday life as a way to investigate local forms of mindreading and provides two examples 
from his own field work experience in Samoa. The first focuses on a situation in which a 
speaker makes a prediction about what someone else will do, the second on a situation in 
which someone interprets what another person wants. Both types of verbal activities, 
according to Duranti, “are candidates for evidence of mind reading” (2008, p. 487). 
In the first example, some women are sitting together and see the child of another woman who 
is absent. They suspect that the child’s mother might come and get on their nerves with her 
stories. Duranti rejects this example – I think rightly - as “a type of inference that is based on 
repeated, generalizable, and even routinized behavior” (2008, p. 489). The prediction that this 
child’s mother will come to get on their nerves might be nothing more than an expectation 
grounded in previous observations. Still, it is another example that is in line with the idea that 
we often predict other people’s behaviour by other means than mental state inference, for 
example by generalizing on the basis of previous behaviour (cf. Andrews, 2008). In Duranti’s 
(2008) words: 
 
Everywhere in the world people are constantly trying to make predictions about what will 
happen. Some of this prediction work is concerned with what specific individuals will do. 
One could argue that this is an example of reading another person’s mind. I would argue 
that this is a limited case of mind reading because it is based on expectations grounded in 
knowledge of previously observed behavior. (ibid., pp. 488-489) 
 
Duranti rejects this example as a limited case of mindreading, although I would say that it is 
no example of mindreading at all: it goes unnoticed by Duranti that suspecting that someone 
might come and get on someone’s nerves does neither involve mental state inference nor 
mental state attribution or mindguessing. Duranti then argues that it is “a different type of 
situation when a speaker shows that he or she has interpreted what someone else has just done 
or said as evidence of some specific desire that the person has not made explicit” (2008, p. 
489). In his second example, little O. rejects some smaller pieces of banana until she is 
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offered the biggest piece. Her older sister R. comments on this and “ascribes to her younger 
sister the specific wish not only to get a bigger piece but ‘the very big one’” (ibid.). Duranti 
comments on this: 
 
What is important in this example is that little O. has not said that she wants the biggest 
piece. She has merely rejected the pieces that her mother has tried to give her. For this 
reason R.’s statement that O. wants the biggest piece available must count as an inference 
about what O. is thinking but not saying. (ibid.) 
 
One could ask, however, whether R’s statement must really count as a mental state inference 
and as an example for mindreading since R’s statement is given after O. has already received 
the biggest piece. Therefore, her statement can also be interpreted as a simple description of 
what has already happened. In this case, the mental state verb “want” can be used to 
redescribe in mentalistic terms the entire interaction without any need for an “inference about 
what O. is thinking but not saying” (ibid.). However, saying that O. wants the biggest piece is 
at least a case of mental state attribution.  
Summing up, we cannot agree with Duranti’s conclusion that his examples “demonstrate that 
some kind of mind reading obviously goes on in Samoa” (ibid., p. 490). Interestingly, 
however, Duranti adds that his examples might “might also indicate that children are more 
likely than adults to engage in this type of mind reading” (ibid.). This resonates with Ochs’ 
suggestion that lower-ranking persons in Samoa have to decenter rather than higher-ranking 
ones (cf. Ochs, 1988).  
But apart from my critique of Duranti’s example: of course there are examples of mental state 
inference in Samoa. Let me give an example from my own experiences in Samoa (information 
on my field-work in Samoa will be provided in the next chapter). One morning, my whole 
guest-family left on a pick-up to a nearby village in order to do some shopping. I didn’t join 
them, and in our hut, their 2-1/2 year old son was still asleep. Silently, in a sneaky way, they 
went to the pick-up. I whispered to my host-mother: “Why are you leaving like this?” And she 
said: “He will be angry when he realizes that we are leaving without him.” In this moment, 
the young boy woke up, saw his parents and sibs near the pickup, began to cry and got pretty 
angry. Apparently, my host-mother had correctly inferred his mental state, although it might 
have been on the basis of previously observed behaviour. Nevertheless, a mental state was 
inferred. Mental state attributions occur as soon as mental states terms are ascribed, be it 
silently or aloud. Eleanor Ruth Gerber listed about 50 Samoan emotion terms in her study on 
 137 
Samoan emotions in 1985. The mere existence of emotion terms proves that mental state 
attributions do occur; and as soon as these terms are used – for example in gossip – mental-
state-talk occurs. Moreover, the mere existence of these terms presupposes that they can 
potentially be expressed. In Samoan language, terms related to feelings of anger are especially 
elaborated. For example, lotomamā is used to describe the absence of angry thoughts, ‘o‘ono 
is used for suppressed anger, ita and fa‘ali‘i can be translated as angry and fa‘a‘u‘ū means 
“sulky”. In Samoa, anger is an elaborated emotion precisley because one should not let it out 
in interactions (especially when higher-ranking persons are present), precisely because it is so 
important not to lose face. This also demonstrates that opaque exteriors are not in contrast to a 
strong awareness and verbal elaboration of inner mental states. Anger must be suppressed and 
is so highly elaborated because it threatens group harmony. But the high elaboration and 
suppresion presuppose the possibility of its outburst, and an outburst is nothing else than 
directly perceivable expression.   
As described above, children in Samoa might sometimes have to guess what is in a higher-
ranking person’s mind in order to grasp the meaning of a command, for example. 
Mindguessing does also occur when people have to adjust their behaviour while being 
observed. Since people in Samoa are under constant social scrutiny, behaving correctly (aga) 
requires the continuous anticipation of how others might evaluate one’s actions. This can, for 
standard situations, be done by a simple reliance on rules of comportment. In more ambiguous 
situations, however, or in situations where rules of comportment are of little help or suggest 
two possible behaviours, mindguessing is the only possibility left for anticipating others’ 
potential evaluations. We have seen above that Duranti (2008) tried to observe mindreading 
and mental state attribution as it occurs in everyday interaction (2008). Yet instead of 
observing people in their everyday interactions, we could also ask them directly whether they 
think about other people’s mental states. In this case, the approach that might sound most 
naïve in an anthropologist’s ear could be quite telling, at least if the interviewees simply 
started to mindguess without hesitation – if they don’t, then anthropologists might object that 
direct questions do rarely lead to satisfying answers. But what if they started to explicitly 
guess what is in another person’s mind? At this point, I will present three short interviews I 
did on my second trip to Samoa in 2010. Since the result of these interviews fits quite well 
into the present subchapter and since the empirical part of this work does focus on 
experimental studies, I will present them on the following pages in smaller type size. 
 
 138 
One of the interviewees was part of my guest family, the other two were interviewed in the context of 
my experimental studies in a primary school. Surprisingly, the answers I got do not even prove the 
prevalence of opacity claims. Admittedly, I interviewed only a handful of people and with limited 
knowledge of Samoan, which is why I could not dig deeper directly after receiving an answer. The 
interviewees’ answers were audiorecorded and later transcribed and translated with the help of 
Samoan assistants. At this point, however, I want to refer to the principle of falsification: few 
examples of explicit guessing of what is going on in another person’s mind in Samoa would be enough 
to question the prevalence of opacity claims and help not to hype the fact that they exist.  
The following extracts of my conversations with Samoans provide examples that strongly contrast 
with the notion of opacity claims we have heard about up to this point (A = Author, interviewer; I = 
Interviewee). The English translations are word-to-word translations. This results in bad English – 
however, the translation is thus very close to the original Samoan answers and free from additional 
interpretation. 
 
The first interview was done with a 26 year-old father of one child who lives in a very rural area of 
Savai’i and works as a teacher in a primary school. He was giving the most representative answer one 
could think of when looking for statements that potentially cast doubt on the prevalence of opacity 
claims in Samoa: 
 
A: E mafai ona e mate le mafaufauga o isi tagata? 
 
Can you guess the thought of another person? 
 
I: E mafai! 
 
 I can! 
 
This is, at least at first glimpse, like a perfect candidate to oppose the idea that opacity claims are 
widespread in Samoa. Moreover, it seems to confirm that mindguessing occurs in Samoa. However, 
one could argue that the question is not specific enough and might have been interpreted by the 
interviewee differently. To a slightly varied question, the man provided the following example. 
 
A: E mafai ona e mate sa‘o o le mafaufauga o isi tagata? 
 
Can you correctly guess the thought of another person? 
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I: O le isi tagata la e iloa o lo ta mafaufau e mafai, tusa e vice-versa, e mafai ona o ta mate le mafaufau 
o le isi tagata i ana mea e fai, ah, fa‘ata‘ita‘iga fa‘apea e, o sa ta friend o sa‘u uo. A fa‘apea o sa´u uo 
teine, ah, for example, o la‘u uo teine ia ma sa ta uo tama foi a ah, tusa o la e close a maua ma la´u uo 
teine, ae iai la ta uo tama, ta te vaai ai a i isi taimi, tele a ina ,… tusa a, tusa a, a ta‘u a a´u e la‘u friend 
tama lea o lo‘u uso, ah. E ta te va‘ai atu a i isi taimi, e close tele ai la‘u uo tama i la‘u uo teine lea, la 
ua tupu loa ma lo‘u mafaufau, pei a la‘a, la tipi a‘u e la‘u uo teine lea, ae alu i la‘u uo tama. E alu alu 
a, e sa‘o a lo‘u mafaufau, o la‘u mate na sa‘o a, la e tele ina tipi a‘u e la‘u uo teine, ae feiloa‘i loa ma 
la‘u uo tama lea. 
 
Some Person who knows our thought, it is possible, like vice-versa, we can guess the thought of 
another person by the things he does, for example, our friend, my friend. For example my girlfriend, 
ah, for example, my girlfriend and my boyfriend too, like we are close with my girlfriend, but I had a 
boyfriend and we met sometimes, often,…. so, so that I was called by my boyfriend his brother, ah. 
Then I saw at some time, my boyfriend was very close with my girlfriend, so my thought developed, 
like that, that girlfirend of mine will cut me off and go to my boyfriend. Time goes by, and my thought, 
my guess was right, I was cut by my girlfriend and she then went around with this boyfriend of mine.  
 
Still, one might argue that this does not necessarily involve something like mindguessing, since what 
is predicted is a certain course of events. In this view, the quotation simply reveals his own thoughts 
and his creeping suspicion. Notice, however, that the interviewee himself provided this anecdote as an 
example for my question whether he can correctly guess the thought of another person. Moreover, he 
says that it is possible to guess the thought of another person by the things he does – and this fits very 
well with the mindguessing definition developed in chapter 2, although the example he gives does not 
clearly demonstrate this. 
 
The second interview was done with the 53 year-old sister of my guest-father. She lives in a small 
rural village on Savai’i and has two daughters. When she was younger, she used to work in a hotel 
where tourists from overseas stayed. Therefore, her English was quite good. Nevertheless, she gave 
her answers in Samoa. 
 
A: E iai se taimi e te mafaufau po‘o a ni mea o lo‘o mafaufau iai isi tagata? 
 
Is there a time you think what are some things that another person are thinking? 
 
I: Ioe! E iai, ah. E iai le taimi oute..oute nofo ma ou mafaufau, pea po‘o lea se mea o manatu lo‘u 
tuagane e fai ia te a‘u, ah, po‘o manatu lo‘u tuagane i se mea e fai ah. Ioe, e iai le masalao, ah, e iai le 
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masalo, ou te masalosalo lava e iai se mea o lo‘o mana´o ai ia, ah;...Tinei ia te a‘u, ah. E iai se mea o la 
e manatu Tinei e fia tau mai ia te a‘u, ah. Ioe!..e iai. 
 
Yes! There is, yes. There is the time when I… I sit and I think, what is the thing or is this the thing my 
brother says/does to me, ah, if my brother is thinking about something to do. Yes, there is the 
speculation, ah, there is the speculation, I am really speculating if there is something he wants, ah… 
Tinei want from me, ah. Is there something Tinei thinks that he wants to tell me. Yes! … there is. 
 
Notably, the words “I am really speculating if there is something he wants” and “Is there something 
Tinei thinks that he wants to tell me” are clear mindguessing examples and contrast with anything like 
a strong reading of Samoan opacity claims. Moreover, they contradict Ochs’ observation that mental 
states in Samoa are not a suitable object for speculation (cf. Ochs 1988). 
The following quotation is again an example for mindguessing. Although her guess what the other 
person wants might be based on routine or previous experience with that other woman, she still 
guesses what the other woman might want. Therefore, the object of her guess is again a mental state. 
 
A: E mafai ona e mate mafaufauga o isi tagata? 
 
Is it possible to guess the thoughts of another person? 
 
PAUSE 
 
I: O le isi taimi.....e..e..e mafai, ah; pe a (pe‘a?) ta tilotilo lelei iai le tagata, e pei o; fa‘apea a ou alu, ou 
te alu foi nale ou te vaai atu o la ete sau, ah, ou te maitaua a o le fafine le la, e masani a ona ou vaaia e 
lalaga le ietoga po‘o le fala. O´u vaai atu loa ua sau le fafine ia te a‘u, ia e tasi la‘u mate fa‘apea, ai foi 
e sau ia,e sau Sieni ia te a‘u e mana‘o i se lauie, ah. E iai la le taimi e mateia ai e a‘u le mea la e 
mana‘o iai le tagata. 
 
 
Sometimes… it, it, it is possible, ah; when take a good look at the person, for example; like when I go, 
I go over there and I see that you are coming, ah, but I recongnise there that woman over there, I use 
to see her weaving fine mats or mats. So I see that the woman is coming to me, and I have one single 
guess like this: Probably she is coming again, Sieni is coming to me because she wants pandanus 
leaves, ah. There is the time where I guess the thing the person wants. 
 
Later in the interview, she confirms that her guess was indeed correct.  
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More in line with opacity claims seems to be the beginning of the following conversation with a 34 
year-old mother of 3 children, who started to give answers in English until I told her to use Samoan. 
This woman lived in one of the most remote areas of Savai’i, in a village about 2-3 hours away from 
the ferry that connects Savai’i with the main island Upolu. I interviewed her in a primary school after 
experimentally testing children there, since she came to pick up her child (or children). In the course of 
the conversation, this woman reveals herself to be a competent ‘mindguesser’ who carefully monitors 
others’ facial expressiveness. 
 
A: E iai se taimi e te mafaufau po‘o a ni mea o lo‘o mafaufau iai isi tagata? 
 
Is there some time you are thinking about what are some things other people are thinking? 
 
I: No. Only me and my husband, my children…thoughts everytime, doesn’t matter another people. 
LAUGHS. 
 
A: Leai? 
 
No? 
 
I: Leai. 
 
No. 
 
A: E mafai ona e mate le mafaufauga o isi tagata? 
 
Can you guess the thoughts of other people? 
 
I: Ia! I can… 
 
A: Fa‘a Samoa! 
 
In Samoan! 
 
I: …ou te mafai ona ou iloa le mea la e mafaufau iai le isi tagata, e fa‘aali mai i ona foliga ah, i ona 
manatu, e iloa la e a‘u le mea la e mana‘o ai le tagata, le isi tagata ia te a‘u, ah. E mafai ona ou mateina 
le mea la e mafaufau ai le isi..... 
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…I can because I know the thing other people think, it shows on their faces, ah, their thought, so I 
know that thing the person wants, the other person from me, ah. I can guess the thing another person 
is thinking about. 
 
Another example is worth mentioning, although I have not audiorecorded it. A woman around 40 
who was working in Apia with an Australian boss replied with a paradigmatic opacity claim to my 
question whether she sometimes thinks about what other people are thinking. She clearly denied this 
and said that she is not interested in that. However, when the Australian boss – who had known this 
woman for a long time and supported my research – asked her the same question in a more colloquial 
style, expressing that he can’t believe this, she suddenly opened up and said that she sometimes 
wonders whether her husband thinks of other women. 
The examples just presented are few and do probably not fulfil the requirements of anthropological, 
qualitative research. However, I think that they are good enough to relativize the opacity claims 
observed in Samoa and to demonstrate that Samoans do think about what is going on in other persons’ 
minds.  
 
With respect to ‘mindreading’ in Samoa, the conclusion is therefore very similar to the one 
that was drawn for the whole bunch of anthropological studies at the end of the previous 
chapter: a great deal of what is usually associated with the term ‘mindreading’ is common in 
Samoa as well. Again, we cannot answer the status of false belief understanding by simply 
looking at the different anthropological reports. The next chapter will therefore focus on false 
belief understanding in Samoa.  
5.7 Empathy in Samoa 
In the previous chapter, I have already introduced the idea that empathy might have 
something to do with attachment. This idea was put forward in the anthropological context by 
Jeannette Mageo, who specializes in Samoa. Mageo’s (2011) main idea is to conceptualize 
empathy as “re-directed attachment”. Intuitively, this makes sense. De Waal tells us that the 
“selection pressure to evolve rapid emotional connectedness likely started in the context of 
parental care long before our species evolved” (2008, p. 282) and thus links the capacity for 
emotional connectedness, which is considered to be an important aspect of empathy, to 
parental care. He goes on: “Once the empathic capacity existed, it could be applied outside the 
rearing context and play a role in the wider network of social relationships” (ibid.). Using a 
more ‘biological’ vocabulary, de Waal actually confirms Mageo’s idea. In arguing that 
attachment is realized differently across cultures, Mageo paves the way for different 
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‘versions’ of empathy that build on early attachment experiences. Mageo argues that the idea 
of sensitive mothering as an indicator and precondition for secure attachment “is so 
ideological a feature of US developmental models that it obscures distancing practices” (2011, 
p. 71). She says that distancing practices play “an equally fundamental role in developing 
culture styles of attachment and empathy” (ibid.). Therefore, people everywhere in the world 
use such practices to create insecurities in children – in Samoa as well as in the US, although 
the practices themselves might differ. According to Mageo, distancing in the US “begins at 
birth in the hospital with the separation of the infant from its family and continues through 
practices of leaving the child alone in its crib or in a fenced playpen while its mother leaves 
the room. Later the mother leaves the child with babysitters or at daycare” (ibid., pp. 79-80). 
Distancing practices create boundaries, and according to Mageo, this is precisely what makes 
empathy possible. The ability to distinguish between oneself and the other is indeed an 
important element in many definitions of empathy (cf. Decety & Jackson, 2004) which helps 
to distinguish it from other forms like emotional contagion. Distancing practices, from this 
point of view, help children to acknowledge the basic difference between self and other: 
“Caretakers prepare the way for empathy by forging boundaries that define social actors 
through distancing practices that generate insecure attachment” (Mageo, 2011, p. 71).  
Mageo thus objects to Ainsworth’s (1973) account which generally pathologizes insecure 
attachment, since aspects of insecure attachment must, according to Mageo, not necessarily be 
considered as a deficient mode of attachment. Rather, it is a constitutive aspect of 
socialization in every culture. Distancing practices help children to recognize boundaries, they 
are “crafted to curtail what elders view as boundary confusion: that is, unreflective 
identifications between individuals or groups that people in the culture regard as distinct” 
(Mageo, 2011, p. 72). Distancing practices therefore help to define social units that are 
supposed or not supposed to engage in empathic relations – and what these social units are 
differs across cultures. With respect to Samoa, Mageo argues that the basic social unit is the 
group rather than the individual. According to Mageo, “empathy is an extension of self across 
a boundary, however self is culturally defined” (ibid.). Distancing in Samoa frustrates 
children’s desire for oneness with the primary caregiver and thus undermines “the prototype 
of the self-other bond that characterizes Western styles of attachment and empathy” (ibid., p. 
75). At the same time, however, this helps children to redirect their desire to bond to other 
persons, to groups – and to develop empathy. For Mageo, empathy “is an as-if form of 
attachment: it appropriates and redirects a state (identification) and behaviors (love and care) 
that characterize attachment” (ibid., p. 72).  
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We have already heard that Samoan caregivers begin to distance their children and frustrate 
their desire for individual, exclusive attention from about 18 months of age onwards. At the 
same time, children become part of the community of siblings which includes children from 
other members of the extended family. From now on, older sisters and (less often) brothers 
care for the youngest one. Children now have to identify with a group instead of the mother, 
and they have to show behaviours that characterized the mother-child dyad towards members 
of this group. Mageo argues that “to the extent that a culture is group-oriented, normative 
attachment is among group members and empathy flows between groups: empathy is, then, to 
treat another group as if it were one’s own” (ibid., pp. 72-73). Now if empathy in Samoa is 
not so much a matter between two individuals, but between groups or an individual and a 
group, then individual mental states might be less important. Mageo says that “only in 
cultures where cultural models of self emphasize inner experience is empathy a matter of 
seeing/feeling as if one were another” (ibid., p. 76) and points out the difference between 
empathy in different cultural contexts: 
 
Attachment in more individually oriented places inspires empathy as an imaginative 
identification of self with another, bridging the self/other divide. In more socially oriented 
locales, attachment leads to empathy as enacted: giving care in gifts, both material gifts 
like food but also more abstract gifts of service – what Samoans call tautua – to one’s own 
group, and through ceremonies, feasts, and festivals to other groups.24 (ibid., p. 78) 
 
Here we find again the idea that empathy in Samoa is enacted. Mageo says that attachment in 
early life “inspires a state of identification, which in turn inspires attendant behaviors of love 
and care” (ibid., p. 69). All this confirms the importance of alofa (LCCP) in Samoa. However, 
alofa is not just a consequence of an imaginative identification of self with another, since this 
kind of identification is frustrated from early on. Rather, LCCP is the result of redirected 
attachment. This idea is also present in Gerber’s work: “Alofa and the terms that are most 
closely related to it in meaning probably code a basic affect involved with social bonding” 
(1985, p. 153). This strongly supports my argument that empathy is primarily a 
compassionate response: 
                                                          
24
 It is important to mention that Mageo does not vote for a binary contrast between cultures: “Am I, then, 
arguing for a binary contrast between cultures of empathy? My effort has been to establish a heuristic for 
thinking about attachment and empathy along with the relations between them. In Samoa, there is ample 
evidence for hybrids that date back at least to Western contact” (2011, p. 87). 
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While empathy does not equal kindness and support, these behaviors flow spontaneously 
toward a person or group to whom we feel attached. People learn to transfer these 
behaviors to new objects and to act as if they felt attached to them. (Mageo, 2011, pp. 86-
87) 
 
I have argued in the previous chapter that the reconsideration of the concept of empathy 
‘through the lense of attachment’ might help us to better conceptualize and define empathy, 
since it would suggest to consider empathy as a primarily compassionate response towards a 
real, present (and important) other. I argued that empathy leads us to understand the ‘how’-
aspect of another’s experience via imaginative processes and sharing. Moreover, I argued that 
this sharing might lead us to engage in behaviours associated with LCCP. According to 
Mageo, however, we redirect a state of identification that characterizes early attachment 
relationships when we are empathetic. Yet since early attachment is already characterized by 
LCCP, redirecting the state of identification that characterizes early attachment does result in 
LCCP without the necessity to grasp and share the ‘how’-aspect of another’s experience via 
imaginative processes or bodily empathy.  
This leads us to ask whether grasping the ‘how’-aspect of an individual’s experience is 
important in Samoa at all. If not, we would not only have to adapt our empathy definition - 
we would have to do away with an important and central aspect of it. According to Mageo, 
empathy in Samoa is not “a matter of seeing/feeling as if one were another” (2011, p. 76), it is 
as-if form of attachment which leads us to identify with others. What happens when we 
identify with others? One might argue that identifying with others makes it even easier to 
grasp how they feel. However, identification might also lead one to minimize, downplay or 
even neglect the differences between oneself and the other. If teenagers identify with their 
peer group, the ‘how’-aspect of another individual’s experience is less important, since people 
expect their peers to be interested in the same things, to feel in a same way about them and so 
forth. To speak of identification might even imply that the boundaries between the self and 
the other get blurred or that they are not clearly recognized. Ontogenetically, however, it 
might be quite appropriate to speak of identification in this sense, since babies do not clearly 
distinguish between themselves and the mother. If empathy redirects a state of identification 
characteristic for early attachment relationships, is it then possible to learn something about 
empathy between adults by looking back at what characterizes early attachment? From a 
phenomenological point of view, it might be most adequate to say that the mother-infant dyad 
creates a shared space of attention and feeling in which certain emotions are jointly invoked 
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and co-constructed (cf. Stern, 1985). We tend to think of empathy as something which lets us 
understand the other in dyadic interactions. Yet if we take seriously the suggestion to think of 
empathy as redirected attachment, then we should question this focus on understanding, since 
what is going on in early attachment might be better described as Einsfühlung25 (one-feeling) 
than Einfühlung (feeling into another person; empathy). Mother and infant jointly invoke 
specific emotions and feelings. In order to facilitate bonding, they co-constitute and co-
construct a shared space in which mood, emotions, and feelings of both participants are co-
regulated.  
Does this tell us anything about our empathic encounters as adults? I think it at least hints to 
two important points, namely, the idea of joint negotiation and co-construction on the one 
hand and the attachment-function on the other. If I empathize with someone, the empathizee 
himself changes. In being empathized with, the feeling formerly experienced alone is now 
empathically assessed by another person. I argue that this very fact changes the feeling of the 
empathizee. Both co-construct an empathic situation in which the empathizee’s wish to be 
empathized with and the empathizer’s attempts to do so create a shared feeling that influences 
the formerly individually felt ones. Hollan and Throop say that what makes empathy difficult 
is “that even the people we are attempting to empathize with may not know why they think, 
act, or feel the way they do, or even what they think or feel at certain times” (2011, p. 8). This 
confirms that many empathic-processes might be about jointly negotiating feelings and co-
constructing an empathic situation. This might help people to identify with each other. As a 
matter of fact, if empathy really develops out of our early attachment relationships and if 
empathy is redirected attachment, then empathy among adults might also be about attachment 
and bonding in the first place. In this view, creating a shared space for empathy might help to 
establish social bonds and to feel responsible for each other. And this might indeed be 
empathy’s primary function.  
What does all this tell us about empathy in Samoa? I have argued with reference to various 
anthropologists that Samoan childhood is very different from what children experience in 
more Western countries. Since children’s autonomy is an important socialization goal in more 
individually-centered places (cf. Keller, 2007), we would expect joint negotiation and co-
construction of feelings to become less in the course of childhood. Let me explain this. In 
Western culture, children are encouraged to talk about their desires and preferences, they are 
taught to rely on themselves and to find out for themselves what they want. Therefore, the 
joint negotiation and co-construction of feelings that characterized the early attachment 
                                                          
25
 I do not use the term Einsfühlung in Scheler’s (1923) sense here. I simply use the term in order to make the 
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relationship is transformed into an assessment of them via interactions that emphasize the 
subjective life of the child. In asking their children what they want, prefer, intend, and desire, 
they learn that they have authority over how they feel and that other people’s attempts to 
assess what they feel must be approved by themselves. In Samoa, in contrast, children are 
socialized to repress and subordinate their more private impulses in order to serve higher-
ranking people and to understand themselves as being part of a group (peer, kin). Therefore, 
Samoan children learn exactly the opposite: in their daily actions, they have little freedom of 
choice and their personal preferences, desires and feelings are of minor importance and not in 
the center of others’ attention (cf. Mageo, 1998). Socialization in Samoa emphasizes 
relatedness over autonomy. Therefore, individual feelings might not be treated as something 
of great importance that can and must be assessed in dyadic relationships. If it comes to 
feelings, joint negotiation and co-construction might be more important than individual 
authority over own feelings. Some anthropologists point in the same direction. Through an 
ethnographic and textual analysis of Nukulaelae gossip, Besnier (1995) does not only show 
how emotions are an object of gossip, he also demonstrates how they are produced and 
constituted jointly among gossipers. Nukulaelae belongs to Tuvalu, which is – like Samoa – a 
Polynesian island. Tuvaluan has borrowed considerably from Samoan and some people even 
speak Samoan there. According to Besnier, “gossip is a site for the production of emotions. In 
other words, Nukulaelae gossipers and, I would surmise, gossipers in many other 
societies…use gossip to trigger certain emotional experiences among themselves” (Besnier, 
1995, p. 231). Although Besnier admits that emotional experiences might well be available to 
the individual, he says that “they are nevertheless best achieved communally, in the same 
fashion that the representation of emotions in gossip narratives is jointly produced”(ibid.). In 
his view, those emotions do not automatically disappear when attempted gossip fails, but they 
become socially irrelevant (ibid., p. 235). Besnier further argues that feelings which have 
become socially irrelevant are also difficult to sustain:  
 
Without the participation of others, gossip itself and the emotions that are elaborated in 
gossip (anger, disgust, outrage) are difficult to sustain, and, while they may stay with 
particular individuals for a certain period of time, there are strong social motivations for 
them to disappear. In short, emotions associated with gossip emerge in the context of 
social interaction. (ibid.) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
point that what is going on in early attachment relationships is not primarily about feeling-into the other. 
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As a consequence, Besnier suggests to consider emotion attribution as a cooperative task: 
 
The implication of these patterns is that the representation and attribution of emotion 
categories are cooperative tasks: emotion attribution is jointly achieved by the quoting and 
the quoted parties if the emotion is identified in a reported speech string, and it is jointly 
achieved by the gossiper and his or her interlocutors when the former leadthe latter to 
name the relevant emotion. Without relying on other people`s contributions, it is very 
difficult to conduct gossip successfully and, in particular, to attribute to third parties 
morally suspect emotions. (ibid., p. 230) 
 
While the former quotation might suggest that Besnier refers only to the verbal attribution of 
emotion categories, the following words make clear that it is also one’s own emotional 
experience that is shaped by interactional processes in a cooperative and joint manner: 
 
the creation and maintenance of the “right” emotional tenor is jointly constructed by the 
various participants involved. Achieving the proper emotional tenor is thus not a simple 
matter of displaying the emotions that the speaker experiences internally, but rather is a 
matter of finding a way to elicit a specific emotion from one`s interlocutor, and to 
maintain that particular emotion in focus and at a level of sufficient intensity. (ibid., p. 
234) 
 
Duranti extends the idea of joint constitution and co-construction to the domain of meaning: 
“For Samoans, meaning is jointly accomplished by speaker and audience. For this reason, a 
Samoan speaker does not reclaim the meaning of his words by saying ‘I didn’t mean it’” 
(1985, p. 49). According to Duranti, such a “practice of linguistic behavior sharply contrasts 
with the ‘reflectionist view,’ according to which the meaning of someone’s words is given by 
his expressed/recognizable intentions” (ibid.). If an utterance would be nothing more than the 
expression of inner intentions, then “the audience’s role is that of recognizing what is 
supposedly already there” (ibid.).  
I have argued above that people who demonstrate opaque exteriors might also feel differently, 
since the feeling lying behind an expressed state is not the same as a feeling lying behind an 
unexpressed state. This seems to support the idea that individual feelings and their assessment 
in dyadic encounters might be of minor importance in more group-oriented places like Samoa. 
Opaque exteriors and opacity claims do not only force joint negotiation of emotions in cases 
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in which they become publicly relevant, they are themselves, so to speak, the result of a 
community’s joint negotiation to deemphasize and conceal emotional expressiveness. 
In a nutshell, it might indeed be possible that the ‘how’-aspect of another’s experience, or, 
more generally, dyadic forms of empathy are less important and deemphasized in places like 
Samoa. We should not take this as the ultimate truth, however. In this chapter, we have also 
encountered some aspects of empathy developed in chapters 3 and 4. From very early on, 
children have to attend to what higher-ranking people expect them to do, which sometimes 
requires grasping their intentions (cf. Ochs, 1988). This involves a certain degree of 
decentering or perspective-taking in dyads. Mageo claimed that empathy is “a matter of 
seeing/feeling as if one were another” (2011, p. 76) only in individually oriented places. But 
at least in situations where one has to grasp another’s intention, perspective-taking indeed is a 
matter of seeing as if one were the other in Samoa as well. Mageo’s account emphasizes the 
importance of alofa: “In Samoa, the word for empathy is alofa” (2011, p. 77). This is 
confirmed by Ochs (1988), who tells us that caregivers try to evoke empathy or love in small 
children and says that these feelings are referred to by alofa (ibid., p. 149). Gerber says that 
“the feeling of alofa is viewed as being owed to everyone” (1985, p. 145). Interestingly, she 
describes a situation informants paradigmatically invoke when they have to describe alofa: 
 
The scenario frequently invoked to illustrate this sense of alofa as a minimal behavioral 
requirement is as follows: an old person, often portrayed as a stranger, is seen walking 
along the road, carrying a heavy burden. It is hot, and perhaps the elder seems ill or tired. 
The appropriate response in this instance is a feeling of alofa, which implies helpful or 
giving actions such as taking over the burden or providing a cool drink and a place to rest. 
(Gerber, 1985, p. 145) 
 
This description is interesting for several reasons. First, alofa is triggered by the direct 
perception of someone. Although it is not clear whether alofa is triggered via bodily 
resonance or via rules of how one should behave when seeing someone, it is still interesting 
that this scenario depicts alofa as a reaction to someone who is in a pitiable state or condition. 
Second, the person that triggers alofa is not only alone, it is also a stranger. If alofa is the 
Samoan word for empathy and thus the result of redirected empathy, then the depicted 
scenario suggests that alofa is also a reaction towards a singular person. This relativizes 
Mageo’s claim that empathy in group-oriented cultures flows between groups and amounts to 
treating another group as if it were one’s own (2011, pp. 72-73). The example is rather a case 
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of treating an unfamiliar single person as if it were part of one’s own group. Framing empathy 
in this way, however, attenuates the distinction between a group-oriented and individuum-
centered empathy. Again, both kinds of empathy appear to be prevalent in every culture, 
while each culture might emphasize and prefer one of them. Moreover, we have seen in the 
previous chapter that even interactions structured around enacted opacity might require 
something like empathic attunement sensu Groark (2008, in press). Finally, any argument or 
contradictory anthropological report that does not describe Samoans as people who attach to 
and identify with groups rather than single individuals poses a problem for Mageo’s account 
or at least casts doubt on it. Derek Freeman, for example, clearly argued against the notion of 
multiple attachment in Samoa (1983, p. 203). But even if Freeman were right and dyadic 
attachment to the primary caregivers was as important in Samoa as elsewhere, it is hard to 
deny that the focus on others, especially on the extended family and meaningful groups (for 
example out of the same village) receives more emphasis in Samoa.  
Summing up, we can say that Mageo’s account does not capture more dyadic aspects of 
empathy as discussed in previous chapters - and it is hard to believe that such dyadic forms of 
empathy should not occur in Samoa at all. Nevertheless, Mageo’s idea is refreshing and adds 
new and important aspects. Most interesting for the present work is the idea that cultures 
might differ with respect to what is primarily important for them: understanding the ‘how’-
aspect of others’ experiences or identifying with them. In more individually oriented places 
that foster dyadic empathy, understanding the ‘how’-aspect of another’s experience might 
lead to a willingness to consequently identify with them and therefore to enact LCCP. 
Moreover, grasping the ‘how’-aspect of another’s experience can also be considered an aspect 
of LCCP in these places, since an empathetic attitude towards oneself is experienced as care 
and compassion. In more group-oriented cultures like Samoa, however, it might rather be the 
other way round: identifying with people of one’s own group or another group via redirecting 
attachment comes first and results in LCCP. Rather than grasping how another individual 
feels, feelings are jointly negotiated and co-constructed. Importantly, however, all this is a 
matter of emphasis. Joint negotiation and co-construction play a role in dyadic empathic 
encounters in individually-centered cultures as well, and forms of dyadic empathy are 
certainly also present in Samoa. Mageo’s account offers a heuristic which might inspire 
further research and which calls attention to the link between empathy and attachment. 
For the third time in this work, we are now able to rethink and refine our definition of 
empathy and to adjust it to Mageo’s ideas. Here is the last definition developed at the end of 
chapter 4 again: 
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Empathy 
1) is a primarily compassionate reaction which normally results in behaviours associated 
with LCCP 
2) is triggered either by resonating with another’s expressed emotional state or one’s own 
bodily resonances and somatic reactions towards another’s opaque exterior in his or her 
presence  
3) involves imaginative processes and sharing in order to grasp the ‘how’-aspect of another’s 
experience or empathic attunement in order to respect the boundaries of another’s 
subjective life 
 
An adjusted definition of empathy should consist of the following points: 
 
Empathy 
1) is a primarily compassionate reaction which normally results in behaviours associated 
with LCCP and which has its roots in primary attachment relationships  
2) is triggered either by  
− resonating with another’s expressed emotional state  
− one’s own bodily resonances and somatic reactions towards another’s opaque exterior  
− redirected attachment that leads to identify with someone or a group  
3) leads us  
− to understand the ‘how’-aspect of another’s experience in individually-oriented cultures 
− via imaginative processes and sharing, which helps us to identify with and attach to others 
− to identify with and attach to others in more group-oriented cultures and to jointly 
negotiate and co-construct feelings 
4) usually results in behaviours associated with LCCP  
5.8 Summary 
Samoans assert the opacity of other minds. Ochs observed a widespread dispreference for 
explicit guessing and other processes of clarification for unintelligible utterances especially 
between children and their caregivers. She explains this by arguing that caregiving in Samoa 
is organized by social rank. In this view, guessing another person’s mind is not generally 
impossible or prohibited in Samoa – its possibility depends on whether the person in question 
is of higher or lower rank. Consequently, Ochs does not support a strong opacity reading. For 
Mageo, the fact that Samoans “are generally indefinite about their own interior life and 
forswear the possibility of fathoming anyone else’s” (1998, p. 64) becomes understandable in 
the light of socialization practices that suppress the more private aspects of the self in favor of 
appropriate behaviour. In this view, we can interpret opacity assertions in a psychoanalytic 
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sense: if spontaneously arising desires, thoughts, and action plans are repressed in oneself 
because they are considered as morally suspect and if they consequently cannot be shared 
with others, then the opacity claim observed by Gerber that “We cannot know what is in 
another person’s depth” (1985, p. 133) could be understood as a commonly shared assertion 
that actually repeats on an explicit and culturally accepted level what was experienced 
individually in childhood and had to be repressed, namely, that one is not allowed to know his 
own depths and to act them out. In the course of socialization, this is transformed into the 
credo – or, doctrine - that one cannot know what is in another person’s depth. In doing so, 
one’s own experience is generalized and projected onto the other. Mageo’s account is at least 
supported by some observations of Ochs concerning parental control strategies as well as by 
observations from Freeman that point in the same direction and explain the difference 
between outer appearance and inner experience. Note, however, that Ochs also adds 
something to Mageo’s description: whereas self-assertive behaviour of children in Mageo’s 
account is transformed via practices of shaming and teasing, Ochs states that assertive 
behaviour is desired as long as it is not demonstrated in front of higher-ranking people who 
must be respected. Gerber was confronted with opacity claims when she asked her informants 
about emotions and concluded that Samoans attend more to the social context and to social 
consequences of emotions than to their individual, inner correlates and effects. Shore’s 
account is very much in line with Mageo’s and stresses the socialization goal to change 
behaviour led by āmio to behaviour led by aga. This opens up the possibility to interpret 
Samoans’ assertions of opacity from a different angle. Since Samoans focus on aga rather 
than āmio, opacity claims can also be seen as a confirmation of people’s belief that others will 
rather stick to their role than to their individual desires and motivations. Samoans clearly 
know about others’ private subjective life (loto) and they engage in a variety of ‘mindreading’ 
practices like mental state attribution, mental state talk, mental state inference and 
mindguessing. Although these practices might also serve the function to predict and explain 
behaviour, behaviour might be better explained and predicted in many situations by reference 
to one’s social role, since mature Samoans are expected to impose aga over āmio. 
There is a third way to interpret Samoan opacity claims. In one of Duranti’s (1988) examples 
presented above, Loa is accused by Iuli for having announced the arrival of the M.P. who did 
not appear. This example suggests that Samoans must play safe when speaking on behalf of 
someone or when saying something towards others which might turn out not to be true. At 
least, this seems to be true when higher-ranking people (e.g. matai) are involved. With this in 
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mind, the following words of Duranti are probably his most convincing attempt to explain 
Samoan opacity claims: 
 
A number of ethnographic accounts show that the very act of bringing out in public one’s 
speculations on the mental activity of others makes speakers worry about potential 
retaliation. Hence, from a sociocultural point of view, the phenomenon of the opacity 
doctrine might be seen as a defense strategy against the accountability that comes with 
making claims about what others think or want … It could turn out that the opacity 
doctrine hides or at least implies a pan-human preoccupation with reducing one’s 
accountability. (2008, p. 493) 
 
For Duranti, opacity claims are mainly a defense strategy applied to reduce accountability and 
he even tries to provide Samoan ‘mindreading-examples’ from his own fieldwork. Moreover, 
he suggests that opacity doctrines do not work in all contexts (cf. Duranti, 2008). Clearly, he 
doesn’t support a strong opacity reading. The few interviewpartners in my own fieldwork who 
directly engaged in mindguessing and explicitly confirmed that they sometimes guess what is 
in another person’s mind fit quite well to Duranti’s interpretation. Since the interviewees 
could choose their own mindguessing-examples, they obviously chose examples that were not 
problematic: they were not accountable for them and therefore had not to claim opacity when 
confronted with my questions. 
With respect to empathy, I have argued that aspects of empathy from previous chapters like 
perspective-taking, LCCP, and empathic attunement sensu Groark occur in Samoa as well. 
Moreover, I have presented Mageo’s idea to consider empathy as redirected attachment or an 
as-if form of attachment. According to Mageo, it is the redirection of the state of identification 
which characterizes early attachment towards others that leads to behaviours associated with 
LCCP (alofa in Samoa). Importantly, Mageo argues that empathy understood this way can 
either be directed to individuals in more individually-centered cultures where dyadic 
relationships are of central importance, or to groups in more group-oriented cultures where 
relationships between groups (for example kin groups) are most important. This poses a 
problem for the definition of empathy developed in the previous chapters of this work, since 
grasping the ‘how’-aspect of another’s experience should consequently not be as central in 
more group-oriented places like Samoa. Building on Mageo’s idea, I tried to characterize 
early attachment relationships and argued that they are more about co-constructing and jointly 
negotiating feelings in order to allow bonding and identification with the primary caregiver. 
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Therefore, I suggested that joint negotiation and co-construction might be more important in 
group-centered places while assessing the ‘how’-aspect of another’s experience might be 
more relevant in individually-centered places. 
This chapter is based on different anthropological accounts, yet we have detected striking 
similarities. Ochs and Duranti were working in the same village and both focused on language 
use in the light of local epistemologies of what can and cannot become an object of 
speculation. I have pointed out the similarities of Mageo’s and Shore’s account and argued 
that Gerber’s work as well as Ochs’ description of control strategies of caregivers resonate 
with theirs, too. But one element plays an important part in all accounts and unites them in a 
certain sense. All of what has been described by the different authors can be seen in the light 
of Samoans’ sociocultural orientation to emphasize relatedness instead of individual 
autonomy (cf. Keller, 2007). If we ask why meaning is jointly constructed in a Samoan fono 
without considering individual intentions (Duranti), why caregivers tease and shame children 
in order to repress their desire for individual attention (Mageo), why Samoans repress anger 
and show respect (Gerber), why children’s unintelligible utterances are not clarified by 
higher-ranking caregivers (Ochs), and why empathy in Samoa might be directed to groups 
rather than individuals (Mageo), then we always arrive at the same answer: because children 
have to focus on others and their relationships and not on themselves. 
Importantly, the detailed analyses in this chapter did not only help to contextualize the 
reported opacity claims for Samoa, they also revealed that none of the anthropologists 
mentioned suggested that the observed phenomena directly challenge theory of mind or that 
they support the idea that sociality without empathy is possible (cf. Robbins & Rumsey, 
2008). In the next and final chapter, I will focus on one aspect of the ‘mindreading tool kit’ 
which still needs to be clarified: false belief understanding.  
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6. False belief understanding in Samoa 
A closer look at the existing anthropological data from different places across Central 
America as well as the Pacific revealed that there is no need to assume that opacity doctrines 
should force a rethinking of theory of mind. Quite on the contrary, we have seen that almost 
all aspects of the conceptual tool kit developed in this work can be found in those locales as 
well, including mental state attribution, mental-state-talk, mindguessing and mental state 
inference. The same holds true for Samoa. Yet since false belief understanding is so closely 
tied to its experimental measurement, the different reports can principally not say very much 
on how false belief understanding develops in the corresponding places. Therefore, three 
different false belief studies were run in Samoa. To my knowledge, the present studies 
constitute the largest sample for a single locale and, as we will shortly see, they appear to 
demonstrate the largest delay in false belief understanding among normally developing 
children reported so far. Before I present the studies, I will present some relevant cross-
cultural ToM studies.  
6.1 Theory of Mind research across cultures  
Ten years ago, one of the most prominent researchers on children’s theory of mind said that 
most of the results stem from a homogeneous research and cultural worldview (Wellman, 
1998). Meanwhile, there have been quite a lot of cross-cultural studies on theory of mind and 
especially false belief understanding. Many of them suggest synchrony in the onset of false 
belief understanding, others suggest variability. Avis and Harris (1991), for example, found 
that preliterate Baka children in southeast Cameroon passed at an age comparable to that seen 
in European and North American studies. They succeeded in transferring an unexpected 
transfer paradigm to local circumstances in rural Cameroon. An influential meta-analysis by 
Wellman and colleagues (2001) tried to organize the existing findings of more than 500 
studies on false belief understanding. The improvement between three and five years of age 
could be confirmed across the different testing procedures of the studies. Because the meta-
analysis also included studies that were conducted in non-Western countries, it does not 
support the idea that false belief understanding might be a culture-specific product or open to 
cultural variability and so the authors conclude that a mentalistic understanding of persons, 
including a sense of internal representations, is widespread (Wellman et al., 2001). 
In contrast to these findings, more and more studies from different locales report differences 
in children’s early social experiences (Keller, 2007) as well as variability in the onset of false 
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belief understanding. Vinden (1996) used two tasks examining children’s understanding of 
false belief among other tasks that focused on representational change and the appearance-
reality distinction among 34 Junín Quechua children between four and eight years of age in 
the Peruvian highlands. The tasks were conducted by a native collaborator. Children between 
four and eight years of age performed poor on the change of location task and the other tasks 
that were used to assess their understanding of mind. Naito and Koyama (2006) conducted 
three experiments on the development of Japanese children’s false belief understanding and 
reported a delay as well as a general cultural difference in reasoning about human action. 
Children in their study developed full false belief understanding between 6 and 7 years of age. 
A meta-analysis by Liu and colleagues (2008) demonstrates parallel developmental 
trajectories but substantially different timetables across locales. They report that Canadian 
children start performing above chance on false belief tasks around 38 months whereas Hong 
Kong children do so around 64 months, which is more than two years later. Furthermore, the 
authors report that although Chinese children have earlier competence at executive function 
tasks than North American children, this did not translate into better false belief performance. 
This finding stands in contrast to accounts suggesting that failure on false belief tasks might 
be due to limitations in executive control.  
What most of the cross-cultural studies on false belief understanding have in common is that 
the chosen countries were not chosen with regard to existing anthropological literature. 
Experimental psychologists were mainly interested in whether theory of mind development is 
universal or not. As a consequence, every culture that significantly differed from Western 
culture was a suitable candidate for cross-cultural experimental research. The common 
inconsideration of the cultural context and the neglect of existing anthropological literature 
might precisely be a reason for the diverging results in cross-cultural theory of mind research 
and for the lack of appropriate explanations that might account for them. The theoretical part 
of this work might have convinced the reader that some locales are especially interesting for 
psychological research. There are, to my knowledge, only two published false belief studies 
from places where opacity claims were reported. Oberle (2009) did research on Yap and Fais, 
which both belong to the Federate States of Micronesia. Since Throop (2008) reported opacity 
from his own research on Yap island, I will only focus on Oberle’s false belief results for Yap 
children. Oberle used a classical surprise-content task and culturally adjusted research 
material: a box of chewing gum that contained a betelnut and a hand puppet. Children saw the 
box of chewing gum and were asked what they think is inside. Then they were shown the 
actual content (a betelnut). Finally, a hand puppet was introduced and children were asked 
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what the puppet would think is inside. Children were scored as passing the false belief 
question if they answered that the puppet would think there is chewing gum inside the box.  
On Yap Island, Oberle tested 43 children. Three out of 17 3-year-old children succeeded in 
the false belief condition (18%) as compared to 22 out of 26 5-year-olds (88%). This 
difference was significant at p<0.001. Therefore, although Throop (2008) reported opacity 
claims as well as opaque exteriors from Yap, children’s false belief understandings seems to 
develop like among Western children. In another study, Callaghan and colleagues (2005) 
investigated mental state reasoning in Canada, Peru, Thailand, India, and Samoa with a 
different false belief paradigm that involves a change of location. The authors found that 
children in all five countries improve in a comparable way between three and five years of 
age and claimed that the age of onset of mental state reasoning might be universal across 
cultures. Together with Oberle’s results, this is the second study which confirms the expected 
developmental trajectory between 3- and 5 years of age in a place where opacity is reported 
(Samoa). In all five countries, the majority of the 3-year-olds significantly failed. In the group 
of the 4-year-olds, however, the difference between those who pass and those who fail was 
not significant in all countries except Samoa, where 18 out of 25 children still failed (p<.05). 
Moreover, while the majority of the 5-year-old children clearly passed the task in Canada and 
Peru (p<.001) as well as in Thailand and India (p<.01), only 13 out of 18 children in Samoa 
passed the task (p<.10). This is neither a convincing p-value nor is it a convincing sample 
size. With regard to the question whether the onset of mental state reasoning across cultures is 
universal it would be interesting to have a closer look at this difference. Like the majority of 
cross-cultural psychologists, Callaghan and colleagues were apparently not interested in the 
anthropological data available for those countries. Otherwise, they should have been more 
interested in the fact that just in Samoa, where people are reported to assert the opacity of 
other minds, children did not perform as convincingly as in the other places.  
It is also noticeable that the false belief paradigms applied so far were not explicitly 
constructed for the application in a specific cultural environment. Cross-cultural psychologists 
do not start their research on the basis of anthropological data which might suggest to design a 
task in a specific, culture-fair way. Usually, classical paradigms are simply translated and 
adapted with respect to the materials involved (Avis & Harris, 1991; Oberle, 2009). To my 
knowledge, no cross-cultural study on false belief understanding has tried to adapt the 
interactions involved in an experimental procedure to local expectations and culturally 
appropriate forms of adult-child interaction. This has been criticized again and again by 
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cultural anthropologists (e.g. Besnier, 1995). Study 3 in this chapter tries to improve this 
situation. 
6.2 Empirical Part: False belief studies in Samoa 
In the conclusion of the first part of this work, I have pointed out that none of the 
anthropologists working in Samoa, although observing opacity claims, suggested that we 
should rethink ToM. I have demonstrated that mental state attributions, mental state talk, 
mindguessing and mental state inferences occur in Samoa, despite of opacity claims. 
Moreover, the study of Callaghan and colleagues (2005) seems to empirically support the 
intuition that Robbins and Rumsey’s claim according to which opacity doctrines should force 
us to rethink ToM is probably exaggerated. However, I have argued above that the result of 
the Samoan sample in Callaghan et al.’s (2005) study is not as convincing as the results in the 
other countries investigated. The logic behind running more false belief experiments in Samoa 
is the following: if the results of Callaghan and colleagues can be confirmed using more than 
one experimental paradigm, then this would be a convincing empirical result against the idea 
that opacity doctrines should force us to rethink ToM. In other words: Running more and 
perhaps more convincing false belief studies with a larger sample in Samoa is the easiest way 
to ward off Robbins and Rumsey’s suggestion and to prove the last part of our conceptual 
‘mindreading’ tool kit. On the other hand, if false belief understanding among Samoan 
children should turn out to be delayed, this does not necessarily imply that opacity doctrines 
are the causal factor, since experimental results in different cultural settings are open to a 
variety of critical interpretations. We will come back to this point later. 
The first experiment, the so-called Cup-task, is very similar to the task applied by Callaghan 
et al. (2005). My aim was to test whether I would get the same results with an almost identical 
task. Small variations in the procedure and translation were made, however. I will discuss 
these differences below in more detail. The second experiment used again the same task and 
another translation, since interviews with Samoans led me to doubt the appropriateness of a 
specific word that was included in the first translation. Interestingly, it is the same word that 
was also used in Callaghan et al.’s study. The third experiment, the so-called “Bring-me!”-
task, was especially designed for typical forms of adult-child interaction in Samoa and uses 
commands. The Cup-task is a paradigmatic example of an explicit verbal prediction task, 
while the “Bring-me!”-task falls into the category of active behavioural response in 
interaction tasks. For practical reasons, I did not add a looking behaviour task to my empirical 
studies. However, looking behaviour tasks do not require to actively respond to the task 
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demands, neither verbally nor behaviourally (see chapter 2), and they are usually applied to 
infants – therefore, I assumed that they might be less appropriate when it comes to 
investigating the relationship between opacity doctrines and false belief understanding, since 
cultural norms need some time to influence other developmental aspects.  
Can we already formulate hypotheses regarding Samoan children’s performance against the 
background of what we know from previous chapters? Some studies have observed that 
children who grow up in an environment with more siblings develop theory of mind skills 
earlier than children who grow up alone (Perner, Ruffman & Leekam, 1994; Jenkins & 
Astington, 1996). The so-called “sibling-effect“ might help Samoan children to develop 
mental state reasoning at an early age, since they grow up with lots of siblings around.  
In a later study, however, Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, and Clements (1998) found that 
only older siblings facilitate false belief understanding. Yet since Samoan children have to 
redirect their attachment to the primary caregivers at an early age towards the community of 
other siblings, and since caregiving is delegated to younger ones, Samoan infants are in 
constant interaction with lots of older siblings as well. Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, 
Maridaki-Kassotaki, and Berridge (1996) reported that not only older siblings, but the general 
number of other children as well as adults available to a single child positively influences 
children’s false belief understanding. Against the background of what we have heard about 
Samoan childood, these findings suggest that the social environment of Samoan children 
might be particularly conducive for an early and fast development of ToM skills.  
On the other hand, a growing body of literature suggests that the caregiver’s “mind-
mindedness” (cf. Meins et al., 2002) might positively influence children’s later understanding 
of mental states as well as their use of mental state terms. For example, Dunn, Brown, and 
Beardsall (1991) demonstrated 36-month-olds’ discourse about feeling states with their 
mothers and siblings correlated with their ability to recognize emotions at six years of age. 
There is growing evidence that such early social experiences might also positively influence 
ToM development. In their influential study, Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, and 
Youngblade (1991) were the first to relate family environment to children’s ToM abilities. In 
this study, children had better chances to succeed on ToM tasks if their families had a 
tendency to discuss feelings and to use causal state language. Moreover, mothers’ frequent 
attempt to control the behaviour of older siblings had a positive influence. Adrián, Clemente, 
and Villanueva (2007) demonstrated that mothers’ use of cognitive verbs when reading 
picture books to their children correlated with children’s later understanding of mental states. 
Meins et al. (2002) investigated infant-mother pairs and found that mothers’ appropriate 
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mind-related comments in a free-play context with 6-month-old children accounted for 11% 
of the variance in their composite ToM score assessed at 45 and 48 months. The positive 
causal influence of mothers’ mental state utterances and ToM understanding was further  
confirmed by Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe (2002). Although I argued that there mere existence 
of emotion terms in Samoa proves that mental state attributions and hence mental state talk 
occur in Samoa, the anthropological reports strongly suggest that mental state discourse might 
play less of a role in Samoa due to the repression of personal impulses in early childhood, the 
imposition of aga over āmio, the virtue of self-governance that results in the public 
presentation of an opaque exterior and the dispreference to speculate about others’ mental 
states. Moreover, dyadic interactions between mother and child become less common as soon 
as the child is introduced into the community of other siblings and (mainly) cared for by them. 
From this point of view, we might also expect Samoan children’s ToM development to be 
slightly delayed.   
The following studies were conducted in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, I stayed with a Samoan 
family who lived in a rural village on the island of Savai’i for almost three months. Sharing 
their lives and being welcomed as a part of their ‘āiga helped me a lot to get acquainted with 
Samoan culture and paved the way for my broader acceptance from other villagers as well. 
The first weeks gave me the chance to rethink my experiments, to discuss translations with 
locals, to get in contact with schools and potential assistants and to organize everything that 
was necessary before running the experiments. The first Cup-task study with the first 
translation was done in these months. In 2010, I went back to Samoa for two months in order 
to run the same task with a slightly different translation and a smaller sample (cf. Mayer & 
Träuble, in press). Furthermore, children were tested with the “Bring-me!”-task in several 
villages on Savai’i.  
6.2.1 Study 1: The “Cup-task” 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
A total of 302 children between three and 14 years of age participated in the course of ten 
weeks. The results of 14 children were excluded, mainly because their birthdates were not 
written down in the teachers’ documents or because of procedural errors by the experimenters 
during the first trials (11 children). Three children were excluded from further analysis 
because they met predefined exclusion criteria. The final statistical analysis was done with 
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288 children (146 girls, 142 boys), with 186 children being tested on Savai’i and 102 children 
on Upolu. 
6.2.1.2 Task  
A variation of Callaghan et al.’s (2005) false belief task was used in this study. In the original 
task, one of two experimenters hid a trinket under one of three bowls and left the room. A 
second experimenter suggested to play a trick on Experimenter 1 and hide the trinket under 
another bowl. After changing the trinket’s location, the child was asked where Experimenter 1 
would look for the toy when coming back. Children indicated their choice by pointing and 
were scored having passed the task if they pointed to the location where the trinket was 
hidden at first and as having failed if they pointed to the location where the trinket was moved 
while Experimenter 1 was absent.  
The differences between the task just described and the one applied in the present work are 
relatively small. In the present study, a wooden toy that looked like an insect and three white 
cups instead of bowls were used. The main difference to the task used by Callaghan and 
colleagues is that children in the present study had to think about the false-belief of another 
child. Instead of thinking about where the adult experimenter would look for the hidden 
object, the child had to think about where another child of more or less the same age and out 
of the same class would look for it. There are some reasons for this variation. First of all, the 
child does not have to think about the mind of an adult or a stranger. The participating pairs of 
children knew each other before and had experiences with each other’s minds, as it were. I 
thought that it should be easier for a child to play a trick on a classmate than on a foreigner. 
Additionally, children are probably less afraid during the testing procedure if they enter the 
room in pairs than alone. Moreover, children recognize that adults normally have more 
knowledge than they do (Siegal, 1993). Children might suspect that the experimenter knows 
about the procedure of the task. If the foreign scientist takes over the role of Experimenter 1, 
there is some chance that the child does not consider the implications of his absence during 
the change of location when answering the question by pointing – after all, it is the foreigner 
himself who came up with that game and therefore children might assume that he will 
probably know about the whole procedure. Even if such an inference is rather difficult, the 
procedure chosen in the present work is more resistant towards this alternative explanation 
which theoretically poses a problem to false belief tasks which involve the deception of an 
experimenter. 
Samoans out of the villages in which the research was done were recruited as experimenters.  
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6.2.1.3 Procedure  
Children entered the room in pairs and were welcomed by the experimenter (the Samoan 
research assistant) and myself. In these tasks, I stayed in the room in order to supervise the 
experimental procedure, to record the trials on viedo and to score children’s pointing 
responses. However, I remained in the background while the Samoan assistants ran the 
experiment. Both children were asked to sit down on chairs opposite to the experimenter in 
front of a table. On the table there were three white cups and a wooden toy-insect with a 
suction cup which looked like a grasshopper and attracted children’s attention because it 
jumped into the air when being pushed down on the table. Samoans referred to this toy as loi, 
which actually means “ant”. The experimenter began the procedure by asking Child 1 to hide 
the ant under one of the three white cups. If she did not react after repeatedly being asked to 
do so, the experimenter hid it and said “Look, I put it under here!” Then Child 1 was sent out 
of the room and it was made sure that she could not look inside. Child 2 stayed with the 
experimenter and was asked under which of the cups the toy is. This control question assured 
that Child 2 had seen Child 1 hiding the toy. Then the experimenter suggested to play a trick 
on Child 1 and to hide the ant under another cup. Children’s names were noted as soon as they 
entered the room and were used by the experimenter throughout the procedure. The false-
belief question was given to Child 2 after the new hiding process and after the cups had been 
put in line again. Child 2 was asked under which of the cups Child 1 would look for the ant 
when coming back into the room. Child 2 indicated his or her choice by pointing. If there was 
no reaction, the question was repeated and finally emphasized by the experimenter’s pointing 
to all three cups while asking with constant emphasis “Under this one, under this one, under 
this one?” After that, Child 2 was given a reward (sweets or balloons) and sent back into the 
classroom. The wooden toy was put in front of the cups again. Child 1 came back into the 
room and a new child, Child 3 entered the room. Child 1 was not told about the new location 
of the reward and that a trick was played on him or her. In so doing, the procedure could be 
repeated, but this time it was Child 3 who hid the toy and Child 1 who was asked where Child 
3 would look for the toy after the change of location. In this way, every child was first in the 
role of the hider and after that in the role of the trick-player. The following instructions were 
given to all children in Samoan (see Appendix A for the original translation): 
 
To Child 1: 
1) “Put the toy under one of the cups.” 
2) “Please go outside and wait there.” 
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To Child 2: 
1) “Where is the toy?” 
2) “Let’s play a trick on (NAME OF CHILD 1). Hide the toy under another cup.”  
3) “Where will (NAME OF CHILD 1) look for the toy when (s)he comes back?” 
 
The translation of the sentences into Samoan language was discussed with Samoans. The 
instructions contain no mental verbs like “think” or “believe”. Instead, children were simply 
asked where the other child would look for the toy. The Samoan verb for the English term “to 
look for” is su‘e (Milner, 1993). It is the word that was also used in the instructions of the 
study by Callaghan and colleagues (2005) (personal communication). I will come back to this 
in a short while.  
After being questioned where the other child would look for the toy, children indicated their 
choice by pointing or touching. If it was not clear to which cup children were pointing, they 
were asked to actually touch the cup. Figure 6 shows a typical experimental setting. 
 
Figure 6: Setting of the Cup-task in a school on Savai’i 
     
6.2.1.4 Scoring 
A child was scored as having passed the task if he or she pointed at the cup under which the 
other child who was sent out of the room had hidden the toy and as having failed if he or she 
pointed at the cup where the toy was moved meanwhile or the third cup that wasn’t involved 
in the hiding process at all. All testing sessions were recorded on video. There was perfect 
agreement between the Samoan experimenters and the supervisor on children’s pointing.  
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6.2.1.5 Analysis 
The data were analyzed using binary logistic regression analyses with performance on the 
false-belief tasks as the dependent variable, taking the values of 0 and 1. The model included 
age and regional provenance (Savai’i or Upolu) as predictors and Wald statistics were 
calculated. Regional provenance might be a predictor as many children tested on Upolu had a 
less traditional and more Western background. 
In a second step, the different age groups were compared with each other using chi-square 
tests in order to see whether there is a conceptual change in performance among Samoan 
children as reported for children in Western societies, where this change usually occurs 
between 3 and 5 years of age. Moreover, binomial tests were calculated in order to see 
whether children within each age class replied above chance. Due to small sample sizes in the 
group of the 13- (n=3) and 14-year-olds (n=1), the 12-, 13-, and 14-year-old children 
constituted one common age-group. 
6.2.1.6 Results and discussion 
The binary logistic regression demonstrated that age (classified in years) was a predictor for 
false-belief understanding (Wald=10.58, p<.01). The analysis also revealed that with 
increasing age the odds of the outcome to pass the false-belief task increase with the odds 
ratio = 1.2. The probability that a 7-year-old child passes the task is hence 20% higher as 
compared to a 6-year-old child. Therefore, the probability to pass the false-belief task does 
increase with age, but rather slowly and gradually. Regional provenance was not a significant 
predictor for children’s false-belief performance. 
As shown in Table 1, there is no relevant improvement in false-belief performance between 
three and five years of age. 5-year-olds did not perform better than the younger children and 
there was no succeeding majority before 8 years of age, where 55.2% of the children 
succeeded. As shown in Table 1, only children from 8 years of age onwards significantly 
replied above chance level. However, the fact that there is a majority of children passing the 
task with 8 years of age is not enough to speak of a conceptual change, as children improve 
only gradually. Moreover, the difference in performance between the 7- and 8-year-olds did 
not reach significance. 
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Table 1 
 
Number of Children who Failed and Succeeded (Study 1) 
 Age-groups (years) 
 
3 
n=8 
4 
n=13 
5 
n=35 
6 
n=33 
7 
n=53 
8 
n=58 
9 
n=32 
10 
n=20 
11 
n=17 
12-14 
n=19 
Fail 5 10 24 17 30 26 15 9 7 6 
Pass 3 3 11 16 23 32 17 11 10 13 
% pass 37.5 23.1 31.4 48.5 43.4 55.2 53.1 55.0 58.8 68.4 
Sign.* n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. p<.001 p<.05 p<.05 p<.05 p<.05 
 
Note. * Significance-information resulting from the binomial tests that were run in order  
to see whether children’s replies significantly differed from chance level. 
 
For further analysis, the whole sample was split in two halves, the cut-off point lying within 
the group of the 8-year-olds. Regarding the performance of all children being 8 years or older 
(n=144, age in days ranging from 2931 to 5205 days), 62 children (43.1%) failed and 82 
(56.9%) passed the false-belief task. In contrast, among the children below the age of 8 
(n=144, age in days ranging from 1168 to 2930 days) only 57 children (39.6%) succeeded on 
the false-belief question whereas 87 children (60.4%) failed (χ2=8.691, df=1, p< .01)  
The developmental trajectory and Samoan children’s improvement is different from what 
would be expected in Western samples. Even among the older children (8 years and older), 
where one would expect almost all children to pass the false-belief task, more than 40% still 
failed. Referring to the results shown in Table 1, it has to be stated that Samoan children seem 
to improve gradually and slowly and there is no threshold to support the idea of a conceptual 
change at a certain age. 
6.2.2 Study 2: The “Cup-task” II 
In Study 2 I tested whether similar results would be obtained when using a different and 
potentially easier translation within the same task. When asking children the control question 
“Where is the ant?” children sometimes pointed to one of the cups in a very hasty and 
indefinite manner. The Samoan experimenter then encouraged them to touch the cup. This 
was important, since knowing where the first child hid the toy is a necessary prerequisite for 
giving a correct answer to the crucial false belief question. However, some Samoan 
experimenter sometimes encourage the child by saying “Su‘e!” as a prompt. This might point 
to another use of the term. In this context, the prompt could also be translated as “Look for 
it!” – however, how the prompt was given and how quickly children followed this order by 
lifting the cup made me suspicious. It seemed to me that su‘e in this imperative form could 
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mean something like “Go and find it!”, or “Get it!”. I wondered whether this term might be 
understood ambiguously in the crucial false belief question. What if children understood the 
translation of the Samoan sentence O fea lā e sau nei X su‘e ai le loi? not as “Where will X 
look for the ant when he/she comes back?”, but rather as “Where will X find or get the ant 
when he/she comes back?”? I asked some Samoans how they would translate the word su‘e, 
which, according to Milner (1993), translates as “to look for, try to find”. Some Samoans said 
that they would translate it as “to find”, however. Note, that this would completely change the 
meaning of the crucial question, since the location where the ant can be found is precisely not 
where a child holding a false belief will look for it at first. The word su’e, however, was also 
used in the study done by Callaghan and colleagues (2005) who reported a significant 
difference between the 3- and 5-year-olds. Their crucial question O fea o le a alu i ai Sina e 
su‘e ai lana meataalo pea foi mai? translates as “Where is Sina going to look for her toy 
when she comes back?”. 
In order to make the task as easy as possible for children and in order to avoid the potential 
difficulties of the term su’e, we wanted to replace it by a less ambiguous word and used the 
Samoan verb for “to touch”, tago. Moreover, the Samoan word muamua (first) was added as 
previous research reported that the use of the word “first” in false belief tasks helps children 
to perform better (Siegal & Beattie, 1991).  
6.2.2.1 Participants 
A total of 55 children between 4 and 8 years of age participated in the course of one month. 
The statistical analysis was done with all 55 children (29 girls, 26 boys).  
6.2.2.2 Procedure 
The procedure is similar to the one applied in Study 1. The instructions were again given to 
all children in Samoan. Instructions were exactly like in Study 1, with a slight translational 
difference at the end of the procedure. The final question to the tested child was no longer 
where the other child would look for the toy when coming back – instead, children where 
asked which cup would be touched first by the other child:  
 
“When (Name OF CHILD 1) comes back, where is the cup (s)he will first touch?” 
6.2.2.3 Scoring  
Children were scored in the same way as in Study 1.  
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6.2.2.4 Analysis 
The data were again analyzed using binary logistic regression analyses with performance on 
the false-belief tasks as the dependent variable, taking the values of 0 and 1. The model 
included age as predictor and the Wald statistic was calculated. 
In a second step, the different age groups were again compared with each other using chi-
square and binomial tests. For all analyses, the one 8-year-old child was assigned to the group 
of the 7-year-olds. 
6.2.2.5 Results and discussion 
The binary logistic regression demonstrated that this time, age was not a significant predictor 
for false-belief understanding (Wald=3.00, p=.083). As shown in Table 2, there is 
improvement in performance with age. However, it did not become significant. As shown in 
Table 2, children between 4 and 8 years of age do not reply above chance level. This is in line 
with the results of Study 1, where children began to reply above chance level not before 8 
years of age. 
Table 2 
 
Number of Children who Failed and Succeeded (Study 2) 
 
4 
n=7 
5 
n=7 
6 
n=21 
7-8 
n=20 
Fail 6 5 14 10 
Pass 1 2 7 10 
% pass 14.3 28.6 33.3 50.0 
Sign.* n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
 
Note. * Significance-information resulting from the binomial tests that were run in order to see 
whether children’s replies significantly differed from chance level. 
 
What appears not to be in line with the results of Study 1, however, is the non-significant 
result of the binary logistic regression. In order to have a closer look at this difference, 
another binary logistic was calculated with the sample of Study 1, but this time, only the 3- to 
7-year-old children were included (n=142). In this way, both samples within this age range 
could be compared with respect to the question whether age is a significant predictor for false 
belief performance between 3 and 7 years of age in Samoa. Within this age range, however, 
age did not significantly predict children’s performance (Wald=1.87, p=.171) in Study 1. 
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What if there was an ambiguous term or shortcoming in the translation used in Study 2? One 
might object that the used question (“When (Name OF CHILD 1) comes back, where is the 
cup (s)he will first touch?”) does not make clear that we assume it to be the purpose of the 
child to find the ant under one of the cups. In Study 1, the crucial question involved the 
information that the child is going to look for the toy when coming back. Note, however, that 
it is difficult to provide this piece of information in Samoan without using the term su‘e. 
There are, however, two arguments that speak for the appropriateness of the present 
translation. First, let us start with the fact that from 55 children who participated in the second 
study, 35 gave a wrong answer to the false belief question. Since there are three cups 
involved, there are two possible wrong answers. Children can either point to the cup where 
the toy actually is or to the third cup that was not involved in the hiding process at all. If 
children who give the wrong answer respond on the basis of reality by pointing to the cup 
where the toy actually is, this would at least support that children understood “where is the 
cup (s)he will first touch” in the correct way, namely, as being part of the attempt to get the 
ant again. One child’s response was not recorded, so that we can analyze the wrong pointing 
responses of n=34 children. From these 34 children, 29 pointed to the cup where the toy 
actually is, while only 5 children pointed to the third cup that was not involved in the 
experimental procedure at all (binomial test, p<.000).  
The second argument that speaks for the appropriateness of the present task comes from a 
small control study with German children (n=19) between 4 and 6 years of age who 
administered the same task with the similar instruction. One boy had to be excluded because 
of confusion. The final sample consisted of 18 children, fairly even split between girls (8) and 
boys (10), with five 4-year-olds, twelve 5-year-olds, and one 6-year-old child. The youngest 
child was 49 months old, the oldest one 80 months. Average age was 59,94 months, i.e., 5 
years (range 31 months, σ=6,90). From these 18 children, only one 5-year-old boy gave the 
wrong answer and pointed to the cup where the toy actually was.   
6.2.2.6 Summary of the “Cup-tasks” 
Although I applied a strikingly similar task with two different translations to a large sample of 
Samoan children, it was not possible to replicate the results of Callaghan et al. (2005). As 
reported by Mayer and Träuble (in press), the present results suggest a slower and gradual 
development of false belief understanding among Samoan children, with no clear majority 
passing the task before 8 years of age. Since I used two different translations and a much 
broader sample, the present results appear to be more convincing than the results obtained by 
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Callaghan et al. Moreover, the difference between the 3- and 5-year-olds in their study was 
only significant at p<.10, which gives rise to the question whether their result actually stands 
in stark contrast to the present one at all.  
Note, that I have mentioned another difference between the present studies and the one 
applied by Callaghan et al. While children in their study had to think about under which 
location an adult would look, children in the present study had to think about under which cup 
another child would look. I have argued above that the present version might have some 
advantages. Still, I cannot rule out that this difference might account for the different results. I 
have already mentioned that cross-cultural psychologists do usually not adapt the interactions 
involved in an experimental procedure to local expectations and culturally appropriate forms 
of adult-child interaction. In Western experimental settings, children are usually involved in 
friendly interactions, in playful settings, and they are kindly asked by adult experiments to 
answer a question, to help, or to do something. In Samoa, in contrast, adults would not kindly 
ask children for help. Rather, they would give short commands. We have heard in the chapter 
on Samoa that intentions might be important to Samoans if they have to grasp the meaning of 
something a higher-ranking person has said or done. Note, that children in Callaghan et al.’s 
study must grasp what an adult intends to get. Although I have provided some reasons against 
experimental setups that involve the deception of an experimenter, this might also have 
facilitated children’s performance in the study of Callaghan and colleagues. Ochs says: 
 
when a higher-ranking person orders a lower-ranking person to carry out some action, the 
personal intentions of the speaker are also of primary importance. The lower-ranking party 
cannot assign his own interpretation but rather must grasp that intended by the higher-
ranking speaker. (1988, p. 142) 
 
With this in mind, it might be reasonable to design a false belief task in which orders are 
given by a higher-ranking person to a lower-ranking one. Since adults are always of higher-
rank in Samoa than children, a paradigm based on commands might be especially suited for 
the Samoan context. What if the adult is a foreigner? Ochs and Schieffelin say:  
 
Foreigners typically (and historically) are persons to whom respect is appropriate – 
strangers or guests of relatively high status. The appropriate comportment toward such 
persons is one of accommodation to their needs, communicative needs being basic. (1994, 
pp. 495-496) 
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The next study is based on commands which are given by myself to children. In the false 
belief condition, I am involved in a situation where children must consider the intention lying 
behind my command in the light of my false belief in order to provide the appropriate help. In 
a sense, the following task tries to operationalize and use Ochs’ observation that lower-
ranking Samoans must grasp the intention of higher-ranking ones when following orders. 
6.2.3 Study 3: The “Bring-me!”-task 
6.2.3.1 Participants 
A total of 61 Samoan children between five and eight years of age participated in the course 
of four weeks. None of them met any of the predefined exclusion criteria. Therefore, the final 
statistical analysis of the Samoan sample was done with 61 children, tolerably even split 
between boys (28) and girls (33). Children were randomly assigned either to a true belief 
condition (n=31) or to a false belief condition (n=30).  
For the cross-cultural comparison, a German sample, consisting of 41 children between 5 and 
7 years of age, was tested. One girl had to be excluded because of ambivalent response 
behaviour. The final statistical analysis was done with 40 children, tolerably even split 
between girls (23) and boys (17). The youngest child was 67 months old, the oldest one 84 
months. Average age was 6;3 years (range 17 months, σ=5,40). Children were randomly 
assigned either to a true belief condition (n=20) or to a false belief condition (n=20).  
For reasons of comparison, the Samoan sample was reduced in order to match it as accurately 
as possible to the German sample. In the analysis of the cross-cultural comparison, the 
Samoan sample consisted of n=40 children between 69 and 86 months. Average age was 6;6 
months (range = 17 months, σ=5,34). 19 children were randomly assigned to the true belief 
condition, 21 to the false belief condition.  
6.2.3.2 Materials 
Two small grey cardboard boxes, suited for pencils, were put on a table in approximately 30 
cm distance from each other. Both could be opened and closed from two sides. A black pencil 
was put in one of the boxes and a red pencil into the other one (see Figure 7). E1 was sitting 
behind the table with a notepad in his hands, while E2 was standing besides, observing the 
whole scene. 
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Figure 7: Setting of the Bring-me!-task in a classroom on Savai’i 
      
6.2.3.3 Procedure 
The child sat in front of E1 at a table. On the table, there were two grey identical boxes, one 
containing a red, the other one a black pencil. E1 requested repeatedly one of the two pencils 
by pointing and saying “Give me the pencil in this box”. During the familiarization phase, 
four commands were given to each child. In order to control for order effects, E1 first pointed 
to the Box in either location A or B, then to the other location, again to the same location and 
finally to the location he pointed at first (ABBA or BAAB). In this way, a single child could 
not stick to the rule that E1 always wants the pencils in turn. In the false belief condition, E1 
left the room after the last command of the familiarization phase. E2 then sat down and 
suggested to play a trick on E1 and to switch pencils. After that, E1 came back, pointed to one 
of the two boxes and said that he wanted to write another word with the colour inside this 
(pointing gesture) box. He asked the child to bring it outside in a moment and left the room 
again. Then, E2 asked the child which pencil E1 actually wanted. The child was considered as 
taking E1’s prior intention into account if he pointed to the non-referred box. Finally, E1 re-
entered the room for the second time and repeated that he wanted to write another word with 
the colour inside this (pointing gesture) box. E1 then remained standing in front of the table 
and said “Give it to me”. Here, too, the child was considered as taking E1’s prior intention 
into account if he gave E1 the pencil out of the non-referred box. In the true belief condition, 
the only difference to the false belief condition was that E1 witnessed E2 switching the 
pencils without suggesting to play a trick. The child was considered as taking E1’s prior 
intention into account if he pointed to the referred box when being asked by E2 and if he 
subsequently gave E1 the pencil out of the referred box.  
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In this way, every child had to give two behavioural responses. First, each child had to point 
in response to the question of E2 about which pencil E1 wants (E1 being absent). Second, 
they had to give one of the two pencils in response to E1’s direct request. In this way, children 
had the opportunity to reveal their knowledge and understanding of the task by pointing while 
E1 was absent, as E1’s direct command might have been too strong. By requiring each child 
to give two behavioural responses, both possibilities could be checked and torn apart. 
The instructions were given to all children in their mother tongue, i.e. Samoan or German (see 
Appendix A for the full instructions in English and Samoan).  
6.2.3.4 Scoring 
In the false belief condition, children were scored as taking E1’s intention and false belief into 
account when they told E2 (either verbally or by pointing) that E1 actually desired the pencil 
that is now in the box E1 was not pointing at. Children were furthermore scored as using this 
ability in the face of E1’s direct request when they gave E1 the pencil out of the box E1 was 
not pointing at.  
In the true belief condition, children were scored as taking E1`s intention and true belief into 
account when they told E2 (verbally or by pointing) that E1 desired the pencil out of the box 
E1 was pointing at. Children were furthermore scored as using this ability in the face of E1’s 
direct request when they gave E1 the pencil out of the box E1 was pointing at. 
E2 made notes to record children’s choices. All trials were recorded on video so that E2’s 
notes could later be double-checked for reliability. Perfect agreement was achieved. 
6.2.3.5 Analysis 
The data were analysed using cross-tables, calculating binomial and chi-square tests. In a first 
step, the full Samoan sample was analysed using binomial tests within both experimental 
conditions. In a second step, the Samoan sample was reduced and age-matched to the German 
sample. Although this matching was done afterwards, it was still random in the sense that the 
original Samoan sample was simply curtailed with respect to its age range, leaving out the 
children much younger than the youngest German child and leaving out the majority of those 
older than the oldest German child. This was done without any regard to the experimental 
condition or performance of the children left out. For reasons of comparison, the original 
Samoan sample was reduced to 40 children so that perfect comparability to the German 
sample (n=40) was given.  
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As several authors in the field of cross-cultural research reported a delay in the onset of false 
belief for certain places, one might argue that curtailing the original Samoan sample by 
leaving out some of the older children might prevent them from demonstrating their false 
belief understanding. Including the older children again might show that, although delayed, 
false belief understanding still develops within the age range of the tested Samoan sample. As 
another approach to the data, we therefore curtailed the 21 youngest children in Samoa in 
order to be able to compare the 40 German children to the 40 oldest children in Samoa. 
6.2.3.6 Results 
The experimental procedure required each child to give two behavioural answers, pointing 
and giving. From all tested children in both samples, only one boy in the German sample gave 
the right behavioural answer in the false belief condition by giving the pencil out of the non-
referred box after E1’s direct request. Therefore, this part of the experimental procedure was 
not further analysed due to a lack of variance in children’s giving responses. Nevertheless, 
this is an interesting result in its own right, since children seem to perceive imperative 
pointing as such a strong command that they do not interpret it as being guided by a false 
belief even in cases where they know that the adult actually wants to have another pencil.  
The following analyses as well as the subsequent discussion refer to children’s pointing 
responses to E2 explicit question only. 
I will start with the Samoan sample alone. From the 31 children in the true belief condition, 
21 correctly indicated that the experimenter wants the pencil in the box he pointed at, while 
ten children wrongly indicated that the experimenter wants the pencil in the non-referred box 
(binomial test, p=n.s.). Most of the children in the true belief condition were either six (n=12) 
or seven (n=11) years old. Neither the group of the 6-year-olds, nor the group of the 7-year-
olds did reply above chance level (binomial tests, p=n.s.).  
From the 30 children in the false belief condition, six correctly indicated that the experimenter 
wants the pencil in the box he did not point at, while 24 children wrongly indicated that the 
experimenter wants the pencil in the referred box (binomial test, p=.001). Again, most of the 
children in the false belief condition were either six (n=15) or seven (n=12) years old. Both of 
them significantly replied below chance level (6-year-olds: binomial test, p<.035; 7-year-
olds: binomial test, p<.006), which indicates that they mostly pointed to the referred box 
(binomial test, p<.001). 
For the cross-cultural comparison, analyses were done with the German and the age-matched 
Samoan sample, with 40 children each. The results for both samples are shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3 
 
Number of Children who Pointed to the Referred/Non-referred Box, per Condition and Country 
 True belief condition False belief condition 
 
Points to 
referred box 
Points to 
non-referred box 
Points to 
referred box 
Points to 
non-referred box 
German sample  
(n = 40) 20 0 5 15 
Samoan sample 
(n = 40) 13 6 17 4 
 
The Samoan sample responded by chance in the true belief condition (binomial test across all 
age classes, p=.167) and – like in the original full sample – significantly below chance level in 
the false belief condition (binomial test across all age classes, p<.05), pointing mainly to the 
referred box. In the German sample, children responded significantly above chance level both 
in the true belief condition (binomial test across all age classes, p<.001) and in the false belief 
condition (binomial test across all age classes, p<.05), where children pointed much more 
often to the non-referred box.  
As the two samples are comparable with respect to average age, range and standard deviation, 
chi–square tests were calculated in order to compare false belief performance between the 
Samoan and the German sample. In Germany, 15 of the 20 children passed the false belief 
condition while in Samoa only 4 of 21 pointed correctly to the non-referred box (Fisher’s 
exact test, p=.001, two-tailed). In the true belief condition, all 20 German children passed 
while in Samoa, 13 of the 19 children passed (Fisher’s exact test, p=.008, two-tailed). 
Finally, chi–square tests were calculated in order to compare the German sample with 40 
oldest Samoan children, curtailing the 21 youngest ones. Thereby, the difference in average 
age between the Samoan age-matched sample (M=78, 05 months) and the German sample 
(M=75,6 months) shifted from less than three months to almost nine months, the newly 
obtained Samoan sample being clearly older now on average (M=84,50 months).  
In the true belief condition, six of the 20 Samoan children indicated wrongly that the 
experimenter wants the pencil in the non-referred box. In the false belief condition, 17 of the 
20 children wrongly indicated that the experimenter wants the pencil in the referred box. 
Again, the difference in true belief performance across cultures was significant (Fisher’s exact 
test, p<.05, two-tailed). The same holds true for the difference in false belief performance 
(Fisher’s exact test, p<.001, two-tailed). Apparently, including only the oldest children from 
the original Samoan sample does not change the significant group difference between both 
samples. 
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6.3 Discussion 
While false belief understanding could be relatively easily demonstrated by Oberle (2009) 
among 5-year-old on Yap island, which is also a locale discussed in the opacity literature, 
Samoan children improved only slowly and gradually when tested with the Cup-task. There 
was no succeeding majority before 8 years of age, and even one third of the 10-12 year-olds 
failed the task in study 1. Still, age significantly predicted children’s performance. Study 2 
focused on children between 4 and 8 years of age, using a more comprehensible question at 
the end of the instructions. Nevertheless, study 2 confirmed the findings from the first study, 
since children within this age range did not reply above chance level. 
The present results are not the first ones that speak for cross-cultural variability in the onset of 
false-belief understanding (Liu et al., 2008; Vinden, 1996). Surprisingly, these results are in 
stark contrast to the results obtained by Callaghan et al. (2005). Since I used two different 
translations, it is rather unlikely that the applied translations might account for this difference. 
The observation that many of the successful children gave the correct answer immediately and 
with an impish smile on their face seems to rule out the possibility that the instructions were 
wrongly translated into Samoan or misunderstood. Importantly, study 1 used the same crucial 
verb (su‘e) as the study conducted by Callaghan and colleagues, and study 2 even included 
the potentially helpful word “first” and replaced the verb su‘e with the verb tago (to touch). A 
control with a smaller German sample proved that this substitution does not change the 
typical pattern in Western places, where 5-year-old children pass this task. However, the 
children in Callaghan et al.’s study had to think about another experimenter, while the 
children in the two present studies had to think about another child. In order to test whether 
this might explain the difference, I designed another task on the basis of typical adult-child 
interactions in Samoa which is based on commands that are given by someone of higher rank. 
Interestingly, Samoan children did not improve when being commanded by a higher-ranking 
person, although this is precisely when children must grasp another’s intention according to 
Ochs (1988). This makes it unlikely that Samoan children’s alleged positive results in 
Callaghan et al.’s (2005) are due to the fact that children in their task had to take the 
perspective of another adult.  
The “Bring-me!”-task, however, was not used in previous studies. Moreover, it is much more 
complex than the Cup-task. Therefore, it is open to critique and must be discussed in a bit 
more detail. Let us have a look at the results again. German children applied above chance 
level in both the true and the false belief condition, indicating that E1 wants the referred box 
in the true belief condition and mainly indicating that E1 wants the non-referred box in the 
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false belief condition. The fact that there was a significant difference between both conditions 
in the German sample suggests that the “Bring me!”-task is a valid false belief task in which 
both conditions are understood differently as intended by the experimental setup.  
In contrast, Samoan children performed below chance level in the false belief condition, 
chosing mainly the referred box and hence giving a wrong response in the framework of the 
experimental setup. In the true belief condition, children replied by chance. Surprisingly, 
children performed better than their Samoan counterparts although the task is based on typical 
adult-child interactions in Samoa.  
The “Bring me!”-task does not require predicting others’ beliefs like in classic false belief 
tasks, but it requires the consideration of the others’ belief when interpreting the 
experimenter’s pointing and command. Some researchers argued that this is easier for 
children than making predictions (Robbins & Mitchell, 1992). The clear difference between 
both experimental conditions in the German sample is only understandable on the background 
of children’s assessment of E1’s current belief. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why 
children in the false belief condition suddenly point to the non-referred box when being asked 
which pencil E1 wants to have. The study of Southgate and colleagues (2010) is based on the 
same considerations, with the difference that the experimenter, after coming back to the room 
with a false belief about the location of a hitherto unnamed novel object, kindly asked for it 
by calling it “sefo”. The authors reasoned that children who take into account the 
experimenter’s false belief will understand that the intended referent, i.e. the sefo, must be 
inside the box the experimenter is not pointing at. Another difference to the study by 
Southgate and colleagues (2010) is that the present study used colours instead of objects. By 
swapping pencils of different colour from one box to the other, the “Bring me!”-task is partly 
an unexpected transfer paradigm and partly a surprise contents paradigm. One might argue 
that this made the task more difficult, as children might try to remember where which colour 
is. Moreover, one might argue that this task presupposes that children understand that it is 
important for E1 to get a pencil of a certain colour and that this might require own 
experiences with colours and drawings. Notice, however, that children do not need to 
remember exactly where which colour is (it is sufficient to understand that the box referred to 
by E1 does not contain the intended pencil, whatever colour it is) in order to correctly pass the 
task and that the familiarization phase gave them enough time to understand that in this 
context, colour indeed is important for E1. Finally, the use of colour terms in a false belief 
task has already been successfully done by Robbins and Mitchell (1992).  
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One might also doubt whether the instruction “I want to write another word with the colour in 
this box” is clear enough. What if children understood it with an emphasis on the box, i.e. in 
the sense of “I want to write with the pen in this box, whatever colour it has”? I cannot 
absolutely rule out that Samoan children understood the instruction in this way. Yet I think 
that this interpretation is rather unlikely, since this would mean that children did not 
understand at all what had to be learned in the familiarization trials, namely, that I want to 
write a word with a certain colour. Moreover, this interpretation does not fit to the fact that 6 
out of 19 children in the true belief condition pointed to the non-referred box. More 
importantly, such an interpretation does not change the cross-cultural pattern: German 
children clearly did not understand the instruction in this way, and so the obtained results 
would still be interesting, since the question would then be why Samoan children understand 
the instruction with an emphasis on the box and German children with an emphasis on the 
colour. Such an alternative interpretation amounts to saying that Samoan children understand 
E1’s command as “Bring me outside what I am pointing at” while German children 
understand it as “Bring me outside what I am intending to point at” – and this would indeed 
be a very interesting difference. 
Another specific feature of the “Bring me!” task is the use of commands. In the studies of 
Southgate et al. (2010) and Buttelmann et al. (2009), the experimenters requested for help. 
The command of E1 in the present task to bring the pencil pointed at outside is actually a 
command to help, so the difference between these studies is a rather small one. Commands, 
directed at children by adults, are usually used to make the child comply immediately, not to 
make him or her think the matter over. Commands are, in contrast to requests for help, less 
open for individual consideration, as we want the other person to obey. Adults in Samoa 
would not kindly ask children for help. Rather, they would give a command. A conflict does 
automatically arise, however, when the person giving the command is holding a false belief 
and if we know about it. This conflict can be solved in two ways. One either can take the 
command as absolute and neglect the false belief behind it, or one can focus on the false 
belief of the other and relativize the command by interpreting it as being guided by a false 
belief. The latter solution would give priority to the intention that led to the command. 
Overtly, however, this might appear as non-compliance and disobedience in the first moment, 
as the person giving the command – being unaware of his own false belief - would primarily 
perceive the child’s behaviour as non-compliance. Because non-compliance is heavily 
sanctioned in Samoa, one might argue that Samoan children might have chosen the first 
solution and take the command as absolute because they do not dare to question whether the 
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communicated referent is also the intended referent. Hence, E1’s command might be harder to 
ignore for Samoan children than for German children. If we look solely at the false belief 
condition, this might indeed explain Samoan children’s performance. Notice, however, that 
this explanation stands in contrast with what is actually going on in the true belief condition, 
where almost one third of the Samoan children do ignore the referential command. As a 
matter of fact, more Samoan children answer that E1 wants the pencil in the non-referred box 
in the true belief condition than in the false belief condition, where this answer would be 
correct. Remember that children in both cultures did only demonstrate their false belief 
understanding via pointing when being asked by E2 while E1 was absent. Neither the Samoan 
nor the German children gave the pencil out of the non-referred box when E1 asked them to 
give him the pencil for the second time, remaining inside the room and pointing to one of the 
boxes. Apparently, the direct command in presence of E1 is too strong for children of both 
cultures to resist. Even children that gave the correct pointing response to E2’s question 
which pencil E1 wants did not give the corresponding pencil when E1 stayed in the room and 
asked for it for the second time. In other words, although they did understand the implications 
of the task and of E1’s false belief, this understanding did not translate into a corresponding 
behavioural response when it came to giving the pencil to E1. This is interesting, as children 
in similar studies have no problems doing so when an experimenter asks for help (Buttelmann 
et al., 2009; Southgate et al., 2010). This might hint to the importance of subtle differences in 
interaction, namely, whether an experimenter kindly asks for help or commands help. 
Summing up, it seems unlikely that only Samoan children cannot ignore E1’s command. 
A more serious objection would be to focus on Samoan children’s true belief performance. 
The fact that 6 out of 19 children pointed to the non-referred box gives rise to the impression 
that they simply did not understand what they were asked to do. Although German children 
understood the logic of the task and performed differently in the true and false belief 
condition, the task could be understood wrongly in culture-specific ways only by Samoans. 
This would mean that the “Bring-me!”-task, although designed for typical adult-child 
interactions in Samoa, was still not understood by Samoan children. However, if we interpret 
children’s failure in true belief conditions automatically as evidence for the inappropriateness 
of a task, then we eliminate any possibility to demonstrate that experimental setups might be 
inappropriate in different cultural contexts on a more general level. I will come back to this 
point in the following final discussion of this work. 
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7. Discussion 
We have reached at the end of our journey, on which we came across various places in the 
Southern Pacific and Central America. On this journey, we delved into disciplines like 
philosophy, cultural anthropology, the interdisciplinary ToM-research and experimental as 
well as developmental psychology. The opacity of other minds phenomenon indeed is a 
meeting point for these disciplines and an exciting area of study in which interdisciplinary 
perspectives are the only adequate ones. In this work, I hoped to clarify the relationship 
between the opacity of other minds phenomenon, ‘mindreading’ and empathy. Yet in order to 
investigate this relationship, it was necessary to get a clearer idea of the discrete parts which 
make up this relationship. A good deal of this work therefore tried to develop clearer 
definitions of various ‘mindreading’-aspects and empathy. This part contributes to the field of 
social cognition on a more basic level by suggesting to use a conceptually less equivocal set 
of terms instead of ‘mindreading’ and theory of mind and by providing a definition of 
empathy which is both more narrow and cross-culturally more valid than current definitions 
are.  
In chapter 1, I started out to think about the terms opacity and transparency. I argued that the 
use of the term opacity of other minds gives rise to the idea that our minds are hidden behind 
our overt behaviour and bodily expressions which are, in this view, something like an opaque 
barrier. This chapter functioned like a warning, since it proved that the mere use of the term 
opacity cannot be neutral and does automatically give credit to the ToM-framework.  
Chapter 2 critically summarized this framework and identified the currently more popular 
‘mindreading’-account as inheriting the core ideas of ToM while giving rise to the illusory 
impression that something like a telepathic access to others’ mental states is possible. In order 
to develop clearer definitions of the different aspects associated with ‘mindreading’, a first 
step was to argue for the distinction between mental state inference and mental state 
attribution. After doing so, I introduced the phenomenologically inspired direct perception 
approach to mental states as a critique to certain core assumptions of the ‘mindreading’ 
approach. Although some researchers accept the direct perception view on the 
phenomenological level, they still think that ToM captures what is going on in sub-personal 
spheres. I tried to argue against this view and suggested that, instead of mistrusting our 
phenomenal experiences as a result of influential cognitivist theories, we should rather do it 
the other way round: the phenomenologically given should inspire our theories. The notion of 
contextreading provided an alternative account which can explain how we predict and explain 
other people’s behaviour without recourse to their mental states. Finally, I talked about mental 
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state inference and related the idea of inference to the experimental laboratory setting which is 
inspired by the logic of the natural sciences, arguing that this gives rise to an illusion of 
certainty. I introduced the term mindguessing as phenomenologically more adequate. This 
chapter temporarily led away from the opacity phenomenon, but it developed the necessary 
conceptual tools that allowed to detect the defined different aspects in various locales around 
the globe.  
Chapter 3 presented some definitions of empathy as well as Batson’s (2009) list of common 
current usages of it. On this basis, I developed a definition of empathy which emphasized the 
sharing of the ‘how’-aspect of another’s experience. Moreover, I suggested that empathy is 
primarily a compassionate response towards real (i.e., non-fictional), present others. Like in 
chapter 2, the opacity of other minds phenomenon remained unmentioned in this chapter in 
order to first develop a preliminary definition of empathy on a theoretical level.  
In chapter 4, different opacity reports from Melanesia, Polynesia and Central America were 
summarized and analysed with respect to whether they suggest a weak or a strong opacity 
reading, whether aspects of the ‘mindguessing’-tool kit developed in chapter 2 do occur (and 
if so, which) and what they tell us about empathy. While opacity claims are quite common in 
these locales, none of the anthropologists actually endorses a strong opacity interpretation. 
Various aspects like mental state attribution, mental state talk, mental state inference and 
mindguessing are present in these reports – however, they do not tell us anything about false 
belief understanding. This is not surprising, since false belief understanding is 
paradigmatically represented in the experimental setting of a false belief task and difficult to 
prove by observation of everyday life situations. Importantly, the anthropological reports add 
new ideas to the common usages of empathy discussed in chapter 3. They open up new 
perspectives and suggest to extend Batson’s list with LCCP, empathic attunement, bodily 
empathy, projective processes and projective empathy, and finally, empathy as redirected 
attachment. Moreover, some reports (for example from Yap and Central America) suggest 
that people in these places do not only verbally assert opacity, they publicly present an 
“opaque exterior” (Throop, 2008, p. 415) and control their expressiveness. In a certain sense, 
they thus assert the opacity of other minds on a non-verbal level as well. The definition of 
empathy developed in chapter 3 was then adapted to account for these new aspects and 
insights.  
In chapter 5, I focused on Samoa in order to narrow down the opacity of other minds 
phenomenon in one specific locale. After providing exhaustive information on Samoan 
culture, childhood and socialization practices, it was possible to again prove all aspects of the 
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conceptual ‘mindreading’-tool kit except (except false belief understanding) by a closer look 
at the different anthropological contributions from Samoa. Samoans, too, present an opaque 
exterior and endorse a virtue of self-governance concerning the expression of emotions. 
Opacity claims were repeatedly reported from Samoa. In contextualizing these claims, it 
became evident that they should not be interpreted in a strong sense. Mageo’s account that 
empathy in Samoa is redirected attachment and primarily enacted (alofa) allowed us to again 
adapt the definition of empathy. At best, this definition is now culture-fair enough to include a 
variety of emic concepts which are at least closely related to our notion of empathy. I arrived 
at this definition in a spiral-shaped process, where emic concepts of empathy from our own 
culture were used as “imposed etics” in order to derive emic concepts from other places. 
These were then incorporated into the prior definition in order to arrive at an emically 
enriched definition which can again be etically imposed to a new place. Finally, the focus on 
Samoa made it easier to answer what opacity in one specific locale actually is. In Samoa, the 
opacity of other minds phenomenon is composed of four different but interrelated aspects: 1) 
opacity as a dispreference to speculate about others’ mental states especially if they are lower-
ranking, 2) opacity as a defense strategy to reduce one’s accountability, 3) opacity as a 
reflection of Samoans’ focus on aga instead of āmio which makes the assessment of others’ 
mental states less necessary for everyday interactions to function, 4) opacity as a consequence 
of the necessity to repress personal impulses in order to focus on others and group demands. 
These four aspects are different facets of a strong group-orientation and cultural emphasis on 
relatedness. They give rise to opacity and to the demonstration of an opaque exterior, whilst 
Samoans still engage in mindguessing, mental state talk, and so forth. 
At the end of the theoretical part of this work, it appeared as if Robbins and Rumsey’s (2008) 
claim that opacity doctrines ought to force a rethinking of fairly settled approaches like ToM 
and empathy can be easily rejected. Moreover, the introductory chapters of the empirical part 
of this work refer to a study by Callaghan and colleagues (2005) which demonstrated false 
belief understanding among 5-year-old children in Samoa and supports the idea that the onset 
of this ability is universal across cultures. More importantly for the purpose of the present 
work, however, is the fact that this result seems to supply the last missing piece which is 
necessary for a full rejection of the idea that opacity doctrines might force a rethinking of 
ToM. I have already proven many other aspects of ‘mindreading’ in Samoa by a mere look at 
the literature. Callaghan et al.’s (2005) positive false belief result speaks against the idea that 
opacity doctrines might influence ToM. However, things turned out to be more complicated. 
The false belief studies presented in the empirical part of this work are in stark contrast to 
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Callaghan et al.’s results and might again nourish the idea that there is an influence of opacity 
doctrines on ToM. I think that there are three main routes one can follow in order to make 
sense of the theoretical knowledge on Samoa on the one hand and the reported results on the 
other. First, one can doubt the appropriateness of the applied experiments, the quality of their 
execution, one can question the translations and argue that the tasks were not adequately 
adapted. A second possibility is to believe in the false belief results presented in this work and 
to think about how opacity doctrines might influence ToM development although other 
aspects associated with ‘mindreading’ (e.g. mindguessing, mental state attributions, etc.) are 
present in Samoa as well. Third, we can try to think about whether experimental tasks, no 
matter how culture-fair and well-adapted they are, might be inappropriate in non-Western 
places on a more general level. In other words, we can think of experimental work with 
children as a Western practice which is more difficult in places where children are not used to 
it and its culturally specific precursors.  
Let us follow the first route for a moment. In the previous chapter, I have already discussed 
the problematic aspects of my empirical research. For future research, it would be interesting 
to replicate Callaghan et al.’s study using two adults like in the original study and the 
translations applied in the present work. This would help to clarify whether the difference 
between my own results and the ones obtained by Callaghan and colleagues are due to 
translational issues or the slight variation (two kids and one experimenter vs. one kid and two 
experimenters) which I actually considered to be an improvement for reasons already 
discussed. However, there are a lot of studies that report cross-cultural variation in the onset 
of false belief understanding. I have critically analyzed the results for Samoa in Callaghan et 
al.’s study and I do not think that they are very convincing for making the claim that the onset 
of false belief understanding universally occurs across cultures between four and five years of 
age. I do not think that the tasks applied in the present work are less appropriate than other 
tasks applied so far in cross-cultural research for various reasons. First, all translations were 
thoroughly discussed with several Samoans. Second, if we take serious Ochs’ (1988) 
observation that lower-ranking Samoans must sometimes grasp the intention of a higher-
ranking person when receiving an order, then the “Bring-me!”-task should be especially well-
suited for Samoa. Third, control studies in Germany suggest that these tasks generally can be 
understood and passed by children at a comparable age. Even the “Bring-me!”-task was 
passed by German children, although they are not as used as Samoan children to receive 
commands in such a straightforward way. Fourth, the first study which used the Cup-task 
revealed a gradual improvement in false belief understanding with age and is therefore suited 
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for mapping children’s growing understanding. The fact that many children gave the correct 
answer and quickly responded with an impish smile supports my argument that this task can 
be understood by Samoan children. Importantly, Samoan children do gradually develop false 
belief understanding in the course of development – at least if we take the results of Study 1 at 
face value. This is important, since it proves the universal development of this capacity. 
The second possibility to make sense of the present results against the background of opacity 
in Samoa is to think about via which pathways it might influence children’s development of 
false belief understanding. In the previous chapter, I have argued that one would either expect 
the number of siblings in Samoa to influence children’s false belief understanding in a 
positive direction, or the probable de-emphasis of mental state talk to negatively influence it. 
The results discussed in the previous chapter are more in line with the latter expectation. Yet, 
I am not sure whether this gives us the whole story. Wu and Keysar (2007) compared mental 
perspective taking between Chinese and American adults. They argue that culture could affect 
perspective taking in two opposing ways and use the “representational hypothesis” and the 
“attentional hypothesis” to refer to these two possibilities (ibid., p. 601). According to the 
first, people in interdependent cultures may be “more likely to confound their own perspective 
with that of the other than are members of a Western, independent-selves culture” (ibid.). In 
this view, Chinese would be worse perspective takers than Americans. The second hypothesis 
predicts that Chinese would be better, since interdependence might lead one to focus one’s 
attention on others and therefore away from the self. In this study, the Chinese participants 
outperformed their American counterparts, which is interpreted by the authors as a strong 
support for the “attentional hypothesis”. Remember that Samoans teach their children from 
very early on to focus their attention on others (Gerber, 1985; Mageo, 1998; Ochs, 1988; 
Shore, 1982). According to the attentional hypothesis and against the background of the study 
by Wu and Keysar, we would expect Samoan adults to perform especially well on adult ToM 
tasks. Consider another study: Sabbagh and Seamans (2008) examined whether adults’ theory 
of mind skills are transmitted intergenerationally to their children. They investigated parent-
child dyads at two points of time: when children were about 3 years old and 6 months later. 
Sabbagh and Seamans found a significant correlation between parents’ and children’s theory 
of mind scores and could predict children’s performance on a scaled battery of ToM tasks by 
their parents’ performance on adult ToM tasks. The authors assume that this transmission 
does also take place via the discussion of mental states in everyday conversations.  
Now if theory of mind skills are transmitted from parents to children (Sabbagh & Seamans, 
2008), and if adults in more interdependent cultures are expected to perform better on ToM 
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tasks than those in more independent cultures (Wu & Keysar, 2007), then the question arises 
why Samoan children perform worse than their counterparts in Germany. Something in this 
picture most either be wrong or missing. Since the anthropological reports on Samoa confirm 
that Samoans must learn to direct their attention to others from very early on, there are three 
possibilities to think of Wu and Keysar’s findings and their relationship to what has been said 
on Samoa. First, the “attentional hypothesis” might be wrong or not be linked to ToM 
understanding. From this point of view, the results of Wu and Keysar (2007) must be 
explained differently. Second, the “attentional hypothesis” might be correct and we would 
expect Samoan adults to perform especially well on ToM tasks. We would then have to make 
sense of the fact that adults perform well while Samoan children do not, although already 
children have to attend carefully to others (Ochs, 1988). Third, the “attentional hypothesis” 
might not necessarily be linked to ToM understanding. Although people in Samoa might 
indeed focus on other people, this orientation might focus on aga, i.e., socially appropriate 
and expected behaviour. It is certainly an interesting question for further research to ask under 
which conditions a focus on others enhances capacities associated with ‘mindreading’ and 
under which conditions it does not. Fourth, other influential factors like opacity doctrines 
might be stronger and override the positive effect which a focus on others would normally 
have. Yet we have seen that many other aspects associated with ‘mindreading’ are present in 
Samoa: as argued above, Samoans attribute and infer mental states, they engage in mental 
state talk and mindguessing, and they frankly admitted that they engage in mindguessing 
when I explicitly asked them. At this point, however, we have to rethink the kind of evidence 
for these ‘mindreading’-practices. Importantly, noticing that all this occurs does not tell us 
very much about the quality of how this occurs. To give an example: if mental state 
attributions occur both in Culture A and Culture B, this does not tell us very much about the 
qualitative dimension of these attributions. If people in Culture A say about someone who is 
mentally ill that he is crazy, that he is of his rocker and that he has lost his marbles, they 
clearly attribute mental states. However, these kinds of attributions are qualitatively quite 
different from what people in Culture B might say: that he is suffering from his memories of 
the bus accident which only he survived, that he is haunted by the question whether he might 
have helped that woman who still moved her head for a while, that he feels culpable and tries 
to atone for it by engaging in specific behaviours and so forth. In this work, I did not explore 
this qualitative dimension. I analysed the anthropological reports and searched for examples 
of mental state attribution, perspective taking, mindguessing, etc. This was an important first 
step, since proving that all these practices associated with ‘mindreading’ occur in a place 
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where people assert opacity helps us to interpret these claims in a weak sense. However, 
Samoan caregivers cannot teach their children to demonstrate an opaque exterior and at the 
same time treat mental states in the same way as people in places where transparent 
expression is valued (cf. von Poser, 2009). Therefore, I argue that mental state talk, mental 
state attributions and mindguessing – although all this clearly occurs in Samoa – differ 
qualitatively from how these practices occur in other places. However, more qualitative 
research is needed in order to find out whether and how these practices differ qualitatively. 
Note that various studies mentioned in the previous chapter document the positive influence 
of caregivers’ mental state talk on ToM. Yet how exactly this influence operates on false 
belief understanding is an open question. Against the background of Samoan socialization, we 
would expect Samoan mental state talk to be less concerned with what children desire or feel 
or what might annoy them. Yet consider what false belief understanding is about: it is about 
knowing that people might falsely believe something to be the case and act on the basis of this 
believe. It boils down to understanding that someone who has not seen that the cooking pot 
was moved to the village’s fresh water pool will still believe it to be close to the hearth where 
it usually is. Given all the differences in socialization and folk psychology mentioned above – 
it is hard to believe, at least in my view, that Samoan children, not to mention adults, should 
have problems with this kind of understanding. Like in Yap or among the Tzotzil Maya, 
where opaque exteriors and strategies of concealment give rise to a hightened preoccupation 
with what really goes on in others, I would expect mindguessing to be even more prominent 
in Samoa than in places where transparent expression is valued. If we take the present results 
seriously, however, then we have to make sense of the fact that Samoans might engage more 
in mindguessing while their children have more problems with another aspect of 
‘mindreading’, namely, false belief understanding. In other words, capacities associated with 
one and the same term might be differently developed across cultures. In this view, 
‘mindreading’ would not be a single capacity any more in which all aspects of it develop 
together. It might even be possible that in places where mindguessing is very common due to 
prevailing strategies of concealment, people might not believe in the possibility of certain 
knowledge – and we have seen in the second chapter that false belief understanding is one of 
the very rare situations in which (at least the illusion of) certain knowledge is possible. This 
would be a very interesting and important result of these analyses, since it suggests to think of 
mindguessing and more certain forms of mental state inference like false belief understanding 
as separate. Finally, if we take the results at face value and interpret them as a delay in false 
belief understanding, this strongly relativizes the importance of it. If even 50% of all 8-year-
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olds do not pass this task, it cannot be as important for normal social interactions as some 
authors think (cf. Spaulding, 2010), since 8-year-old Samoans are in many respects much 
more mature than their Western counterparts: they have learned to control their impulses and 
feelings, they care for younger siblings, serve higher-ranking people, have their first 
experiences with English language, are navigating between the Western world as it is 
represented in formal schooling contexts and Samoan culture in their villages and take over a 
variety of duties. In a nutshell, if we assume that opacity doctrines might indeed influence 
Samoan children’s false belief understanding, I think that the qualitative dimension of mental 
state talk and the lack of absence experiences are factors in Samoan children’s life that might 
be influential and worth investigating in future research. 
Finally, we can interpret the results and their relationship to what has been said so far on 
opacity in Samoa as evidence for a more general inappropriateness of experimental setups in 
non-Western places. In this view, the present results would not necessarily speak for a later 
acquisition of false belief understanding. Duranti and Ochs (1986) pointed out that Samoan 
parents do not engage in labelling routines with small children. They do not ask children any 
questions to which the caregiver already knows the answer. Note that this is precisely what 
happens in many experimental paradigms. According to Gauvain (1998), such practice is a 
“mainstay of discourse in school” (ibid., p. 40) in Western countries, but not necessarily in 
other places. In Western communities, schooling and forms of communication, knowledge 
acquisition and transmission which are typical for schooling contexts do also influence other 
aspects of life. That caregivers in these communities ask their children questions to which 
they already know the answer is a precursor of similar practices in school settings. Yet due to 
the relative unimportance of personal intention in Samoa and the dispreference for guessing at 
what is going on in others, “activities such as test questions, riddles, and guessing games of 
the Twenty Questions and I Spy variety” (Ochs, 1988, p. 143) are rare, since they “all involve 
explicit guessing at what the speaker has in mind” (ibid.). Vinden was surprised by the fact 
that Junín Quechua children passed an appearance-reality task (which is considered to require 
ToM) while failing a change of location task and states: “One might want to argue that there 
is something in the nature of the tasks themselves that is producing this unusual result” 
(Vinden, 1996, p. 1714).  
Our third route to make sense of the false belief results presented in this work is thus very 
different from the second one: instead of interpreting Samoan children’s difficulties with false 
belief as evidence for the influence of opacity doctrines, the peculiarity of experimental tasks 
and their background in practices that are typical for Western communities suggest that they 
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might themselves be a Western practice. In this view, even the best cultural adaptation of a 
task would not change the fact that Western children are more used to experiments than for 
example Samoan children. This might alternatively explain why the only aspect that could not 
be easily demonstrated to occur in Samoa – false belief understanding – is also the only one 
which is closely linked to experimental setups. It must be mentioned, however, that a number 
of hiding games was reported for Samoan children’s playing behaviour (Schwartz, 1992), 
indicating that they are at least familiar with similar contexts than those enacted in the studies 
of this work. Let us think about the idea to consider experimental tasks as Western practice in 
a more adventurous way. If children’s failure in a true belief condition must be interpreted as 
a sign that the task was not good or not easily understandable for children in a certain culture 
– what kind of evidence, then, could show that experimental tasks of this kind are strange for 
those children in general? In concluding that the task was not good enough, we still stick to 
the belief that an optimally adapted task can be designed in principle, that experimental setups 
are universally applicable as long as they are culture-fair. But what if the whole idea of 
experimental tasks is not culture-fair? Let us follow this line of thought. What would count as 
supporting evidence for such a claim? Note, that many cross-cultural studies on false belief 
did not include a true belief condition. To my knowledge, no cross-cultural study on false 
belief understanding has used a true belief condition at all. Failure in these tasks was 
interpreted as a false belief delay (Naito & Koyama, 2006) or as a cultural orientation on 
perceivable actions (Vinden, 1996). Imagine a true belief task had been included in these 
studies and imagine that about one third of the Japanese children had failed the true belief 
condition like in the present study. Would this suddenly render these tasks and the published 
results inadequate? What would this suggest? That my results would be more convincing and 
clearly speak for a false belief delay of Samoan children if I had not included a true belief 
condition? Clearly, the present results cannot support or even prove this. Another task might 
precisely demonstrate that 3-year-old Samoans pass the true and fail the false belief condition, 
while the 5- and 6-year-olds pass both. Nevertheless, I think it is important for the future of 
cross-cultural psychology and for an adequate interdisciplinary investigation of phenomena 
such as the opacity of others minds, to question what we do normally not dare to question: our 
own research methodologies, especially the logic of experimental studies which is so 
appealing.  
I have exhaustively discussed three possible routes we can follow to make sense of the present 
false belief results and their relationship to what has been presented in the theoretical part of 
this work. Summing up, I think that the second and the third routes are the most interesting 
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and plausible ones. If opacity doctrines should really influence the development of false belief 
understanding, qualitative aspects of mental state talk in children’s environment and their 
experience with absences should be in the focus of future studies. Moreover, the integration of 
true belief conditions in false belief tasks of the explicit verbal prediction type (which were 
hitherto run without true belief conditions), might either confirm the results of existing cross-
cultural studies on ToM, or point into a radically new direction which might lead us to rethink 
whether experimental tasks should really be in the center of cross-cultural psychological 
research. This leads to a final question: did I use adequate methods for my purpose of 
clarifying the relationship between opacity, ‘mindreading’ and empathy? The answer is: Yes, 
but I did not apply all adequate methods. I think that the conceptual part of this work is an 
important first step for future research on this relationship. In developing a conceptual 
‘mindreading’ tool kit, it was possible to prove different aspects of it by a mere look at the 
existing anthropological reports. With respect to false belief understanding, I clearly applied 
the adequate methods, although anthropologists like Duranti (2008) would rather opt for 
proving this kind of understanding in the field. Yet since the relationship between opacity, 
‘mindreading’ and empathy must be investigated with an interdisciplinary approach, I clearly 
did not use all adequate methodologies. I focused on conceptual work, text analyses and on 
experimental false belief studies. Conversation analyses, qualitative interviews, classical 
anthropological fieldwork and joint research programmes where psychologists and 
anthropologistst cooperate (Funke, 2010) are clearly necessary and would add important 
information – but this was unfortunately not within the realm of possibilities.  
I will finish with what I consider to be most important: Samoa is not anything like the 
fictional ‘opacity island’ mentioned in the introductory chapter. On the contrary. Complex 
forms of interaction and hierarchical principles affect Samoan children’s early experience. 
They have to focus on others and learn to read others in terms of their social role (cf. McGeer, 
2007). Mental state inference and –attribution, mental state talk and mindguessing clearly 
occur in Samoa. Moreover, aspects of empathy like perspective taking and LCCP are common 
in Samoa. However, the assertion of opacity and the presentation of an opaque exterior seem 
to complicate dyadic forms of empathy. At the same time, a group-oriented form of empathy 
makes people to identify with a group and to enact empathy as alofa (cf. Von Poser, 2009, 
forthcoming). Interestingly, opaque exteriors should both enhance mindguessing and make 
empathy more difficult. I have repeatedly argued that the enactment of social opacity 
presupposes knowing what it is that must be concealed. A similar picture results from other 
places in the Pacific and in Central America. Robbins and Rumsey (2008) did a good job: 
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they convincingly introduced cultural anthropology as an interesting discipline which has 
something to contribute to the ongoing discussion between psychologists, philosophers, and 
neuroscientists on how we come to understand other minds. They caught our attention by 
claiming that opacity doctrines ought to force a rethinking of our theories of mind and 
empathy. Yet they might have claimed a little bit too much. The present work demonstrated 
that opacity doctrines do not “fundamentally contradict social scientific models that assume 
such knowledge is possible” (Robbins & Rumsey, 2008, p. 408; emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, the anthropological contributions are important. They should lead us to rethink 
the scope of our theories, since assessing what is in another’s mind indeed might be less 
relevant in places where social roles are more emphasized, for example. Instead of doing 
away with existing theories and concepts, then, we should broaden them to allow for the 
inclusion of concepts from other places. Some might fear that the acknowledgment of the 
importance of culture leads us away from discovering the ‘true universal laws’ of the human 
psyche. Yet if we allow for very different forms of empathy and social organization to inform 
our theories, we still can, somehow paradoxically, arrive at statements that can claim to be 
universally valid. May I give an example? Here is such a statement: There are no ‘opacity 
islands’. 
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Appendix A – Instructions in English and Samoan 
Cup-task 
 
To Child 1: 
1) “Put the toy under one of the cups.” 
Tu‘u le loi i lalo o se ipu. 
2) “Please go outside and wait there.” 
Alu i fafo. Fa‘atali i tua o le faitoto‘a. 
 
To Child 2: 
1) “Where is the toy?” 
O fea le loi? 
2) “Let’s play a trick on (NAME OF CHILD 1). Hide the toy under another cup.”  
Se‘i fa‘ase‘e (NAME OF CHILD 1). Tu‘u le loi i lalo o se isi ipu. 
3) “Where will (NAME OF CHILD 1) look for the toy when (s)he comes back?” 
Study 1: O fea la e sau nei (NAME OF CHILD 1) su‘e ai le loi? 
Study 2: A toe sau (NAME OF CHILD 1), o fea o ipu e muamua tago ai? 
 
 
Bring-me!-task 
 
True belief condition:  
E1: Give me the pencil in this box (pointing). I want to write a word with this colour (holding 
up the pencil).  
 Aumai le penivali o i totonu o le pusa (lea). 
 Do you know the name of this colour? (E1 writes some words on his note pad). 
O le a le lanu lea? 
 Take the pencil and put it back into the box. 
 Tago e tu´u i totonu o le pusa. 
 AFTER FAMILIARIZATION: 
 I am done! 
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 Ia! O lea ua uma. 
E1 stands up and waits beside the table while E2 takes a seat. 
E2: Look, I exchange the pencils. I put the black pencil into this box and the red pencil into 
that one. 
 Va´ai. Ua ou suia lanu. Ou te tu´u le lanu uliuli i le isi pusa a´o le lanu mūmū i le isi 
pusa. 
E1: I am back in two minutes. (leaves the room) 
 Se´i ou te toe sau i se lua minute. 
E2 remains seated, doing nothing, not communicating with the child. 
E1 comes back. 
E1: I want to write another word with the colour in this box (pointing). Wait a minute and 
then bring it outside to me. 
 Ou te toe fia tusi se upu i le lanu lea o i totonu o le pusa (pointing). Fa´atali mo se minute 
ona aumai ai lea i fafo iate a´u. 
E1 leaves again. 
E2: Which pencil does (NAME OF E1) want? Show it to me. Touch the box. 
O le a le penivali e mana´o iai (NAME OF E1)? Fa´asino mai. Tago le pusa.  
E1 comes back. 
E1:  I want to write another word with the colour in this box (pointing). Give it to me. 
  Ou te toe fia tusi se upu i le lanu lea o i totonu o le pusa (pointing). Aumai. 
 
False belief condition: 
E1: Give me the pencil in this box (pointing). I want to write a word with this colour (holding 
up the pencil).  
 Aumai le penivali o i totonu o le pusa (lea). 
 Do you know the name of this colour? (E1 writes some words on his note pad). 
 O le a le lanu lea? 
 Take the pencil and put it back into the box. 
 AFTER FAMILIARIZATION: 
 I am done! I am back in a minute. (leaves the room) 
 Ia! O lea ua uma. Se´i ou te toe sau i se lua minute. 
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E2 takes a seat. 
E2: Look, let’s play a trick on (Name OF E1). I exchange the pencils. I put the black pencil 
into this box and the red pencil into that one. (NAME OF E1) doesn’t see this. 
 Va´ai. Se´i fa´ase´e Anitele´a. Ua ou suia lanu. Ou te tu´u le lanu uliuli i le isi pusa a´o le 
lanu mūmū i le isi pusa. E le´o va´ai iai Anitele´a. 
E1 comes back. 
E1: I want to write another word with the colour in this box (pointing). Wait a minute and 
then bring it outside to me. 
 Ou te toe fia tusi se upu i le lanu lea o i totonu o le pusa. Fa´atali mo se minute ona 
aumai ai lea i fafo iate a´u. 
E1 leaves again. 
E2: Which pencil does (NAME OF E1) want? Show it to me. Touch the box. 
 O le a le penivali e mana´o iai (NAME OF E1)? Fa´asino mai. Tago le pusa.  
E1 comes back. 
E1: I want to write another word with the colour in this box (pointing). Give it to me. 
 Ou te toe fia tusi se upu i le lanu lea o i totonu o le pusa (pointing). Aumai.
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